University of Tennessee, Knoxville

TRACE: Tennessee Research and Creative
Exchange
Doctoral Dissertations

Graduate School

5-2018

Three Essays in Public Economics
Jinseong Park
University of Tennessee, jpark61@vols.utk.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_graddiss

Recommended Citation
Park, Jinseong, "Three Essays in Public Economics. " PhD diss., University of Tennessee, 2018.
https://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_graddiss/4972

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at TRACE: Tennessee
Research and Creative Exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Doctoral Dissertations by an authorized
administrator of TRACE: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange. For more information, please contact
trace@utk.edu.

To the Graduate Council:
I am submitting herewith a dissertation written by Jinseong Park entitled "Three Essays in
Public Economics." I have examined the final electronic copy of this dissertation for form and
content and recommend that it be accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree of Doctor of Philosophy, with a major in Economics.
Donald J. Bruce, Major Professor
We have read this dissertation and recommend its acceptance:
Celeste K. Carruthers, LeAnn Luna, Marianne H. Wanamaker
Accepted for the Council:
Dixie L. Thompson
Vice Provost and Dean of the Graduate School
(Original signatures are on file with official student records.)

Three Essays in Public Economics

A Dissertation Presented for the
Doctor of Philosophy
Degree
The University of Tennessee, Knoxville

Jinseong Park
May 2018

c by Jinseong Park, 2018
All Rights Reserved.

ii

I dedicate this dissertation to my loving wife
Seo Hee Choi
who has been the biggest support to my journey.

iii

Acknowledgments
I would like to thank my committee members, Dr. Donald Bruce, Dr. Marianne
Wanamaker, Dr. Celeste Carruthers, and Dr. LeAnn Luna, for their guidance and support
throughout my dissertation. They have shared their knowledge and experiences, and opened
up many opportunities for me to grow as an independent scholar.
I would also like to thank professors, colleagues, staffs in the Department of Economics
and the Boyd Center for Business and Economic Research. In particular, I would like
to thank Dr. William Fox, Dr. Scott Gilpatric, Dr. Enda Hargaden, Dr. Matthew Harris,
Dr. Lawrence Kessler, Dr. Mohammed Mohsin, Dr. Matthew Murray, Dr. William Neilson,
Dr. Maria Padilla-Romo, Dr. Rudy Santore, Dr. Georg Schaur, Dr. Christian Vossler, Bilal
Celik, Ryan Farley, Beth Glenn, Ye Hong, Bongkyun Kim, Sangwon Lee, Jing Li, Sang
Soo Park, Yancheng Xiao, Lia Yin, Brittany Blair, Betty Drinnen, Tammy Lemon, Sherri
Pinkston, Emily Pratt for their advice, help, and support.
Thank my wife, Seo Hee Choi, and two daughters, Junhee and Junghyun, for their love
and understanding. Thank my mother, father, parents-in-law for their love and support.
Lastly, my special thanks go to Dr. Byong Hyong Bahk and Dr. Min-Hong Oh at Dong-A
University who encouraged me to study abroad and helped me prepare for the graduate
school.

iv

Abstract
My dissertation consists of three essays in public economics. The first essay explores the
role of parental wealth on school-to-work transitions and labor market outcomes of college
graduates. I rely on quasi-experimental variation generated by short-run housing market
fluctuations in South Korea during the 2000s. I find that a one percent increase in parental
housing wealth reduces the employment hazard of their children by one percent. The result
is mainly driven by young individuals who took additional years of schooling after college
graduation. I also find some evidence that a greater level of parental wealth improves job
security. The second essay, which is a joint work, examines whether the U.S. Department
of Defense 1033 program crowds out police protection expenditure of localities. We exploit
plausibly exogenous variation in item availability across time interacted with cross-sectional
variation in transaction costs and land area. We find that items received through the 1033
program do not crowd out local police spending. The third essay documents evidence of
consumption externalities from upper-income households to lower-income households using
a series of tax reforms during the Bush administration as a natural experiment. I find
that consumption externalities generated by the tax reforms raised quarterly consumption
of lower-income households by more than 400 U.S. dollars. The increase was mainly driven
by consumption of visible goods such as housing and vehicle. The effect of consumption
externalities was stronger for lower-income households who were closer to upper-income
households in the income distribution.
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Chapter 1
Parental Wealth, Time to First Job,
and Labor Market Outcomes:
Evidence from Housing Wealth
Shocks in South Korea
I

Introduction
For young adults who make transitions from school to work, financial resources of parents

can work as insurance against labor market risks [35]. When students enter the labor market,
they usually have limited resources to manage expenses that are incurred from the job search.
Monetary support from parents can help first-time job seekers smooth consumption while
searching for a job, allowing them to be more selective in accepting job offers. This selectivity
margin prolongs job search durations [27]. On the other hand, a longer search has its own
costs in terms of human capital depreciation, foregone on-the-job training, and/or a reduction
in job availability. These factors render so-called negative duration dependence, which means
that a longer search duration lowers the probability of finding a job (for example, Kroft et al.

1

[61]). The adverse effects of long-term unemployment may prevent young job seekers from
being overly selective.1
This paper explores whether parental wealth affects the time that it takes for college
graduates to land a first job and corresponding labor market outcomes. While economists
pay enormous attention to the role of education as a vehicle for intergenerational mobility
(see Lefgren et al. [66], Hilger [48], Richey and Rosburg [85] for recent evidence), a better
education alone does not guarantee a quality job, which finally turns human capital into
a paycheck. The role of parental wealth as a private safety net against labor market risks
can be an important but rarely investigated channel of intergenerational transmission of
wealth. Additionally, one’s early labor market experience could have a long-lasting impact
on subsequent labor market outcomes Burgess et al. [17], Kondo [58] and the negative impact
is not easily mitigated by additional human capital accumulation in the following periods
[78].
In the absence of a randomized experiment, it is challenging to identify the causal effect of
parental wealth on job search and labor market outcomes of their children. Any correlation
between parental wealth and unobserved factors such as abilities [93], time preferences [28],
or qualities of informal networks [53, 9] gives rise to endogeneity. To address potential
endogeneity, I exploit quasi-experimental variation in parental housing wealth generated by
short-run housing market fluctuations within municipalities. The approach is similar to
Lovenheim [71] and Lovenheim and Reynolds [73], except that I use variation in home prices
per square meter rather than total home prices. In other words, I control for variation in
home size across households because it might be correlated with factors mentioned above.
Considering the idiosyncratic nature of the housing market, the variation that I exploit is
arguably exogenous, especially conditional on municipality fixed effects as well as individual
and parental characteristics. Indeed, the data supports that the variation is not associated
with the ranking of college from which an individual graduated or the probability of using
informal networks to find a job.
1

Nekoei and Weber [79] argue that the effect of unemployment insurance on wages, not on durations,
depends on the relative importance between the selectivity effect and the duration dependence effect.
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To answer this question, I link unique survey data from the Graduates Occupational
Mobility Survey (GOMS) to administrative data on assessed housing values from South
Korea. Using a two-step control function approach, I find that a one percent increase in
estimated parental housing wealth reduces the employment hazard of their children by about
one percent. I also find that the effect is concentrated on male young adults and those from
high-income households. Consistent with many empirical studies, parental housing wealth
does not affect wages at the first job, or even wages in the longer run [18, 35]. However, a
greater level of parental wealth lowers the probability of working in a large firm and raises the
probability of working in the public sector. I further explore the mechanisms through which
parental housing wealth affects search spells. Results indicate that an exogenous increase
in parental housing wealth encourages young adults to receive post-college education, in
particular those who had a time gap between college graduation and post-college enrollment.2
The estimate implies that the effect of parental housing wealth accounts for one third of
additional schooling after graduating from college. This evidence mirrors Barr and Turner
[7] who show that extending UI benefits increases college enrollment in the United States.
Studying the case of South Korea has several benefits. First, the GOMS data provides a
relatively large sample size and contains detailed information on education, school-to-work
transitions, and early career development of college graduates. The GOMS also collects
data on self-reported reservation wages and job-finding routes, which are rarely available
from other data sources. Second, the role of family support, if it exists, should be stronger
in South Korea where about 69 percent of 25-34 years-olds completed tertiary education
according to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [81]. Third,
due to fierce competition for jobs and a tight labor market, the demand for post-college
investment in job preparation is rapidly growing [80], making young adults’ reliance on
their parents stronger. Finally, South Korea has recently launched a program that provides
financial support of 300,000 Korean Won (slightly less than $260 U.S. dollars) for up to
three months to young individuals who participate in a government training program called
the Youth Employment Success Package. While a government subsidy can have a different
2

Most young individuals in my sample enrolled in graduate schools, but about 4.4 percent of those who
received post-college education enrolled in college.

3

impact than parental wealth, the findings of this paper shed light on whether the existence
of insurance affects job search behavior of young individuals and labor market outcomes.
This paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First of all, I provide the first
causal evidence of the effect of parental wealth on time to a first job of their children. Fradkin
et al. [35] also consider the role of family insurance for first-time job seekers in Belgium,
but the authors focus on the labor supply of young adults measured by total days worked
rather than search durations. I employ a different identification strategy with different data
in a very different context. Second, the rich information in the GOMS data allows me to
explore potential mechanisms through which parental wealth influences search spells of young
adults. More broadly, I document new evidence of the effects of insurance on labor market
outcomes. Until recently, researchers have not found evidence that extending UI benefits
improves employment outcomes, mostly measured by wages [18, 64, 102]. However, a couple
of recent studies find that the UI benefit extensions affect reemployment wages negatively
[91] or positively [79]. The finding of this paper adds more evidence regarding the role of
insurance in shaping search outcomes.
This paper is not without limitations. First, although the GOMS collects data on
some characteristics of a residential home of parents, it does not collect data on housing
wealth. To overcome this limitation, I estimate parental housing values based on household
characteristics, housing characteristics, and residential locations of households. Results
from the reduced-form estimation, which do not rely on the imputation, are qualitatively
similar to results from the control function approach. It is also worth emphasizing that
measurement errors generated from the imputation would work against finding the effect of
parental housing wealth on outcomes of interest. Second, I focus on a selected subsample of
young adults, especially those who were living with their parents three to four years after
college graduation. However, these individuals could be the population of policy interest if
they moved back to their parents’ home after failing to find a job [55]. I also show that
individuals in my estimation sample are similar to those in the full sample in terms of
observed characteristics.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section II develops a simple framework to motivate the
empirical analysis of this paper. Section III provides background information regarding the
4

youth labor market in South Korea in 2000s. Section IV describes data sources, housing
wealth imputation process, duration calculations, and sample selection criteria. Section V
proposes an empirical strategy. Section VI explores the effect of parental wealth on time-tofirst-job of college graduates as well as robustness and heterogeneity. Section VII examines
the role of parental housing wealth in determining labor market outcomes and Section VIII
investigates potential channels through which parental housing wealth influences job search
behaviors of their children. Section IX concludes.

II

A simple framework
To motivate my empirics, I develop a simple model that describes a first job search

process, based on Card et al. [18] and Chetty [22]. The authors greatly simplify the model
suggested by Lentz and Trans [67] by assuming that (1) once an individual finds a job, it lasts
forever as in Danforth [27] and (2) wages are exogenously given. Since I only consider a single
unemployment spell for each individual, which is the time to a first job, this simplication is
well-suited for the purpose of this study.
Consider a discrete time finite horizon model where δ represents a subjective rate of time
preference and r represents an interest rate, which is time-invariant. The utility function is
separable in consumption, ct , and search effort, st . Unlike experienced workers, first-time
job seekers are not eligible for unemployment insurance (UI) benefits. Instead, I assume that
an individual receives a fixed amount of unconditional transfer, b, from his parents in every
period until he finds a job. While the transfer provides consumption smoothing benefits,
suppose that it also create disutility from being dependent. For example, if an individual
lives together with his parents, the costs come from the shared residence [55]. If an individual
does not live with his parents, the disutility comes from reduced consumption of his parents
under other regarding preferences or any discomfort from “not standing on his feet.” The
utility function is given as:
u(ct , st , b) = φ(ct ) − ψ(st ) − η(b)

5

(1.1)

where φ0 (·) > 0, φ00 (·) < 0, ψ 0 (·) > 0, ψ 00 (·) > 0, η 0 (·) > 0, η 00 (·) > 0, by assumption. For
further simplification, search effort st is normalized to the probability of getting a job in the
current period t.
Suppose that an individual enters the labor market and starts looking for a job at t = 0.
In each period, he chooses the intensity of search st . If search is successful, he begins
working immediately and earns wage rate of wt . Otherwise, he receives financial support
from his parents. Let cet and cut denote the optimal consumption choice under employment
and unemployment, respectively.
The value function for an individual who finds a job is then
Vte (at ) = max φ(at −
at+1 ≥L

at+1
1
+ wt ) +
Vt+1 (at+1 )
1+r
1+δ

(1.2)

where L denotes the borrowing limit imposed by the capital market and a denotes his own
assets. The first term on the right hand side represents the utility of consumption in period
t where cet is replaced with at −

at+1
1+r

+ wt using the recursive budget constraint. The second

term implies the present value of optimal lifetime utility from t + 1 up to T .
The value function for an individual who fails to find a job is
Vtu (at ) = max φ(at −
at+1 ≥L

at+1
1
+ b) +
Jt+1 (at+1 )
1+r
1+δ

(1.3)

where
e
u
Jt+1 (at+1 ) = max st+1 Vt+1
(at+1 ) + (1 − st+1 )Vt+1
− ψ(st+1 ) − η(b)
st+1

(1.4)

is the expected utility of entering period t + 1 without having a job.
To maximize his expected utility at the beginning of period t, an unemployed individual
should choose the optimal search effort s∗t that satisfies the following optimal condition:
ψ 0 (s∗t ) = Vte (at ) − Vtu (at )

(1.5)

The condition implies that the marginal cost of search should be equal to the utility
difference from the employment and unemployment status, or to put it differently, the
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marginal utility of being employed at the optimal level of search. A simple comparative
static produces a testable hypothesis regarding the effect of parental transfers on one’s search
effort. That is,
∂s∗t
φ0 (cut ) − η 0 (b)
=−
≶0
∂b
ψ 00 (s∗t )

(1.6)

Equation (1.6) suggests that the effect of parental transfers depends on two competing
forces, the consumption smoothing benefit while searching for a job and the psychological
cost of being dependent on his parents. While Chetty [22] predicts that an exogenous increase
in individual wealth leads to a reduction in search effort, my model implies that the role of
parental support on job search effort of their children is uncertain. When one’s disutility from
receiving parental support is completely insensitive to changes in the level of the transfer
(i.e., η 0 (b) = 0), the result is exactly the same as Chetty [22]. On the other hand, if the
disutility from being dependent dominates the consumption smoothing benefit, an increase
in parental transfer can facilitate one’s school-to-work transition.

III

Youth labor market in South Korea in 2000s

South Korea is famous for its education fever [82]. The college enrollment rate in South
Korea jumped from 33.2 percent in 1990 to 79 percent in 2010 [59]. Despite the surge in the
supply of highly educated labor force, the economy could not keep up with the trend, failing
to generate a sufficient number of decent jobs. Figure 1.1 depicts the trend in unemployment
among young adults aged between 15 and 29, which does not seem particularly troublesome
compared to other countries. But the trend in the labor force participation rates reveals the
problem: a nontrivial share of South Korean youth does not actively look for a job.
There are several factors that explain a low youth labor force participation in South
Korea. Young individuals attending schools or preparing for job-related exams account for
a large share of them [52]. In addition to the high college enrollment rate, 8.9 percent of
4-year university graduates went to graduate school in 2010. At the same time, roughly ten
percent of young adults (aged between 15 and 29) who were not in the labor force prepared
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Figure 1.1: Trends in unemployment and labor force participation in
South Korea
Note: The figure depicts trends in unemployment and labor force participation among
individuals aged between 15 to 29. Source: Economically Active Population Survey,
2000-2010

for job-related exams in 2010 [60].3 However, only a very small number of individuals can
pass the exams. For example, the pass rate of civil service exams for general public official
positions was 1.35 percent in 2011 [76]. Despite the low chance of success, many South
Korean youth still prefer to work in the public sector due to high job security and other
benefits it provides [65]. Substantial anecdotal evidence suggests that it is common for exam
takers to prepare for an exam more than a year [56]. Because both additional schooling
and preparing for job-related exams are so costly that young individuals cannot afford them
by themselves, parental support can be crucial in determining time to a first job and labor
market outcomes.
3

Statistics Korea defines six categories of job-related exams: exams for enterprises, media and public
enterprises, teachers, general public officials, high-ranking public officials and professional jobs, and
technicians and others. In 2010, young individuals who prepare for civil servant exams for general public
official positions account for 32.3 percent among the population of youth preparing for job entrance exams
[98].
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IV
IV.A

Data
The Graduates Occupational Mobility Survey (GOMS)

The Graduates Occupational Mobility Survey (GOMS) was first implemented in 2006.
The survey is designed to alleviate mismatch between labor supply and demand, and to help
students make major choices by providing up-to-date information on Korean labor markets.
The GOMS samples about 18,000 college graduates each year, which cover approximately
3-4 percent of the population of interest. Individuals are interviewed either 18 months or
24 months after their graduation, depending on whether they graduate in August or in
February. By the time of the survey, most graduates have completed transitions from school
to work.4 At the beginning, the GOMS implemented a follow-up survey two years after the
initial survey, but it has become a cross-sectional survey since 2011. For the purpose of
this study, I use the panel waves surveyed from 2009 to 2011, which cover individuals who
graduated from college between August 2007 to February 2010.
The survey collects data on school experience, job preparation, and early employment
history of recent college graduates. In particular, the GOMS asks survey participants about
their reservation wages and routes through which they obtained the jobs. The richness of
information allows me to explore mechanisms through which parental housing wealth might
influence job search and outcomes of the graduates. The GOMS also contains detailed
information on parental characteristics, including their combined income levels, occupations,
and educational attainments.5
Although the GOMS is well-suited for the purposes of my research in many dimensions,
there are limitations of using the data as well. First, the GOMS does not have information
on parental housing wealth, which is the variable of interest. To overcome this limitation, I
estimate the housing wealth using data on household characteristics, housing characteristics,
and residential locations of households. Section IV.B discusses the estimation procedure in
4

For example, 83.2 percent of the GOMS participants between the survey year 2009 to 2011 were either
employed (74.6 percent) or enrolled in schools (8.6 percent) when they were interviewed.
5
The survey asks combined income levels of parents at two different points in time: (i) when their children
entered college and (ii) when they were interviewed. In the analysis, I only use the former information.
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detail. Moreover, I can observe home ownership status of parents and their housing types
only for young adults who lived with their parents three and a half years (or four years
for those graduated in August) after graduation.67 This raises a concern regarding sample
selection bias. I discuss issues related to sample selection in Section IV.D.

IV.B

Parental housing wealth estimation

To impute parental housing wealth, I use data from the Korea Housing Survey (KHS).
Starting from 2006, the KHS interviews approximately 30,0000 households every two years
and asks questions regarding characteristics of past/current residential homes, moving
history, housing preferences, etc. The survey also collects household characteristics including
information on various types of household assets.
The imputation procedure consists of two steps. First, I estimate the following linear
equation using the KHS data:
ln(sizei ) = α0 + βLocationi + γT ypei + δInci + ηEdui + θY eart + εi

(1.7)

where sizei is the size (in m2 ) of residential home of household i and Location, T ype, Inc,
and Edu are vectors of dummies for residential locations, housing types, income brackets, and
education levels of a household head, respectively. Y ear is a vector of year dummies.8 Once
equation (1.7) is estimated, I plug the GOMS data into the estimated equation to predict the
house size. Then, I multiply the predicted house size by the municipality-specific per-unit
(m2 ) home price for a given housing type to obtain synthetic housing values. Because data
on per-unit home price is not publicly available at the municipality level, I construct per-unit
home prices of municipalities using administrative data on assessed housing values provided
by the Korea National Spatial Data Infrastructure Portal. The data covers the universe of
housing units in South Korea and contains information on housing values assessed for tax
purposes as well as house size and location.
6

Data on home ownership status and housing types are only available in the follow-up surveys of the
earlier GOMS. If a young adult lived with his parents, I assume that he provided housing charactersitcis of
the parents, unless he was a head of the household.
7
I consider three housing types: house, apartment, and multi-family residential housing.
8
See Table A.1 in Appendix A for variable descriptions.
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Figure 1.2: Correlation between original housing values and imputed
housing values
Note: The x-axis represents the log of the linear predication of original housing values
from the KHS data using the covariates in equation (1.7) as predictors. The y-axis
represents the log of imputed housing values obtained following the procedure that I
describe above. Both values are expressed in thousands of 2010 Korean Wons.

One way to test the performance of the imputation is to plot the correlation between
original housing values and imputed housing values. Because I discard variation that is
unexplained by covariates in equation (1.7), it is appropriate to compare the synthetic
housing values to the corresponding first-stage linear prediction of the original housing values.
As shown in Figure 1.2, the imputed housing values closely follow the original housing values
along the 45 degree line. The correlation between the two values is 0.924.
Thus far, I use housing wealth and housing value interchangeably. However, to be
precise, a housing value does not necessarily represent one’s housing wealth. If an individual
purchases a house using significant debt, the discrepancy between the two will be nontrivial.
Nevertheless, I argue that the distinction should not make a big difference in this analysis.
First, the correlation between the home value and the home equity in level terms is 0.974
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in the KHS sample.9 Second, regardless of the size of housing debt, homeowners will fully
enjoy gains and losses due to changes in their home values. Third, Bostic et al. [12] show
that the elasticity of consumption with respect to housing value is similar to the elasticity
of consumption with respect to housing wealth. Fourth, for households who own multiple
houses, which consist of 13.6 percent of the KHS sample, the difference between the value
of the residential home and the housing wealth is larger. Note that the underrepresentation
of housing wealth for multi-home owners will bias the estimates upward.

IV.C

Duration calculation

To calculate job search durations of young adults, I need to identify the time of the
job market entry and first employment. I set the time of job market entry to a year before
graduation. First, many students start searching for jobs when they become seniors. Second,
a smaller number of observations are left-censored under this definition, compared to using
the time of graduation as an alternative definition. Third, Light [69] shows that the choice
of career starting time affects returns to schooling as a different starting time is associated
with a different level of “pre-career” work experience. My definition of the job market entry
would be more inclusive of the “pre-career” by allowing individuals to begin their careers a
year before graduation.
For identification of a first job, I use questionnaires from the GOMS. Under the current
employment section, the survey asks participants whether their current job is a first job. The
survey also has a separate section for first employment experiences and asks participants
whether they have had a first job and when they started working on that job. For those who
have never been employed at the time of the initial survey, I use data on the employment
history available in the follow-up survey to figure out the time of the first employment.
Based on the above discussion, I define the primary measure of duration as the number
of months from the time of job market entry to a first job. Figure 1.3 shows the distribution
of search spells. Two features are noticeable. First, there exists a spike in the number of
individuals who found a job around the time of graduation, which is not surprising. The
9

I weight observations using the KHS sampling weights in calculating the correlation. However, the
unweighted correlation is very similar.

12

Figure 1.3: The distribution of search spells
Note: The duration is the number of months from the time of job market entry to a
first job. The time of job market entry is set to a year before graduation. Observations
with negative duration are dropped. I use the optimal kernel width to plot the kernel
density estimates.

majority of graduates made the transition from school to work within 3 months of graduation
and about 72 percent of graduates found a job within a year of graduation. Second, the
distribution has a very long right-tail. Observations are right-censored for individuals who
remain non-employed by the time of the follow-up survey.

IV.D

Sample selection

The estimation sample consists of young adults (i) who attended high schools in
municipalities with school equalization policy, (ii) who enrolled in 4-year college within 2
years after graduating from high schools, (iii) who did not have a first job until a year before
graduation (i.e., job market entry), and (iv) who were living with their parents at the time
of the follow-up survey.
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The first criterion is required since I approximate municipality of parental residence based
on high school locations given that the secondary school equalization policy in South Korea
forces students to attend schools within certain distance of their municipality of residence.10
For individuals who graduated from schools to which the equalization policy did not apply,
high school location is a poor proxy for their residence. Moreover, if students were able to
sort into high-quality schools and home prices of municipalities in which good schools were
located grew faster, it would render spurious correlation between school quality and search
spells.
I focus on 4-year college students which account for about two thirds of the GOMS sample.
The sample of 2-year college shrinks further when I restrict the sample to general education
high school graduates, which makes identification difficult.11 In addition, because 4-year
college education is less directly attached to developing skills that industry demands, schoolto-work transitions of 4-year college graduates also has an important policy implication.
I also focus on students who do not have more than a 2-year gap between high school
graduation and college enrollment.
I exclude individuals who had worked full-time before the labor market entry since they
are different than their counterpart in several aspects. For example, the average graduate
who had a full-time job before the job market entry is about 9 years older and less likely
to live with their parents than their counterpart. Furthermore, their work experience might
facilitate job search either through more information, a wider network, and/or accumulated
wealth.
Finally, I only use a subsample of individuals who lived with their parents at the time of
the follow-up survey. GOMS only asked information on home ownership and housing types
in the follow-up survey and that information is only relevant when young adults cohabitated
10
In general, students who plan to attend general education high schools first apply for schools within
their Hakgun, which consists of multiple municipalities. Schools admit students based on their preferences
to some extent and then remaining slots are randomly assigned based on proximity to schools from students’
residence. The school equalization policy applies to both public and private general education high schools,
but the policy does not apply to vocational and specialized high schools.
11
GOMS also surveys individuals who graduate from education college. I exclude those individuals, which
make up less than 2 percent of the sample.
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with parents.12 Rosenzweig and Wolpin [86] and Kaplan [55] show that parental assistance
in the form of shared residence helps young individuals insure themselves from labor market
risks. The evidence suggests that job search durations might be endogenous to the living
arrangements of young individuals. In other words, individuals who were not successful in
finding jobs could sort into coresidence. Ignoring the selection would overestimate the effect
of parental housing wealth on search spells. On the other hand, the selection can also result
in underestimation of the wealth effect if coresidence and monetary support are substitutes
as Rosenzweig and Wolpin [86] assume. Lastly, I drop individuals with missing covariates.
Table 1.1 shows descriptive statistics for each stage of sample selection. Starting from the
full sample in column (1), I add an additional restriction from one column to the next. The
resulting estimation sample consists of 8,250 college graduates, covering about 15.4 percent
of the full sample. On average, individuals in the estimation sample remained nonemployed
longer, and had richer, and better educated parents. The sample also contains more female
individuals. While most of the differences are due to the selection of 4-year college students,
restricting the sample to young adults who cohabitated with their parents leaves a population
whose parents experienced relatively large gains in their housing wealth. It is possible that
endogenous living arrangements can confound the effect of parental housing wealth on search
durations. The average municipality-level 3-year home price difference per square meter is
0.34 MKRW. This leads to a 31,089 MKRW (or a 10.7 percent) increase in imputed parental
housing wealth net of inflation.
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To be precise, GOMS lacks data on homeowners. However, it is very rare for a young individual to
become a homeowner in three years after graduating from college and to live with his parents. Thus, I
simply assume that parents are homeowners when they cohabitate with their children.
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Table 1.1: Descriptive statistics
(1)
Full
Sample
Duration (month)
12.48 (35.92)
Duration (month, censored)
13.85 (34.43)
Housing wealth (MKRW)
3-year changes in housing wealth (MKRW/m2 ) 0.25
(0.59)
Parental income, 0 to 1MKRW
0.09
(0.29)
Parental income, 1 to 2MKRW
0.13
(0.34)
Parental income, 2 to 3MKRW
0.25
(0.43)
Parental income, 3 to 4MKRW
0.23
(0.42)
Parental income, 4 to 5MKRW
0.14
(0.35)
Parental income, 5 to 7MKRW
0.09
(0.29)
Parental income, over 7MKRW
0.07
(0.25)
Share of fathers received higher education
0.32
(0.46)
Share of mothers received higher education
0.16
(0.37)
Male
0.55
(0.50)
Age (at the time of survey)
27.18
(5.46)
Number of household members
3.08
(1.39)
Rank
GPA (100)
80.30 (18.14)
Student loan take-up
0.11
(0.31)
Dual degree
0.16
(0.36)
Work experience
0.65
(0.48)
TOEIC (takers only)
742.81 (149.40)
Study Abroad
0.17
(0.37)
Qualification
0.51
(0.50)
4-year college graduates
School equalization policy
Non-negative durations
Coresidence and home ownership
No missing covariates
Observations
53626

(2)
Sample 1
18.90
19.69
0.25
0.04
0.11
0.24
0.25
0.16
0.11
0.09
0.39
0.21
0.57
26.37
2.96
60.56
79.77
0.10
0.22
0.73
758.91
0.23
0.50

(3)
Sample 2

(14.10)
(13.08)
(0.63)
(0.19)
(0.31)
(0.43)
(0.43)
(0.37)
(0.32)
(0.28)
(0.49)
(0.41)
(0.49)
(2.08)
(1.40)
(47.55)
(15.73)
(0.31)
(0.42)
(0.45)
(139.25)
(0.42)
(0.50)
X

32412

18.93
19.71
0.29
0.04
0.10
0.24
0.25
0.16
0.12
0.09
0.41
0.23
0.57
26.40
3.11
58.74
79.70
0.10
0.23
0.73
762.44
0.24
0.50

(14.20)
(13.16)
(0.67)
(0.19)
(0.30)
(0.43)
(0.43)
(0.37)
(0.32)
(0.29)
(0.49)
(0.42)
(0.50)
(2.10)
(1.35)
(46.89)
(15.83)
(0.31)
(0.42)
(0.45)
(137.98)
(0.43)
(0.50)
X
X

26218

Note: See Table A.1 in Appendix A for variable descriptions.
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(4)
Sample 3

(5)
Sample 4

(6)
Estimation
sample
20.13 (11.85) 21.75 (12.52) 21.71 (12.48)
20.83 (10.73) 21.47 (10.63) 21.41 (10.59)
278.10 (228.82) 283.56 (229.80)
0.29
(0.67)
0.33
(0.70)
0.34
(0.71)
0.04
(0.19)
0.03
(0.17)
0.03
(0.17)
0.10
(0.30)
0.09
(0.29)
0.09
(0.28)
0.24
(0.43)
0.24
(0.43)
0.24
(0.43)
0.25
(0.44)
0.26
(0.44)
0.26
(0.44)
0.16
(0.37)
0.17
(0.37)
0.17
(0.38)
0.12
(0.32)
0.12
(0.32)
0.12
(0.33)
0.09
(0.29)
0.09
(0.28)
0.09
(0.29)
0.41
(0.49)
0.42
(0.49)
0.42
(0.49)
0.23
(0.42)
0.23
(0.42)
0.23
(0.42)
0.56
(0.50)
0.50
(0.50)
0.50
(0.50)
26.37
(2.07)
26.05
(1.84)
26.07
(1.82)
3.11
(1.35)
3.65
(1.05)
3.65
(1.04)
58.57 (46.83) 63.07 (46.91) 62.51 (46.74)
79.77 (15.77) 79.77 (15.73) 81.39
(8.52)
0.10
(0.30)
0.09
(0.29)
0.09
(0.29)
0.23
(0.42)
0.23
(0.42)
0.24
(0.43)
0.73
(0.45)
0.74
(0.44)
0.75
(0.43)
763.02 (137.57) 749.01 (143.86) 751.07 (142.68)
0.24
(0.43)
0.23
(0.42)
0.24
(0.42)
0.50
(0.50)
0.52
(0.50)
0.52
(0.50)
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
25523
9356
8250

V

Empirical strategy
The primary goal of this paper is to estimate the effect of parental housing wealth on

job search durations of their children. Since the outcome of interest is time to employment
and it is right-censored for individuals who fail to get a job during the estimation window, I
rely on a survival analysis framework. Specifically, I estimate the following Cox proportional
hazard (PH) model stratified by college major:
ˆ i,h,j,t ) + ΓXi,j,t + φΩk,t
ln(hi,h,j,t ) = β0g + β1 ln(hwealth

(1.8)

where hi,h,j,t is the employment hazard of individual i in month t whose parents own a home of
ˆ i,h,j,t denotes
type h in municipality j. β0g is the baseline hazard specific to major g.13 hwealth
the imputed parental housing wealth of individual i in month t. Xi,j,t includes individual
i’s age, sex, major, college ranking, time of graduation, and high school types.

Xi,j,t

also includes combined income, educational attainments, occupations, residential location,
home ownership status, and housing type of i’s parents. Ωk,t is a vector of proviciallevel macroeconomic factors, including unemployment rates, the number of employees per
establishment, and GDP per capita at the time of graduation.14
The coefficient of interest is β1 . To obtain an unbiased estimate for β1 , parental housing
wealth should not be correlated with the error terms εi . However, endogeneity can arise for
several reasons. The classical example is unobserved abilities transmitted from parents to
their offspring [93, 19]. For example, β1 would underestimate the wealth effect if graduates
from wealthier families tend to have greater abilities, and thus exit unemployment status
quicker. In a similar vein, a greater level of housing wealth may be correlated with time
preference of individuals [28], or parents who live in a rich neighborhood may have a better
informal network [9].
I address concerns regarding endogeneity using a 3-year difference in per-unit home price
for a given housing type. With a deregulation of the housing finance market in late 1990s
and the recovery from the Asian Crisis in 1997, South Korea’s housing market expanded
13
14

The GOMS is primarily stratified by college major.
See Table A.1 in Appendix A for variable descriptions.
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Figure 1.4: The trend in quarterly real housing price index in South
Korea
Source: Bank for International Settlements, Real Residential Property Prices for
Republic of Korea, retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

dramatically [40]. Figure 1.4 shows the trend in real housing price index (HPI) in South
Korea during 2000s. In general, there exists an upward trend in the HPI. A drop in HPI
started from the first quarter of 2004 was a result of the government policy to curb the
soaring housing price. Housing price declined once again at the time of Great Recession, but
the dip was not as dramatic as the collapse of the U.S. housing market. The rise and fall of
the Korean housing market during 2000s provides a natural experiment to test the effect of
housing wealth on outcomes of interest.
Lovenheim [71] also uses a short-run change in housing wealth as an instrument for the
level of parental housing wealth. There are several mechanisms through which housing wealth
effects manifest. One channel is so-called pure wealth effect [24], suggesting that increased
household wealth would lead to greater spending, regardless of whether the housing wealth
is liquidated. Another channel is home equity extraction [77, 71]. The Bank of Korea [101]
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(a) From 2004 to 2007

(b) From 2005 to 2008

(c) From 2006 to 2009

(d) From 2007 to 2010

Figure 1.5: 3-year changes in home prices per unit (m2 ): Apartments
Note: I construct each map by grouping municipalities into ten deciles of 3-year changes in home prices per
square meter. See Section IV.B for home price construction details.
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documents that South Korean households use about 40 percent of mortgage lending for
purposes other than home purchases.
Although the strategy mitigates potential biases due to endogeneity, wealth differentials
are still a function of wealth itself and there might be mechanical correlation between the two
that leads to violation of the exclusion restriction. However, I exploit variation in parental
housing wealth picked up by within-municipality differences in per-square-meter home prices
across years and housing types, which is less prone to endogeneity as it does not encompass
variation in housing sizes. Figure 1.5 shows the evolution of the 3-year changes in home
prices for apartments in South Korea. Although the home wealth appreciation is usually
higher in Seoul Metropolitan City and other cities around it, the figures clearly show that
within-municipality variation is also substantial.
Due to nonlinearity in the structural equation (1.8), I use a two-step control function
approach instead of relying on an instrumental variable approach. In particular, the firststage equation is given as
ˆ i,h,j,t ) = α0 + α1 ∆hpriceh,j,t + ΛXi,j,t + ψΩk + µi,h,j,t
ln(hwealth

(1.9)

where ∆hpriceh,j,t ≡ hpriceh,j,t − hpriceh,j,t−36 and hpriceh,j,t is a home price per m2 for
housing type h in municipality j. I first estimate equation (1.9) using OLS in order to
obtain the residual, µi,h,j,t
ˆ . Then, I add µi,h,j,t
ˆ in equation (1.8) as an additional covariate
to directly control for the endogeneity. Since the residual is a generated regressor, the usual
standard errors are incorrect. Therefore, I adjust the standard errors using bootstrap.

VI
VI.A

The effect of housing wealth on search spells
Baseline results

I begin by plotting the Kaplan-Meier survival curves for young adults who received
parental housing shocks of different intensity. Since housing wealth can be correlated with
factors such as abilities or neighborhood, simply plotting the survival curves for two different
levels of housing wealth would fail to show the wealth effect. Instead, I use variation in the
20

Figure 1.6: Kaplan-Meier survival curves
Note: The solid line represents the survival curve for individuals who belong to the
bottom 20 percent of the parental housing shock distribution and the dashed line
represents the survival curve for individuals who belong to the top 20 percent of the
parental housing shock distribution. See the text for housing shock contruction details.

home price instrument, ∆hpriceh,j,t . More specifically, I regress ∆hpriceh,j,t on dummies
for municipalities, year, and housing types, and obtain the residuals. The variation in the
residuals is plausibly exogenous and can be used to demonstrate the causal effect of housing
wealth on job search durations.
Figure 1.6 shows the Kaplan-Meier survival curves for individuals who belong to the
bottom 20 percent and the top 20 percent of the housing wealth residuals distribution in a
given year. While individuals in the top 20 percent group experienced gains of about 1.14
MKRW per m2 of their parents’ homes, those in the bottom 20 percent group experienced
only losses of 0.23 MKRW. The survival rates for the two groups look similar before
graduation. However, graduates who received a stronger housing wealth “treatment” tend
to stay unemployed longer than their counterparts once they left college. The two curves
diverge over time until around month 28, then the gap starts shrinking. This pattern becomes
more pronounced when comparing graduates in the bottom 5 percent of the treatment
21

distribution to those in the top 5 percent, but less pronounced when comparing the bottom 50
percent group to the top 50 percent group (see Figure A.1 in the appendix). Non-parametric
estimation results presented in Figure 1.6 and Figure A.1 suggest that an increase in parental
housing wealth leads to a longer search duration of their children, which is consistent with
evidence from the UI literature.
To further complement the graphical evidence, I estimate the Cox PH model using
the control function approach.

Table 1.2 summarizes estimation results.

Column (1)

estimates equation (1.8), which serves as a baseline specification. The coefficient estimate
for ln(hwealth) is -0.97 and statistically significant at 5 percent. It implies that a one
percent increase in parental housing wealth reduces the employment hazard of college
graduates by 0.97 percent. In other words, a greater level of parental housing wealth allows
individuals to search longer. The residual obtained from the first-stage equation is positive
and statistically significant at 5 percent. Given that I control for all predictors of parental
housing wealth in the second-stage equation except the instrument, the significant estimate
for the residual term indicates that even within-municipality variation in per-unit home price
level is endogenous and, therefore, should be accounted for.
The employment hazard for students whose parents earned 1MKRW to 2MKRW per
month at the time of college entrance was 17 percent lower than students whose parents
earned 0 to 1MKRW. For all other income groups, however, I do not find any evidence
of parental income effect. This may indicate that the income effect only exists for those
who are severely credit-constrained. It is also possible that parental income serves as a
sufficient statistic that encompasses unobserved individual characteristics such as abilities
passed on to their offspring to some extent. The positive coefficient for the top two income
brackets may suggest that this non-financial aspect dominates the pure income effect for
those at the right-tail of the income distributions. Male students tend to search longer
than female students, but for only up to the age of around 29. While an increase in the
number of household members is associated with a 5 percent decrease in the hazard rate, a
better school quality measured by college ranking facilitates transitions from college to work.
Among provincial-level macroeconomic factors, only GDP per capita negatively affects the
transitions.
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Table 1.2: The effect of parental housing wealth on search durations: Baseline estimates

Housing wealth (in log)

Male

Age

Male × Age

Number of household members

College ranking

Parental income, 1 to 2MKRW

Parental income, 2 to 3MKRW

Parental income, 3 to 4MKRW

Parental income, 4 to 5MKRW

Parental income, 5 to 7MKRW

Parental income, 7MKRW over

Unemployment rate

Employee per establishment

GDP per capita

GPA

Cox proportional hazard
Accelerated failure time
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
∗∗
∗∗
∗
-0.9774
-1.0580
0.5370
0.4860∗
(0.4842)
(0.4824)
(0.2902)
(0.2757)
[-1.8779, 0.0855] [-1.9233, -0.0089] [-0.0529, 1.0648] [-0.0617, 1.0162]
-0.8124
-0.7973
0.5855
0.6085∗∗
(0.5107)
(0.5108)
(0.3108)
(0.2995)
[-1.7950, 0.1991] [-1.7963, 0.2287] [-0.0340, 1.1943] [0.0004, 1.1910]
-0.0019
-0.0044
0.0092
0.0119
(0.0149)
(0.0152)
(0.0094)
(0.0093)
[-0.0291, 0.0290] [-0.0313, 0.0280] [-0.0087, 0.0280] [-0.0060, 0.0302]
0.0286
0.0298
-0.0219
-0.0236∗∗
(0.0198)
(0.0199)
(0.0121)
(0.0117)
[-0.0108, 0.0658] [-0.0100, 0.0680] [-0.0458, 0.0022] [-0.0459, 0.0000]
-0.0523∗∗∗
-0.0509∗∗∗
0.0301∗∗∗
0.0294∗∗∗
(0.0146)
(0.0148)
(0.0082)
(0.0080)
[-0.0784, -0.0221] [-0.0781, -0.0207] [0.0130, 0.0451] [0.0127, 0.0437]
0.0006
0.0005
-0.0004
-0.0004
(0.0004)
(0.0004)
(0.0002)
(0.0002)
[-0.0001, 0.0013] [-0.0002, 0.0013] [-0.0009, 0.0000] [-0.0009, 0.0001]
-0.1696
-0.1993
0.1197
0.1177
(0.1241)
(0.1277)
(0.0822)
(0.0800)
[-0.3871, 0.0985] [-0.4193, 0.0861] [-0.0469, 0.2738] [-0.0463, 0.2709]
-0.1632
-0.1767
0.1090
0.0998
(0.1197)
(0.1220)
(0.0816)
(0.0793)
[-0.3705, 0.0903] [-0.3923, 0.0773] [-0.0490, 0.2678] [-0.0474, 0.2539]
-0.0997
-0.1159
0.0683
0.0658
(0.1048)
(0.1065)
(0.0703)
(0.0681)
[-0.2954, 0.1117] [-0.3194, 0.1038] [-0.0641, 0.2098] [-0.0641, 0.2046]
-0.0629
-0.0687
0.0532
0.0457
(0.1167)
(0.1176)
(0.0761)
(0.0741)
[-0.2901, 0.1702] [-0.2966, 0.1652] [-0.0957, 0.2055] [-0.0965, 0.2013]
0.1498
0.1512
-0.0669
-0.0712
(0.1263)
(0.1265)
(0.0789)
(0.0763)
[-0.0909, 0.3983] [-0.0885, 0.4015] [-0.2207, 0.0900] [-0.2225, 0.0788]
0.2929∗
0.2958∗
-0.1653∗
-0.1518∗
(0.1571)
(0.1552)
(0.0949)
(0.0911)
[-0.0079, 0.6066] [-0.0013, 0.6013] [-0.3487, 0.0133] [-0.3276, 0.0199]
-0.0256
-0.0271
-0.0041
-0.0000
(0.0384)
(0.0402)
(0.0228)
(0.0235)
[-0.1012, 0.0473] [-0.1097, 0.0494] [-0.0465, 0.0406] [-0.0438, 0.0447]
0.3607
0.3146
-0.1734
-0.1241
(0.2843)
(0.2877)
(0.1805)
(0.1774)
[-0.1745, 0.9401] [-0.2018, 0.9295] [-0.5141, 0.1755] [-0.4678, 0.2096]
-0.0000∗
-0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
(0.0000)
(0.0000)
(0.0000)
(0.0000)
[-0.0001, 0.0000] [-0.0001, 0.0000] [-0.0000, 0.0001] [-0.0000, 0.0000]
0.0065∗∗∗
-0.0043∗∗∗
(0.0024)
(0.0015)
[0.0018, 0.0113]
[-0.0072, -0.0014]
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Table 1.2: The effect of parental housing wealth on search durations: Baseline estimates
(continued)
Cox proportional hazard
(1)
(2)
Loan take-up
0.1154∗∗∗
(0.0366)
[0.0490, 0.1908]
Dual degree
0.1076∗∗∗
(0.0290)
[0.0501, 0.1644]
Toeic
0.0004∗∗∗
(0.0002)
[0.0001, 0.0007]
I(Toeic > 0)
-0.4459∗∗∗
(0.1166)
[-0.6914, -0.2281]
Working experience
0.1188∗∗∗
(0.0327)
[0.0464, 0.1790]
Study abroad
0.0968∗∗∗
(0.0358)
[0.0230, 0.1637]
Qualification
0.1444∗∗∗
(0.0248)
[0.0942, 0.1913]
Residual
1.0366∗∗
1.1122∗∗
(0.5019)
(0.4996)
[-0.0218, 1.9752] [0.0456, 2.0232]
PH-test (p-value)
0.9865
0.5269
F-statistics
55.19
55.16
Observations
8250
8250

Accelerated failure time
(3)
(4)
-0.0699∗∗∗
(0.0206)
[-0.1122, -0.0320]
-0.0644∗∗∗
(0.0161)
[-0.0977, -0.0354]
-0.0003∗∗∗
(0.0001)
[-0.0005, -0.0001]
0.3081∗∗∗
(0.0745)
[0.1627, 0.4549]
-0.0810∗∗∗
(0.0200)
[-0.1180, -0.0381]
-0.0656∗∗∗
(0.0209)
[-0.1075, -0.0254]
-0.0926∗∗∗
(0.0152)
[-0.1234, -0.0634]
-0.5745
-0.5250
(0.2998)
(0.2850)
[-1.1258, 0.0208] [-1.0751, 0.0410]
55.19
8250

55.16
8250

Note: All specifications include fixed effects for graduation year-month, municipality, education and occupation
of both parents, housing type, and high school type. P-values for the PH-test demonstrate the validity of the
proportionality assumption. The Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistic shows the relevance of the instrument. Standard
errors given in parentheses are clustered at the municipality level and obtained via 2,000 bootstrap replications.∗
p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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In column (2), I add variables on which housing wealth might have impact. These
variables include one’s grade point average (GPA), English test score (TOEIC), dummy
variables for student loan take-up, dual degree, work experience while in college, and study
abroad. Note that the regressors would be endogenous if longer durations allow individuals
to improve their qualifications for a job. On the other hand, omitting those controls can
underestimate the insurance aspects of parental housing wealth on search, assuming that
the wealth is positively correlated with overall quality of job seekers and a more qualified
individual gets a job faster. The coefficient estimate for logged housing wealth indicates that
a one percent increase in parental housing wealth reduces the employment hazard by 1.06
percent. Adding additional controls increases the size of the wealth effect. In addition, not
surprisingly, the coefficient estimates for most variables that are newly added to the model
are statistically significant at the one percent level with expected signs, suggesting that
controlling for individual quality is important in explaining individual job search behavior.
It is worth emphasizing that student loan takers who are likely to be credit-constrained tend
to get a job quicker.
I prefer to present the Cox PH estimates because the model does not require an assumption regarding the baseline hazard, λ0 (t), in equation (1.8). But it is more straightforward
to interpret results from alternative parametric models because the dependent variable of
those models is a duration rather than a hazard rate. Moreover, exploring whether the
main finding holds in another specification is an interesting exercise on its own. Therefore,
I estimate the accelerated failure time (AFT) model in column (3) and column (4). Based
on the Akaike Information Criterion, I present the estimates from the AFT model where
the hazard function is assumed to follow the log-logistic distribution.15 In column (3), the
coefficient estimate for logged housing wealth is 0.537 and it is statistically significant at the
10 percent level. It implies that a one percent increase in parental housing wealth leads to a
0.7 (= e0.537 − 1) percent increase in search durations. The direction of the effect implied by
the estimate is consistent with the estimates from the Cox PH model. When I add individual
qualification controls as well as a loan take-up indicator in column (4), the estimate for logged
15

I also estimate the ATF models with log-normal, Weibull, Gompertz, and exponential distributions. I
find that estimates from those alternative models are qualitatively similar to the results presented in Table
1.2.
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Figure 1.7: Survival curves by housing wealth percentiles
Note: This figure shows survival curves across different housing wealth percentile,
implied by the result in column (4) of Table 1.2. All curves are evaluated at the
average values of the covariates, except the housing wealth.

housing wealth is reduced to 0.486 with an implied elasticity of 0.63. Again, the results are
qualitatively similar to the ones presented in column (2).
To evaluate economic significance of my results, I calculate how much shorter the average
duration would have been, had parental housing wealth grown at the inflation rate before
graduating from college. Specifically, I calculate the difference between the average duration
implied by the AFT model given in column (4) of Table 1.2 evaluated at housing wealth
at t and the average duration implied by the same model evaluated at housing wealth in
t − 36. This exercise suggests that the average duration spell of college graduates would have
shortened by roughly a month in the absence of housing wealth gains.
Remember that the results presented in Table 1.2 use imputed housing wealth. Since I
control for all the predictors that are used to impute the size of parental housing, the variation
that I use for identification comes exactly from the covariation between hpriceh,j,t and
∆hpriceh,j,t ≡ hpriceh,j,t − hpriceh,j,t−36 . Although the two-step control function estimator
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Table 1.3: Reduced-form survival model estimates
Cox proportional hazard
(1)
(2)
∗∗
∆hpriceh,j,t
-0.0495
-0.0535∗∗∗
(0.0196)
(0.0191)
PH-test (p-value)
1.0000
0.9435
Observations
8250
8250

Accelerated failure time
(3)
(4)
∗∗
0.0272
0.0246∗∗
(0.0121)
(0.0120)
N/A
N/A
8250
8250

Note: All specifications include individual characteristics, qualifications, and fixed
effects for graduation year-month, municipality, education and occupation of both
parents, housing type, and high school type. P-values for the PH-test demonstrate
the validity of the proportionality assumption. Standard errors are clustered at the
municipality level and given in parentheses.∗ p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01.

enables interpretation of the treatment effect in terms of housing wealth, it may be more
efficient to fully exploit variation in short-run home prices, provided that the variation is
ˆ i,t ) in
exogenous. Thus, I estimate reduced-form survival models by replacing ln(hwealth
equation (1.8) with ∆hpriceh,j,t , which does not rely on imputation.16
I present reduced-form estimation results in Table 1.3. I only report the coefficient
estimates for ∆hpriceh,j,t to save space.17

The signs of the coefficient estimates for

∆hpriceh,j,t are consistent with the previous results. The Cox PH model estimates suggest
that 1MKRW appreciation in home price per square meter of a municipality reduces the
hazard rate of college graduates by 5 to 5.4 percent. Given that the average 3-year home
price changes per square meter is 0.36MKRW in the estimation sample, the implied hazard
rate reduction ranges from 1.8 to 1.94 percent. Results from the ATF models in column (3)
and column (4) show that when per-unit home price of a municipality goes up by 1MKRW,
it prolongs the duration of job search by 2.4 to 2.7 percent.

VI.B

Tests of the proportionality assumption

The Cox PH model assumes that the effect of any covariate on the hazard ratio is constant
over time. I test the validity of the assumption in two ways. First, I perform an analytic
16

[73] and [72] provide similar reduced-form estimates, claiming that the short-run changes in housing
wealth is conditionally exogenous and that any home price appreciation should be capitalized into housing
wealth.
17
Coefficient estimates for other covariates are qualitatively similar to those presented in Table 1.2.
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test proposed by [42].18 As shown at the end of the Tables 1.2 and 1.3, the test fails to reject
the null hypothesis of the constant hazard ratio in these specifications.
I also test whether the proportionality assumption is valid by plotting the log-log
transformation of the survival function for major variables. The results are shown in Figure
A.2. While the patterns are quite noisy up to the first three months of job search, the
figures clearly evidence that the employment hazards are proportional across different values
of a control variable, conditional on other covariates in the model. Because less than one
percent of young adults in the estimation sample completed their transitions in the first
three months, it is unlikely that any deviation from the proportionality assumption ocurred
in the early stage of job search affects my results.

VI.C

Instrument exogeneity

The use of the instrument, ∆hpricejt , is only valid when (i) there exists enough correlation
between the instrument and the endogenous variable and (ii) the instrument is uncorrelated
with the error term of the structural equation (1.8), εi . The F-statistics presented at the
end of Table 1.2 clearly show that the 3-year difference in home price at the municipal level
is sufficiently correlated with the level of parental housing wealth. Although the validity of
the second assumption, which is often called the exclusion restrictions, cannot be formally
tested in a just-identified model, this section aims at providing some evidence that supports
the exogeneity of the instrument.
As Section V describes, unobserved individual ability is one major source of endogeneity
in studies exploring the intergenerational wealth effects [93, 19, 71]. Given that I control for
several variables that must be strongly correlated with both individual and parental abilities,
this particular type of endogeneity is unlikely to arise. Nevertheless, I test whether the
instrument is associated with the ranking of the college from which an individual graduated
using OLS. In South Korea where the college admission is based on a standard test score
called Suneung, the ranking of the college serves as a proxy for individual ability. I present
18

The idea of the test is to check whether the scaled Schoenfeld residual, which is the difference between
observed values of a covariate and its expectation evaluated at each survival time, do not systematically
evolve over time. In Table 1.2 and Table 1.3, I report p-values for the global test. For more details, see [92].
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Table 1.4: Some tests of validity of exclusion restrictions

Dependent variable
Panel A: CF estimates
Housing wealth (in log)

Panel B: RF estimates
∆hpriceh,j,t
PH-test (p-value)
Observations
R2

(1)
College ranking

(2)
I(Informal)

(3)
Hazard rate

25.4053
(19.3183)
[-11.4053, 65.1663]

-0.1482
(0.1623)
[-0.4630, 0.1700]

0.9058
(0.8025)
[-0.4302, 2.4483]

1.237
(0.837)
N/A
8250
0.245

-0.007
(0.007)
N/A
8250
0.071

0.034
(0.041)
0.6273
3702
N/A

Note: All specifications include individual characteristics, qualifications, local macroeconomic factors,
and fixed effects for graduation year-month, municipality, education and occupation of both parents,
housing type, and high school type. P-values for the PH-test demonstrate the validity of the
proportionality assumption. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level and given in
parentheses. For CF estimates, standard errors are obtained via 2,000 bootstrap replications.∗
p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01.

the results in column (1) of Table 1.4. Panel A summarizes the two-step control function
estimates and Panel B summarizes reduced-form estimates. Both estimates imply that the
correlation between college rankings and the instrument is not statistically significant.
Another threat to identification stems from the use of informal network to obtain a job
[53, 9]. If the average quality of informal network of residents of a municipality evolved
together with the housing price, the previous estimates would be biased. GOMS asks how
individuals get into their job. About 13.3 percent of individuals who found a job answered
that they got that job using family members, friends, and relatives. In column (2), I test
whether young adults whose parents experienced larger short-run gains in housing wealth
were more likely to get a job through informal networks. I estimate a linear probability
model where the dependent variable takes 1 if an individual used an informal network and
0 otherwise. Again, I find no evidence that the local housing price predicts the likelihood of
finding a job using informal networks in both Panel A and Panel B.19
Lastly, I implement a placebo test that is employed by [71]. The intuition is that the
short-run home price changes only affect the housing wealth of homeowners. Renters would
19

Reduced-from estimates from logit and probit models are qualitatively similar and available upon request.

29

gain nothing or even lose some portion of wealth if they were supposed to pay higher rents
due to local home price appreciation. If the sign of the coefficient for parental housing
wealth is the same for homeonwers and renters, it might indicate that the results are driven
by a spurious correlation rather than the intergenerational wealth effect. In constrast to
the results from the homeowner sample, the coefficient estimates presented in column (3)
are positive and statistically insignificant, reassuring that the relationship between parental
housing wealth and time to first job is not driven by a spurious correlation.

VI.D

Robustness checks

This section explores whether my results are robust to different specifications and
alternative empirical setups. I summarize the results in Table 1.5. Column (1) presents
control function estimates and column (2) presents reduced-form estimates. When it is
feasible and relevant, I present both estimates.20
I first examine sensitivity of the results to an alternative duration censoring. Previously,
I censor search spells at 36 months. Although I provide some rationale behind the choice,
it is still arbitrary and might influence the estimates. When the spells are censored at
month 60, which is the maximum spell that I can observe in the data, economic and
statistical significance of both estimates become smaller than the baseline estimates. This is
potentially due to additional noise introduced by individuals who had very long spells, which
are unexplained by the parental wealth effect. On the contrary, censoring the spells at month
30 results in larger estimates than the baseline estimates. Together with the results from
specification (1), these results suggest that the role of parental housing wealth in supporting
job search of their children is concentrated in the short run. Note that the Kaplan-Meier
survival curve estimates in Figure 1.6 and Figure A.1 show similar patterns.
Specifications (3) and (4) test whether the functional form of the control function matters.
The baseline model uses a simple linear control function, but this might not be sufficient
if unobserved factors that are correlated with parental housing wealth nonlinearly affect
20

I only present two-step estimates in specification (3) and (4) because the choice of a functional form of
the control function is not relevant in the reduced-form context. For specification (7), I only estimate the
reduced-form model because the control function estimator fails to converge.
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Table 1.5: Robustness checks
Specifications

Statistic

(0) Baseline
(N = 8250)

β1
SEs
PH-test
95percent CI
(1) Censor durations at 61 months
β1
(N = 8250)
SEs
PH-test
95percent CI
(2) Censor durations at 30 months
β1
(N = 8250)
SEs
PH-test
95percent CI
(3) Quadratic control function
β1
(N = 8250)
SEs
PH-test
95percent CI
(4) Cubic control function
β1
(N = 8250)
SEs
PH-test
95percent CI
(5) Exclude individuals who attended
β1
college more than 6 years
SEs
(N = 7504)
PH-test
95percent CI
(6) School fixed effects
β1
(N = 8250)
SEs
PH-test

Control function
(1)
-1.0580∗∗
(0.4824)
0.5269
[-1.9233, -0.0089]
-0.7965∗
(0.4440)
0.7204
[-1.6575, 0.1040]
-1.1044∗∗
(0.5203)
0.9288
[-2.0768, 0.0176]
-1.0453∗∗
(0.4825)
0.6229
[-1.9004, 0.0186]
-1.0456∗∗
(0.4845)
0.5996
[-1.8972, 0.0259]
-1.2218∗∗
(0.5664)
0.3537
[-2.3342, -0.1461]

Reduced-form
(2)
-0.0535∗∗∗
(0.0191)
0.9727
-0.0442∗∗∗
(0.0170)
0.9727
-0.0559∗∗∗
(0.0209)
0.9948

-0.0610∗∗
(0.0239)
0.9094
-0.0578∗∗∗
(0.0197)
0.0000

Note: All specifications include individual characteristics, qualifications, local macroeconomic factors, and
fixed effects for graduation year-month, municipality, education and occupation of both parents, housing
type, and high school type. P-values for the PH-test demonstrate the validity of the proportionality
assumption. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level and given in parentheses. For CF
estimates, standard errors are obtained via 2,000 bootstrap replications. ∗ p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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job search of young adults. As alternatives, I use quadratic and cubic control functions
and confirm that the results are robust to the choice of the functional form of the control
function.
It is possible that a larger housing wealth allows individuals to postpone graduation so
that they can have more time to prepare for the job market. Or, some students would not
leave schools until they find a job to avoid the gap in their résumés. Since including those
individuals in the estimation sample may underestimate the parental wealth effect on search
spells, I exclude female (male) students who attended college more than six years (eight
years) and estimate the baseline model in specification (5).21 Indeed, the implied wealth
effect is about 15 percent larger than the estimate presented in column (2) of Table 1.2. The
evidence suggests that parental wealth as insurance against job market risk in part works
through a longer time to college completion.
Lastly, I estimate specification (6) to examine whether replacing the college ranking
variable with institution fixed effects. The baseline equation controls for the school ranking as
it captures the effect of institution quality on the employment hazards in a more parsimonious
way than controlling for school fixed effects. However, school fixed effects account not only
for the average school quality, but also for any unobserved school-specific characteristics fixed
in time, which can affect the result. The reduced-form estimate with institution fixed effects
is slightly larger than the baseline estimate and statistically significant at the 1 percent level.
Overall, the results presented Table 1.5 confirm that the negative relationship between
parental housing wealth and search spells is robust to alternative specifications.

VI.E

Heterogeneous treatment effects

This section investigates whether parental housing wealth varies across different population groups. As a first exercise, I divide the sample into individuals whose parental income
is below 4MKRW or above 4MKRW monthly. Search theory predicts that an increase in
wealth leads to a longer search duration by relaxing one’s credit constraint [22]. If this
is the mechanism that explains the results, assuming that intergenerational transfers are
21

I set an eight-year restriction for male students to account for two years of military service, which is
mandatary for male adults in South Korea.
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Table 1.6: Heterogeneous treatment effects
By income group

By gender

Panel A: CF estimates
(1)
(2)
Low income
Female
Housing wealth (in log)
-0.7363
-1.4602∗∗
(0.7142)
(0.6787)
[-2.1288, 0.7479] [-2.7457, -0.0804]
PH-test (p-value)
0.1125
0.6263
Observations
5096
3154
Panel B: RF estimates
(1)
(2)
Female
Male
Housing wealth (in log)
-0.0351
-0.0730∗∗
(0.0393)
(0.0358)
PH-test (p-value)
0.1125
0.6263
Observations
5096
3154

(3)
(4)
Male
High income
-0.9702
-1.4024∗∗
(0.8295)
(0.6490)
[-2.9872, 0.4250] [-2.5110 0.2567]
0.7466
0.0800
4140
4110
(3)
Female
-0.0520
(0.0371)
0.7466
4140

(4)
Male
-0.0670∗
(0.0360)
0.0800
4110

Note: All specifications include individual characteristics, qualifications, local macroeconomic factors, and fixed effects
for graduation year-month, municipality, education and occupation of both parents, housing type, and high school type.
P-values for the PH-test demonstrate the validity of the proportionality assumption. Standard errors are clustered at
the municipality level and given in parentheses. For CF estimates, standard errors are obtained via 2,000 bootstrap
replications. ∗ p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01.

proportional to all financial resources available to households, individuals whose parents
make high income are less likely to be credit-constrained and thus affected less by exogenouse
parental wealth shocks.
The results are presented in Panel A of Table 1.6. The control function estimates
presented in first two columns of Panel A suggest that the effect of parental housing
wealth on job search of their children is stronger for young individuals from upper income
households than those from lower income households in terms of both economic and statistical
significance. The reduced-form estimates presented in the second two columns of Panel B
corroborate the finding. These results are inconsistent with the idea that lower-income
individuals are forced to get any job quicker to smooth consumption intertemporally.
However, note that two groups can be systematically different in many other aspects.
For example, low income households might prioritize additional wealth differently than high
income households. If low income households have higher discount rates than high income
households [46], they may underestimate the value of the search and use additional resources
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to satisfy more immediate needs.22 In other words, family support for job search might be a
luxury good that low income households cannot afford unless the wealth gain from a housing
boom is substantial. Furthermore, on average, the level of housing wealth gain was larger
in high-income groups with greater variation (Figure A.3). This difference in treatment
intensity and variation can also contribute to different responses across income groups.
As a second exercise, I test whether parental housing wealth affects male and female
populations asymmetrically.

Traditionally, Korean parents favor boys over girls.

This

phenomenon is dubbed son preference. While the sex imbalance at birth becomes less
noticeable in terms of the sex ratio, Choi and Hwang [23] show that Korean parents devote
more time and money to their first-born sons than first-born daughters. The persistence
of son preference can result in heterogeneity in the effect of parental housing wealth on job
search.
Column (3) and column (4) of Table 1.6 summarizes the results. Both control function
and reduced-form estimates suggest that parental housing wealth reduces the employment
hazard rate for male graduates and the effect is at least marginally statistically significant.
Although the estimate for female graduates is also negative, it is not statistically significant.
While the evidence is consistent with [23], it is difficult to draw a firm conclusion out of the
results for two reasons. First, the upper limit of the bias-corrected confidence interval in
column (4) of Panel A is positive and large relative to the previous estimates. Second, the
reduced form estimates are not very different from each other. While it is not straightforward
to test equality of two coefficient estimates from a nonlinear model, I can check whether an
interaction between sex of individuals and the instrument matters. The coefficient estimate
for the interaction term is not statistically significant with p-value of 0.869, implying that
the heterogeneity in the effect of parental housing wealth on job preparation might be small
at best.
22

Note that my argument is distinct from DellaVigna and Paserman [28] who focus on the effect of time
preference on search intensity rather than on intra-household resource allocation.
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Table 1.7: Labor market outcomes

ln(hwealth)

F-statistic
Observations
R2

ln(hwealth)

F-statistic
Observations
R2

(1)
(2)
ln(wage)
ln(wage3)
-0.1907
-0.0423
(0.1960)
(0.1619)
[-0.5834, 0.2108] [-0.3459, 0.2959]
60.424
59.830
7765
6869
0.0725
0.1091
(5)
(6)
1(big firm)
1(public)
-0.4798∗∗
0.3053∗∗
(0.2075)
(0.1363)
[-0.9536, -0.1203] [0.0817, 0.6142]
55.164
55.164
8250
8250
0.0172
0.0072

(3)
wage3 - wage
6.9441
(42.4946)
[-65.3102 98.1313]
60.055
6845
0.0141
(7)
ln(workhour)
0.0210
(0.1571)
[-0.2906, 0.3275]
59.705
7815
0.0178

(4)
1(contract)
-0.1070
(0.1621)
[-0.4498, 0.1912]
61.062
7578
0.0199
(8)
1(start-up)
0.0583
(0.0451)
[-0.0335, 0.1544]
59.410
7810
0.0016

Note: All specifications include individual characteristics, qualifications, local macroeconomic factors, and
fixed effects for graduation year-month, municipality, education and occupation of both parents, housing type,
and high school type. P-values for the PH-test demonstrate the validity of the proportionality assumption.
The Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistic shows the relevance of the instruments. Standard errors given in
parentheses are clustered at the municipality level and obtained via 2,000 bootstrap replications. ∗ p < 0.10,∗∗
p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01.

VII

Does larger parental housing wealth improve labor
market outcomes?

I document that an exogenous increase in parental housing wealth reduces the employment hazard of college graduates. I also show that my finding is not driven by other
confounding factors. Given the robustness of the finding, it is natural to ask whether parental
housing wealth has any bearings on labor market outcomes. Search theory suggests that a
longer search spell leads to a higher wage [27], whereas the argument is barely supported
by empirical evidence [18, 64], even for first-time job seekers [35]. One notable exception
is Nekoei and Weber [79], who find that individuals who are marginally eligible for the UI
benefit extension receive a higher wage at a new job than those who are marginally ineligible
for the UI benefit extension. The authors also find that individuals are more likely to get
into firms that pay higher wages to their peer employees.
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This section explores whether parental housing wealth improves the quality of the match
measured by several labor market outcomes. Table 1.7 presents the estimates from the twostage least squares. Column (1) examines the effect of parental housing wealth on wages
at the first job. Consistent with most empirical studies, I do not find any evidence that a
greater level of parental housing wealth leads to higher wages at the first job. It is possible
that some college graduates from wealthier families may use a low-paid first job (such as
internships) to accumulate skills that are required to get a better job and make more money
in the longer run. The dependent variable in column (2) is the current wage at the time of the
follow-up survey, which was implemented about three to four years after college graduation.
The estimate is not statistically significant, but the magnitude of the estimate is reduced
in the longer run, compared to the estimate presented in column (1). This motivates me
to test whether parental housing wealth contributes to the wage growth, similar to Nekoei
and Weber [79]. The estimate presented in column (3) is positive, but it is not statistically
significant.
Among other outcomes, I find that a one percent increase in parental housing wealth
reduces the probability of working in a firm that has 300 employees or more by 0.48
percentage points in column (5) and increases the probability of working in the public sector
by 0.3 percentage points in column (6). These effects are statistically significant at the 5
percent level. In particular, the result in column (6) mirrors the finding of Rothstein and
Rouse [88] who document that a rise in debt discourages U.S. college students from working
in nonprofit, government, education sectors. A larger parental housing wealth has a negative
impact on the likelihood of finding a fixed-term contract job and a positive impact on the
likelihood of starting a business, but these effects are not statistically significant.

VIII

Potential mechanisms

In this section, I investigate the mechanisms behind the negative causality between
parental housing wealth and job search duration. A simple model proposed by Chetty [22]
implies that an exoegenous parental wealth increase leads to a longer search duration because
it reduces the utility gap between the employment state and the unemployment state. On
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Table 1.8: Potential mechanisms

Dependent variable
Panel A: CF estimates
Housing wealth (in log)

(1)
ln(reservation
wage)

-0.0767
(0.0883)
[-0.2629, 0.0825]
Panel B: RF estimates
∆hpriceh,j,t
-0.0039
(0.0042)
Observations
8202

(2)
I(exam
preparer)

(3)
I(in school)

0.0309
0.4517∗∗
(0.1318)
(0.2004)
[-0.2198, 0.2985] [0.0758, 0.8577]
0.0016
(0.0058)
8250

0.0228∗∗∗
(0.0083)
8250

(4)
I(unplanned
schooling)
0.2610∗∗
(0.1266)
[0.0283, 0.5386]
0.0132∗∗
(0.0054)
8250

Note: All specifications include individual characteristics, qualifications, local macroeconomic factors, and fixed
effects for graduation year-month, municipality, education and occupation of both parents, housing type, and high
school type. P-values for the PH-test demonstrate the validity of the proportionality assumption. The KleibergenPaap Wald F statistic shows the relevance of the instruments. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality
level and given in parentheses. For CF estimates, standard errors are obtained via 2,000 bootstrap replications. ∗
p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01.

the other hand, Danforth [27] shows that a greater level of wealth raises one’s reservationg
wage, and it is an increased reservation wage that prolongs the search. Empirical studies
explore either the effect of relaxing credit constraints on search durations or the mechanism
through which additional credits work. But only a paucity of studies consider both aspects
at the same time, largely due to data limitations.23
I begin by testing whether parental housing wealth negatively affects the hazard rate by
raising one’s reservation wage. The result is given in column (1) of Table 1.8. In contrast
to the theory and empirical evidence that Bloemen and Stancanelli [11] provide, I do not
find that an exogenous gain in parental housing wealth increases reservation wages of their
children systematically. In fact, the sign of the estimate suggests that the causality might be
negative, not positive. Using nonlinearities of the UI benefit schedule in New Jersey, Krueger
and Mueller [62] also find a negative but statistically insignificant relationship between the
size of the UI benefits and the ratio of the reservation wage to the previous wage.
Because GOMS does not collect data on consumption, I cannot test whether parental
housing wealth changes individual consumption on food or clothing. Instead, I look at
the effect of parental housing wealth on exam preparation, which can be considered as a
23

See Bloemen and Stancanelli [11] and DellaVigna and Paserman [28].
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particular type of consumption. There are plenty of anecdotes that as many as half of
young job seekers engage in some type of exam preparation, mostly for civil service jobs [56].
Because of the fierce competition, it is common for young Korean individuals to spend more
than a year preparing for a test. An exogenous increase in parental housing wealth may
encourage college graduates who otherwise would have found a job to study for exams. As
shown in column (2), however, the hypothesis is not supported by the data.
Lastly, I examine the role of parental housing wealth on schooling decisions. Barr and
Turner [7] show that extending UI benefit duration encourages unemployed workers to enroll
in college in the United States. Similarly, I test if family insurance proxied by parental
housing wealth induces enrollment in a new school after college graduation. For young
adults who never had a job, additional schooling can be a continuation of human capital
accumulation. Or, it can be a retreat from the labor market if individuals feel that they
are not quite ready for the transition or decide to go back to school after an unsuccessful
job search. In column (3), I do not make a distinction between the two motivations for
schooling. The result suggests that a one percent increase in parental housing wealth raises
the probability of going to school by 0.45 percentage point and it is statistically significant at
the 5 percent level. Considering that the average housing price went up by 11.8 percent in the
estimation sample, the estimate implies that the effect of parental housing wealth accounts for
about one third of additional schooling after graduating from college (= (11.8×0.45)/15.78).
This evidence is consistent with Lovenheim [71] who shows that an increase in parental
housing wealth raises college enrollment.
Note that the sample in column (3) includes students who originally planned to continue
their study. In general, it is unclear whether one should view schooling after college as a
part of career preparation or pure human capital accumulation. However, if an individual
has a time gap between college graduation and new school enrollment, his schooling decision
is more likely to be accidental. So, I examine the effect of parental housing wealth on
the incidence of unplanned schooling in column (4). The size of the estimate is reduced
substantially, but it is still statistically significant at the 5 percent level, indicating that
the probability of going back to school unexpectedly rises by 0.26 percentage point when
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Table 1.9: The effect of parental housing wealth on time to first job: Revisited

Panel A: CF estimates
ln(housing wealth)

Panel B: RF estimates
∆hpriceh,j,t
PH-test
Observations

(1)
Exclude
all students

(2)
Exclude students
w/o a time gap

-0.7374
(0.4499)
[-1.4987, 0.2887]

-0.9337**
(0.4486)
[-1.7055, 0.1098]

-0.0402
(0.0269)
206.8676
6948

-0.0512*
(0.0263)
212.1750
7429

Note: All specifications include individual characteristics, qualifications,
local macroeconomic factors, and fixed effects for graduation year-month,
municipality, education and occupation of both parents, housing type, and
high school type. P-values for the PH-test demonstrate the validity of the
proportionality assumption. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality
level and given in parentheses. For CF estimates, standard errors are obtained
via 2,000 bootstrap replications. ∗ p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01.

parental housing wealth increases by one percent. The result strongly supports the role of
parental wealth in securing their children from potential labor market risks.
Given the evidence that a greater level of parental housing wealth increases the chance of
getting additional schooling, I revisit the parental wealth effect on time to first job in Table
1.9 and see whether it is the school-to-school-to-work transitions that actually prolong time
to first job. In column (1) , I exclude all individuals who were in school at the time of initial
surveys. Both the CF estimate and the RF estimate are not statistically significant and the
size of the estimates become smaller relative to the baseline estimate presented in column (2)
of Table 1.2. In column (2), I exclude students who did not have a time gap between college
graduation and new school enrollment, but retain those who did have a time gap. The latter
individuals are likely to enroll in school for reasons other than academic study. Now the
estimates presented in both panels are at least marginally significant and their magnitudes
are comparable to the baseline.
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IX

Conclusion

This study explores the effect of parental housing wealth on the school-to-work transitions
of college graduates. I exploit within-munipality variation in 3-year difference in per-unit
house prices across years and housing types, which is arguably exogenous to search behaviors
of college graduates. I first look at whether exogenous gains in parental housing wealth
prolong time-to-first-job of Korean youth and find that a one percent increase in parental
housing wealth reduces the employment hazard of their children by roughly one percent.
Other unobserved factors such as abilities or the quality of informal network cannot explain
the result. Parental housing wealth also decreases the probability of working in firms that
have 300 or more employees and increases the probability of getting a job in public sectors,
probably through a longer job preparation. Given the popularity of public sector jobs among
South Korean youth, the results can be interpreted that young individuals from wealthier
families find a better job. Consistent with other empirical studies, I do not find that parental
housing wealth has an impact on wages at the first job. However, there might be differences
in fringe benefits or job tenure.
Further analysis shows that the wealth effect on school-to-work transitions is driven by
young individuals who moved to school, in particular those who had a time gap between
college graduation and new school enrollment. The evidence might suggest that the role of
parental wealth as insurance to first-time job seekers is mainly to prevent them from having
a gap between careers when a job search turns out to be unsuccessful. When this particular
type of school-to-work transition is ignored, the parental wealth effect becomes small and
insignificant, implying that the parental wealth effect on extending a narrowly-defined search
duration is weak.
Overall, my findings imply that a greater level of parental wealth provides a wider range
of options available to young individuals transitioning from school to work. A better family
insurance would allow their young adult children to be more selective in accepting job
offers or to receive further education for the purpose of either advancing human capital or
waiting for future opportunities without damaging their careers. A direct deposit from the
government to youth may have a very different impact than exogenous changes in parental
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wealth, especially when low-income families and high-income families have heterogeneous
consumption preferences. In general, a government subsidy to young job seekers would
provide consumption smoothing benefits. Nevertheless, it is uncertain whether the subsidy
affects job market outcomes given its small amount and limited availability.
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Chapter 2
Do In-Kind Grants Stick? The
Department of Defense 1033 program
and local government spending
I

Introduction
Intergovernmental transfers are a key source of funds to local governments. The National

League of Cities reports that approximately 5 percent of municipal budgets comes through
the federal government, while an additional 30-40 percent of local government revenues comes
from states.1 The motivation for and structure of grant programs are both important because
this external funding will affect the allocation of local public resources, overall local spending,
and subsequent welfare. In some cases grants may be used to redistribute resources from highincome to low-income areas, in turn addressing differentials in local tax capacity. In other
instances, local government provision of a public good may be preferable to state or federal
provision, either due to diseconomies of scale or heterogeneity in preferences between local
jurisdictions. In these circumstances, providing grants to local governments for the provision
of a particular service may generate more welfare than the federal government providing the
service directly. Grants are also widely used to address interjurisdictional spillovers (as
1

http://www.nlc.org/revenue-from-intergovernmental-transfers
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with transportation infrastructure), and they may serve as a lever for paternalistic oversight
from higher levels of government in a federalist system. If local preferences lead to too
little spending on a public good, state or national agencies may choose to encourage more
provision through grants.
The underlying motivation for a grant matters because it determines how the grant should
be structured to maximize welfare. At the heart of this issue is the extent to which grants
from higher levels of government replace, or crowd out, lower-level government spending.
For example, if the goal is simply to redistribute income, a lump sum grant would yield the
largest welfare gain to local citizens. Such a grant, however, could crowd out a substantial
degree of funds that local budget-setters would have committed in the absence of external
support. Thus, if the impetus for a grant is to correct the under-provision of a public good
or to elicit spillovers, the grant should be designed to minimize crowd-out and promote
stickiness. In this case, crowding out is undesirable and may defeat the objectives of the
grant program.
Intergovernmental grants typically crowd out some degree of recipient spending no matter
how grant funds are earmarked, which is consistent with theoretical expectations outlined
by Bradford and Oates [13]. For example, Lutz [74] examines the fiscal consequences of New
Hampshire’s 1999 school finance reform and shows that the tax burden of local residents
falls by 90 cents per grant dollar. Lutz attributes this finding to the context surrounding the
reform, including the state’s direct democracy that allows for perfect reflection of median
voter preferences, perfect information on the part of the voters regarding the reform, fiscal
autonomy of the state, and fungibility of the grants. Crowding out is rarely perfect in settings
that have been studied: most of the literature on intergovernmental grants shows that some
share of grant proceeds translates into higher spending, a result dubbed the “flypaper effect”
[49]. The extent of crowd out has been studied for a number of funding sources and funding
intentions, including matched Title I education grants [41, 21], health care [6], highway
funding [57], and law enforcement [5, 33]. A related literature describes agency or grant
features that make income equivalence unlikely, usually highlighting institutional features
that differ from the conditions considered by Bradford and Oates [13]. See, for example,
Filimon et al. [34], Strumpf [99], Payne [83], Brooks et al. [14], Glaeser [39].
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While much is known about the effect of intergovernmental funding transfers on recipient
spending, the literature is much quieter, to date, on the effect of intergovernmental grants
in-kind. There are numerous examples of in-kind transfers from the public sector directly
to individuals, such as food assistance, health care, and housing vouchers [100, 26]. Such
transfers have been shown to raise targeted consumption (i.e., supplement would-be spending
in target areas) but perhaps not to the same extent as cash [25] and not without some
substitution between private purchases and government provision [44]. In a related vein of
research, Carruthers and Wanamaker [20] detect an incomplete flypaper effect arising from
a pre-War school building campaign in the segregated South, which amounted to a series of
large capital transfers from private philanthropies to public school districts. The question of
whether intergovernmental in-kind transfers crowd out local government spending, however,
is open and unstudied. Examples of in-kind transfers from one level of government to another
include the Morrill Act establishing land-grant universities, emergency response equipment
provided to local governments following natural disasters, and the Department of Defense
1033 program considered here.
We contribute to our understanding of the public finance implications of external grants
by exploring local effects of the federal 1033 program, which provides surplus military
gear and vehicles to local governments. This application is the first to our knowledge
that investigates the fiscal impacts of intergovernmental grants taking the form of goods
rather than income. Since 1997, Section 1033 of the National Defense Authorization Act has
allowed for the transfer of surplus or decommissioned U.S. military equipment to local law
enforcement agencies at a nominal price of zero. Decommissioned capital initially used to
provide national defense is re-purposed for the provision of public safety. From 1997 through
2014, the department of defense transferred over $5.2 billion dollars in equipment to local
law enforcement agencies, making it the largest federal-to-local grant of capital goods of
which we are aware.
The 1033 program offers a unique context in which to examine the effects of intergovernmental grants; in short, this setting is one where we would expect little to no crowding
out. Indeed, transfers through the 1033 program are not intended to modify local spending
or preferences, or to transfer resources from rich to poor. Items received through the 1033
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program are physical goods and are thus less fungible than cash. They cannot be sold or
transferred to other local governments. Crowding out is still possible, of course, and could
manifest as intra-agency substitution within or across functions related to 1033 equipment.
This is most likely to arise for in-kind goods that have close substitutes within the local
government’s public safety budget. Additionally, decisions to acquire items through the
1033 program are made solely by police chiefs, typically without local institutional oversight,
public input, or even a signature from a city or county government official. The preferences
of law enforcement executives are thus pivotal and may or may not reflect those of other
bureaucrats or the voting populace. As a result, the median voter is less relevant to the
acquisition of goods. The opacity of the process implies that city or county officials with
presumptive budgetary authority may have incomplete information about the amount of
equipment that police chiefs acquire through the 1033 program. These features of the 1033
program are the inverse of the New Hampshire school finance reform that resulted in almost
complete crowd out [74]. Accordingly, we expect that 1033 transfers will result in little to
no crowding out.
To empirically evaluate the relationship between 1033 program receipts and local public
spending on police protection, we use panel data on county expenditure accounts from the
Annual Survey of Governments matched to the value of 1033 equipment transfers from
the Defense Logistics Agency. Exploiting within-county intertemporal variation in 1033
acquisitions over time, we find that the value of 1033 receipts has no significant effect on
local spending (i.e., a complete flypaper effect with no crowding out and no crowding in). In
our baseline specification, the effect of 1033 acquisitions on local police spending is a relatively
precise zero. Confidence intervals imply that a one percent increase in 1033 transfers affects
police spending in the following year by an absolute value of no more than 0.02 percent.
In no specification do we find statistically significant evidence that receiving goods through
the 1033 program reduces spending. The robust lack of crowding out of intergovernmental
transfers stands in sharp contrast to nearly all of the related grant literature.
While grants through the 1033 program are much less likely to reflect endogenous
voter preferences than other intergovernmental transfers [57], local police spending might
be correlated with other time-varying unobserved factors (e.g., preferences of police chiefs,
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severity of departmental budget constraints, endogenous voter preferences, perhaps, or timevarying heterogeneity in law enforcement leadership). To address concerns about omitted
variables driving both police budgets and 1033 receipts, we approach causal identification
from a second angle exploiting exogenous variation in transaction costs faced by departments
when acquiring 1033 items [45].

Instrumental variables estimates are less precise, but

estimated coefficients for the effect of 1033 receipts on local police expenditures are positive,
nearly significant, and more consistent with crowding in rather than crowding out.
Within the limitations of our data, we examine the possibility that null results mask
heterogeneous effects by county type or equipment. Acquiring items through the 1033
program may raise spending (i.e., crowd in additional resources) if the items in question
are not regular purchases and require complementary inputs.

Of the various types of

equipment considered, vehicles are the largest and most likely to fit this description. A
tactical truck, for example, may require a new storage facility, specialized training, and
unforeseen maintenance. To examine this possibility, we divide 1033 receipts into vehicle
and non-vehicle items. The estimated coefficients on 1033 receipts are greater than zero,
favoring crowding in, we do not find statistically significant evidence for either category of
goods. Additionally, we might expect the effects of 1033 receipts on local police spending to
vary by areas’ fiscal or social conservatism. To evaluate this possibility, we divide the county
panel according to political leanings in the 2008 presidential election. We find no evidence of
heterogeneous effects by aggregate partisanship. We also split the sample into counties with
above or below median population to examine whether crowding in is more or less prominent
in smaller counties. We find statistically significant crowding in among smaller counties, but
the precision of this result is not robust to minor specification changes.
The absence of crowding out is likely attributable to the design of the 1033 program rather
than special features of law enforcement. Evans and Owens [33] and Baicker and Jacobson
[5] examine intergovernmental financial transfers to law enforcement and find significant
but partial crowding out, in accord with the body of research on intergovernmental grants.
The 1033 program transfers capital goods, often large and rarely purchased by agencies
on their own, with decision makers positioned at the end-user department rather than
higher levels or inter-departmental levels of local authority. On the surface, the absence
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of a significant crowd-out (or crowd-in) effect of 1033 transfers on local spending can be
viewed as a positive outcome, given that the program is not designed to replace or amplify
local spending. More importantly, the program-specific circumstances offer lessons for how
intergovernmental transfers could be designed to minimize crowd out. In cases where higher
levels of government wish to increase overall local spending or one reason or another, policy
makers might look to the structure of the 1033 program for guidance.

II

Relevant Background on the 1033 program
The 1033 program was created as a part of the National Defense Authorization Act

of 1997. The stated purpose of section 1033 was to enable the Department of Defense to
transfer military equipment no longer in use to local Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs)
to assist in drug interdiction. While the 1033 program has garnered considerable attention
for transferring tactical equipment (e.g., assault rifles and armored personnel carriers) to
local law enforcement, it has also facilitated transfers of clothing, ice chests, first aid kits,
flashlights, etc. Over 70 percent of the items transferred were of a non-tactical nature. The
1033 program was not designed to be a grant-in-kind program, but rather an avenue for
surplus defense items.
Several features of the 1033 program stand in sharp contrast to most intergovernmental
transfers. First, the items transferred are relatively non-fungible goods of a very specific
nature. The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) forbids secondary transfers of items acquired
through the 1033 program to other agencies.2

Second, there is very little, if any,

administrative cost to participating in this program. There is a simple two-page form to
register as a receiving agency. There is then a one page form to request non-tactical items,
a one page form to request an armored vehicle, a one-page form to request an aircraft, and
so forth. The highest-ranking signature on these forms is that for the chief of police or a
law enforcement officer of similar rank. Unlike Title 1 grants, for example, these transfers
2

For example, a police department cannot request utility trucks and gift them to the county ambulance
service.
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are not overseen or administered by the state.3 Similarly, the acquisition process does not
operate under the auspices of county or municipal governments who make funding decisions,
nor is there any other form of public oversight. Rather, 1033 acquisitions may occur with
or without the knowledge of the local budgetary authority and likely without the knowledge
of voters. While federal monetary grants to local governments must be accounted for and
therefore included in the budgetary process, that is not the case with the 1033 program.4
These features create conditions under which transfers can have an ambiguous effect
on local budgets for law enforcement. If local voters and elected officials are aware of
equipment transfers through the 1033 program, they may choose to reduce police budgets in
subsequent years as is the case with receipts from civil asset forfeitures [5]. This would be
especially likely for transfers that are a close substitute for items that could be acquired from
private sector vendors. Alternatively, if voters and elected officials are (relatively) unaware
of 1033 transfers, these transfers may have no effect on police budgets. However, there
are at least two mechanisms by which transfers through the 1033 program may actually
increase police budgets, or lead to crowding in. First, many state programs contain clauses
that equipment must be used in some form, or returned to the DLA. While these clauses
are essentially toothless (no burden of proof is required), they would give law enforcement
officials leverage to request budget increases. Second, for certain sorts of equipment there
may be a complementary inputs effect, where the items cannot be engaged to produce public
safety without additional inputs. Therefore, the receipt of items through the 1033 program
increases the marginal returns to discretionary resources allocated to police departments,
thus justifying higher spending until net marginal benefits equalize across funding categories.5
3

While each state does have a coordinator, the function of this role is to facilitate communication rather
than control or coordinate the use of funds or gather data.
4
The field on the ASG questionnaire explicitly asks respondents to exclude depreciation and other capital
asset accounting from their reported expenditure figures. The survey is designed to capture operating costs
rather than the depreciation of buildings or in this case, military surplus.
5
For example, if a police department receives a large military vehicle, they may need a storage facility
and a diesel mechanic. With these inputs in place, the vehicle may contribute substantially toward public
safety; without the complementary inputs, the vehicle will simply sit idle. The same analogy can be drawn
for guns requiring ammunition and training time, or non-tactical items requiring storage space.
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II.A

Program Logistics and the Role of Land Area and Proximity

Due to the unique structure of the 1033 program, receipts through this program are less
vulnerable to the sorts of endogeneity concerns first addressed by Knight [57]. Nevertheless,
one arm of our identification strategy relies on a fixed effects instrumental variable (FE-IV)
specification previously discussed by Harris et al. [45]. An abbreviated outline of FE-IV
methods follows. we refer the reader to Harris et al. [45] for further discussion.
Specifically we draw on two sources of exogenous variation.

First, the amount of

equipment available for distribution through the 1033 program varies exogenously over time.
Disbursements of tactical items increased sharply in 2006 when the M-16 was replaced by
the M-4 carbine as the standard issue weapon for the Army and Marine Corps. After 2009,
the draw down from Iraq and Afghanistan steeply increased the availability of all types of
equipment. More generally, the supply of equipment is determined by national military
spending and need rather than any facet of local law enforcement. Second, law enforcement
agencies face plausibly exogenous differences in the transportation costs associated with
acquiring 1033 items. The interaction of these two factors (variation in availability and
transaction costs) yields variables that affect the cost of acquiring goods through the 1033
program but are uncorrelated with bureaucratic and voter preferences for public safety or
other unobservable factors that determine police budgets.
The DLA states that, particularly for vehicles, preference will be given to jurisdictions
with larger land areas. There is a field for “land area” on the 1033 vehicle request form.
Counties whose law enforcement officers have more ground to cover will likely gain greater
benefits from the use of vehicles. This is an important source of variation, given that
vehicles account for approximately half of the total value of goods distributed through the
program. While DLA relayed that they were able to meet the needs of local enforcement
agencies over time (meaning there was no long-term two-way selection problem), land area
was a consideration in determining which claims were prioritized at a given point in time.
The interaction of land area with the total value of equipment distributed through the
1033 program in a given year serves as our main instrument in the empirical specification.
Additionally, local LEAs were responsible for their own costs in identifying, evaluating, and
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acquiring equipment through the 1033 program. There are 18 Field Activity Centers (FAC)
that are in charge of distributing 1033 items. All decomissioned items, particularly those of a
sensitive nature, are sent to the FAC nearest the military unit from which the decomissioned
item originated for processing. LEAs that acquire 1033 items must pay for all transaction
costs, including evaluation and shipping costs from the FAC where the decommissioned
items are processed. The location of these FAC’s predates the 1033 program by at least
20 years, meaning that their placement is completely independent of whether nearby police
departments are substantial users of surplus equipment. Additionally, being near a FAC
does not equate to being near a military base. All else equal, LEAs that are farther from
a FAC will face higher evaluation and acquisition costs than LEAs in close proximity to a
FAC. Given that items are only made available for claim by local law enforcement in a 14-day
window and that claimed items must be immediately taken into possession, the difference
between traveling 100 miles or 200 miles to evalulate goods is non-trivial. We therefore
also use inverse distance to the nearest FAC as an instrument in some specifications and
sensitivity analyses.

III

Data

The main source of local finance data is the Census of Governments and the Annual
Survey of Government Finances (ASG) from 2006 to 2014, collected by the U.S. Census
Bureau. While the Census Bureau canvassed the universe of government units in 2007
and 2012, data for other years are based on voluntary surveys of the same government
units. These data provide detailed information on the revenues and expenditures of different
levels of government. We primarily focus on police expenditures of county governments
since this is the finest unit of government for which all necessary data are available. Police
protection expenditures comprise spending on “police patrols and communications, crime
prevention activities, detention and custody of persons awaiting trial, traffic safety, and
vehicular inspection.”6
6

https://www.census.gov/govs/local/definitions.html.
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Although ASG data are widely used in the public finance literature, there are some
known issues that must be acknowledged. First, any zero values in ASG data can either
represent a true zero or a missing figure; differentiating between the two is not always
possible. Fortunately, only 1.3 percent of the sample reported zero expenditure for police
protection. Assuming that data from counties that consistently reported zeros for police
protection are valid, those dubious zeros account for less than one percent of the observations.
Second, the county-year panel in the ASG data is not balanced. If survey participation
decisions of governments are not random conditional on control variables, our estimates
would be biased. While we use the unbalanced panel as our primary analytical sample, we
show in Appendices B.A and B.C that results are similar when using the balanced panel.
Data on transfers of military equipment to local law enforcement agencies come from
the DLA. These data contain information on agencies to which transfers were made, item
name and corresponding National Stock Number (NSN), shipping date, quantity, and the
acquisition value of the item. The data that we use in the analysis were last updated in
September 2015 and coded at the individual agency level. Thus, we infer county information
from the agency name and the state to which the agency belongs by combining DLA data
with the Law Enforcement Agency Identifiers Crosswalk file created by the Bureau of Justice
Statistics and the National Archive of Criminal Justice Data (NACJD). We first combine
the two datasets using character-merge and then manually match observations that have
low matching scores or cannot be matched automatically. Observations from agencies whose
county information cannot be identified are dropped from the sample.7
We also collect information on county characteristics from other sources. Data on crime
rates are obtained from the county-level Uniform Crime Reports, published by the Federal
Bureau of Investigation and reproduced by the NACJD. Using agency-level data provided
by the FBI, the NACJD imputes missing data and aggregates the data by county.8 We use
aggregate rates of arrests for murder, rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, and other
assaults. The Census provides intercensal population estimates, which includes demographic
7

In particular, because Berkshire County Sheriffs Office (MA), Northern York County Police (PA), and
York-Poquoson Sheriffs Office (VA) belong to multiple-jurisdictions, we are unable to uniquely identify county
information for those agencies.
8
For more details regarding the imputation, refer to the NACJD’s Uniform Crime Reporting Program
Resource Guide (https://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/content/NACJD/guides/ucr.html).
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information for counties. Using these estimates, we calculate the male population share, the
share of population aged 15 to 24, and an index of racial diversity similar to one used
by [1].9 Data on household median income and unemployment rates are obtained from
the Small Area Income and Poverty Estimates of the Census Bureau and Bureau of Labor
Statistics, respectively. Finally, we collect data on the 2008 U.S. presidential election from
the Guardian.10 The data contain the number of votes that each presidential candidate
received by county.
The counties in our analytical sample constitute a substantial portion of county-level law
enforcement in the United States. The Bureau of Justice Statistics reported that the U.S.
as a whole spends $100 billion on the policing aspect of law enforcement per year.11 County
Sheriff’s Offices - the focus of our analysis - account for approximately $30 billion of the $100
billion spent nationally. In 2007, counties in our sample accounted for 73.5% of that $30
billion [16]. Additionally, county government entities in our sample absorbed a significant
portion of the items distributed through the 1033 program. In 2012, county governments
in our sample received 38 percent of the total value of goods transferred through the 1033
program.
Table 2.1 lists summary statistics. The first two columns show the mean and standard
deviation of each variable in the unbalanced sample and the last two columns show the
same statistics for a balanced subset of our main panel. Note that lagged 1033 item values
and police expenditures are expressed in per capita terms and crime rates are expressed
per 100,000 population. All monetary values are adjusted for inflation using CPI-U-RS
and given in thousands of logged 2012 U.S. dollars. The unbalanced panel contains about
30 percent more observations than the balanced panel. While statistics of most variables
look quite similar across the panels, the average population size of the unbalanced panel is
substantially smaller than the average population size of the balanced panel. Since small
9

P
The racial diversity measure is defined as diversityjt = 1 − k race2kjt , where racekjt represents the
population share of a particular race k, where k consists of white, black or African American, American
Indian and Alaska Native, Asian and Native Hawaiian/Other Pacific Islander, two or more races, in county
j in year t.
10
The data can be obtained from the following webpage (https://www.theguardian.com/news/
datablog/2009/mar/02/us-elections-2008).
11
The ‘policing aspect’ reflects that this estimate does not include funds spent on corrections. Source:
http://www.justicepolicy.org/research/3906
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Table 2.1: Summary statistics

Lagged 1033 item value per capita ($)
Lagged 1033 value per capita — value¿0
ln(Lagged 1033 item value per capita) ($)
ln(Lagged 1033 vehicle item value per capita) ($)
Police expenditure per capita ($)
ln(Police expenditure per capita) ($)
Population (1,000)
Land Area (sq. mi.)
Median income
Male (%)
Age 15 to 24 (%)
Diversity index (% point)
Poverty (%)
Unemployment rate (%)
Lagged murder per 100,000 population
Lagged rape per 100,000 population
Lagged robbery per 100,000 population
Lagged aggravated per 100,000 population
Lagged burglary per 100,000 population
Lagged assault per 100,000 population
Observations

Unbalanced
Balanced
Mean Std. Errors Mean Std. Errors
0.24
(2.04)
0.19
(1.73)
1.46
(4.82)
1.144
(4.17)
0.08
(0.34)
0.06
(0.30)
0.06
(0.32)
0.05
(0.28)
96.75
(103.49)
91.34
(76.33)
4.29
(0.79)
4.24
(0.79)
130.42
(374.86)
189.13
(462.28)
1084.43 (1510.55) 1220.38 (1701.70)
45.45
(11.91)
47.73
(12.90)
49.80
(1.84)
49.57
(1.48)
13.38
(3.40)
13.77
(3.58)
20.80
(15.82)
22.81
(15.76)
15.32
(6.39)
15.89
(6.38)
7.00
(2.94)
6.90
(2.95)
1.17
(4.31)
1.03
(3.07)
2.34
(5.92)
2.09
(4.96)
3.46
(8.77)
3.80
(9.17)
34.98
(60.83)
31.50
(51.80)
30.18
(46.24)
27.22
(42.07)
116.76
(162.73)
112.16
(162.47)
17,539
10,998

Note: The unbalanced panel consists of all county governments that at least once participated in the
Annual Survey of State and Local Government Finances from 2006 to 2014 (including census years 2007
and 2012) and the balanced panel consists of county governments that fully participated in the survey.
Both samples consist of county-level law enforcement agencies that are matched to county governments.
All dollars are inflation-adjusted using CPI-U-RS and expressed in 2012 U.S. dollars.

county governments have greater participation rates in the census years (2007 and 2012),
the difference is not surprising. In the unbalanced panel, the average county spends about
$96.80 per capita for police protection and receives 1033 items that amount to 24 cents
per capita. While that number appears small, it is an artifact of irregular participation in
the 1033 program. In the balanced panel, 61.3 percent of counties participated in the 1033
program in at least one year, whereas only 16.7 percent of counties received any 1033 item in
a given year. Conditional on receipt, the average value of receipts in the unbalanced panel
increases to 1.47 dollars per capita, or 1.5 percent of total police spending.12

12

Conditional on receipt, the average police spending is $99.80 in the unbalanced panel.
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Table 2.2: National county average vs. counties in our estimation sample (in 2012)

ln(Lagged 1033 item value per capita) ($)
ln(Lagged 1033 vehicle item value per capita) ($)
ln(Police expenditure per capita) ($)
Population (1,000)
Median income ($1,000)
Male (%)
Age 15 to 24 (%)
Diversity index (% point)
Poverty (%)
Unemployment rate (%)
Lagged murder per 100,000 population
Lagged rape per 100,000 population
Lagged robbery per 100,000 population
Lagged aggravated per 100,000 population
Lagged burglary per 100,000 population
Lagged assault per 100,000 population

Obs.
3002
3002
2992
3118
3118
3118
3118
3118
3118
3118
3007
3007
3007
3007
3007
3007

National average
Mean Std. Errors
0.12
(0.43)
0.11
(0.42)
4.37
(0.74)
99.44
(319.95)
44.75
(11.32)
50.04
(2.24)
13.03
(3.46)
20.47
(16.16)
17.22
(6.57)
7.85
(2.77)
1.12
(5.76)
2.26
(8.59)
4.22
(70.66)
32.66
(116.51)
30.51
(59.73)
109.03
(197.08)

Estimation sample
Obs. Mean Std. Errors
2656 0.13
(0.45)
2656 0.12
(0.45)
2656 4.37
(0.74)
2656 103.18
(330.58)
2656 44.94
(11.31)
2656 50.00
(2.06)
2656 13.00
(3.26)
2656 20.27
(15.76)
2656 17.12
(6.49)
2656 7.88
(2.74)
2656 1.16
(3.98)
2656 2.39
(5.85)
2656 3.13
(7.86)
2656 34.29
(55.85)
2656 33.31
(49.23)
2656 118.84
(159.99)

Note: This table compares the average characteristics of the whole U.S. counties to the average characteristics of
counties in our unbalanced panel as of 2012. We compute the county-level national average using data from various
sources described in Section III. All dollars are inflation-adjusted using CPI-U-RS and expressed in 2012 U.S. dollars.
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Counties in our unbalanced analytical sample are broadly representative of the U.S. as
a whole. Table 2.2 compares summary statistics of our estimation sample in 2012 to the
national average for each county. In no area are there significant differences.

IV

Empirical Model

We begin with the following equation to evaluate the reduced-form effect of 1033 item
acquisition on police protection expenditures of county-level LEAs:
ln(protectionj,s,t ) = β0 + β1 ln(valuej,s,t−1 ) + ΓXj,s,t + θj + δs t + εj,s,t

(2.1)

where ln(protectionj,s,t ) represents logged police protection expenditure of county j in state s
in year t and ln(valuesj,s,t−1 ) represents a monetary value of items that the law enforcement
agency received through the 1033 program in year t−1. Note that both ln(protectionj,s,t ) and
ln(valuesj,s,t−1 ) are normalized to the county population and expressed in per capita terms.
Xj,s,t is a vector of time-varying county-level characteristics including median household
income, male population share, the share of the population aged 15 to 24, racial diversity
index, poverty rate, and unemployment rate. Parameters θj and δs t are county fixed effects
and state-specific time trends, respectively. Results are robust to inclusion of year fixed
effects in lieu of state-specific time trends for both the unbalanced and balanced panel samples
(see Appendices B.B and B.C). Robust standard errors are clustered at the county level. As a
benchmark for interpretation, if β1 = 0, that implies there is no crowding in or crowding out,
but that the 1033 grants are perfectly sticky. If β1 < 0, that implies there is some crowding
out, that 1033 receipts displace some future county expenditures on law enforcement. If
β1 > 0, that result implies there is crowding-in, or that 1033 receipts attract additional
resources to law enforcement. The recent economics literature on intergovernmental grants
nearly always finds evidence of crowding out. The features of different grant programs
determine the strength of the crowding out effect.
The fixed effects model presented in Equation 2.1 relies on within-county variation in the
value of acquired 1033 items over time. Under the assumption that the error term εj,s,t is
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not systematically correlated with 1033 item values after controlling for other variables, we
can obtain an unbiased estimate for β1 . However, this assumption might not hold for several
reasons. For example, Knight [57] shows that endogeneity arises due to a correlation between
grant receipts and unobserved tastes for public goods. In general, any correlation between
time-varying unobserved factors that affect both public expenditures on public safety and the
value of receipts through the 1033 program (e.g., motivation by law enforcement leadership
to court additional resources) can lead to biased estimates.
To address concerns about endogeneity, we estimate the FE-IV model using a subset of
instrumental variables described above and by Harris et al. [45]. Most critically, we use the
interaction between the total value of all items dispensed through the 1033 program in a
given year and the land area of a county (value-land interaction).13 The first stage of the
FE-IV expression can be expressed as:
ln(valuej,s,t ) = α0 + α1 ln(landareaj,s ∗ Vt ) + αXj,s,t + θj1 + δs1 t + εj1,s,t

(2.2)

where Vt represents the total value of all items disbursed through the 1033 program in year
t. Our main specification includes state-specific time trends rather than year fixed effects
to control for time-varying heterogeneity by state. This allows us to take full advantage of
exogenous time-series variation in the disbursements of capital through the 1033 program.
Several conversations with the DLA revealed that time-series variation in items disbursed
is not from an unobservable source, but from observable military operational and logistical
decisions. For example, in 2006, the Army and Marine Corps switched from the M-16
assault rifle to the M-4 carbine as their standard infantry weapon, creating a large number
of assault rifles transferred through the 1033 program that year. The increase in items made
available through the 1033 program from 2009-2013 was due to the drawdown from Iraq
and Afghanistan, and the continued decommissioning of equipment as units returned. By
omitting year fixed effects, we assume that nationwide intertemporal shifts in police spending
are not correlated with shocks in 1033 disbursements. However, not only is the 1033 program
is a very small part of DLA’s overall operation, but Law Enforcement Agencies are third or
13

Land area and all other time-invariant characteristics are implicitly captured by county-level fixed effects,
as are time-invariant unobservable factors that are correlated with land area or proximit to FAC.
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fourth in the hierarchy of claimants of decommissioned equipment. These factors minimize
the threat to identification from year-specific unobservable factors. However, for readers
concerned about year fixed effects, results from specifications with year fixed effects are
available in Appendices B.B and B.C. In these specifications, we use the inverse distance to
the nearest field activity center as the cross-sectional component of our instrument.
We use log-log specifications for our regressions due to the high level of skewness in both
the distribution of police spending, but also 1033 receipts. The 1033 receipts in particular
are highly skewed not only between, but within counties over time. As the data on 1033
receipts are administrative data, we do not suspect that this skewness is due to reporting
errors. Therefore, any strategy involving the trimming of outliers would be arbitrary and
unacceptable. Because level-level specifications are the standard in the flypaper literature,
we have included a set of results using a level-level specification in Appendix B.D. While the
FE models and the FE-IV models with year fixed effects provide further evidence for the
stickiness of the 1033 grants, the IV results are too imprecise to be informative. Therefore,
the log-log specification, the results of which should be interpreted as an elasticity rather
than a dollar-for-dollar displacement, is our preferred specification.

V

Results
We first report results from the FE models to establish a baseline descriptive relationship.

We then present results from IV specifications. Almost all versions of equation 2.1 return a
null result for 1033 item value, implying that these particular in-kind grants do not crowd
out or crowd in local spending on law enforcement. Finally, we investigate whether null
results mask heterogeneous treatment effects by county or equipment characteristics.
Table 2.3 contains results of the baseline FE models. Estimated coefficients are generally
close to zero with economically small confidence intervals, implying a perfect flypaper effect.
Column (1) lists results from the baseline Equation 2.1 specification, and column (2) includes
additional control variables for crime rates.14 In both cases, the 95 percent confidence interval
14

While adding crime variables to the baseline specification improves the precision of the estimates, it
is unclear whether the best specification includes or excludes crime rates. While arguments for including
crime rates as control variables are obvious, studies have also shown that police protection expenditures
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implies that a one percent increase in the value of receipts from the 1033 program leads to
a change in local police expenditures between -0.012 and 0.004 percent. Because many of
the items received through the 1033 program are durable capital goods, they may have
budgetary effects beyond the next year, particularly if crowding in occurs due to the need
for complementary inputs.15 Column (3) evaluates this possibility by examining whether
items received in period t − 2 or t − 3 affect contemporaneous spending on public safety.
While only the third lag is statistically significant, all estimates are positive, reinforcing that
we find no evidence of crowding out. Column (4) represents a specification that includes
item values for year t + 1 as a falsification test of the timing assumptions in our model.
The estimate for the lead term is insignificant, indicating that pre-existing trends are not
of primary concern in our setting. Columns (5) and (6) demonstrate that results are not
sensitive to alternative ways of controlling for time-varying heterogeneity, such as year fixed
effects and the inclusion of both state-specific time trends and year fixed effects. While we
find no evidence of crowding out, confidence intervals indicate that if 1033 receipts do crowd
out local police spending, they do with an elasticity less than 0.02.16
While the institutional features of the 1033 program make sources of endogeneity
discussed by Knight [57] less likely, they do not eliminate all concerns about correlated
unobservables that affect local spending on police protection and acquisition of items through
the 1033 program. For example, if chiefs of police who participate in the 1033 program
aggressively court resources from all sources (including the local government), our results
will suffer from omitted variable bias. We therefore implement a fixed effects instrumental
variables approach as described in Harris et al. [45], the results of which are found in Table
2.4. Panel A of Table 2.4 contains the results of the first-stage estimation, and Panel B
contains FE-IV estimates of the effect of 1033 receipts on local police spending. For all
specifications in Table 2.4, we use land area as a time invariant characteristic, interacted
are endogenous to crime [68, 29]. Therefore, results in (1) and (2) should not be viewed as a horse-race,
but simply specification checks that our results are not sensitive to the inclusion/exclusion of crime rates as
controls.
15
For example, if a department acquires assault rifles, it will need additional funding for ammunition to
train/qualify officers beyond the next calendar year.
16
As a robustness check, we have run a specification that includes both leads and lags of 1033 receipts.
the results are not substantively different in any way.
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Table 2.3: The effects of 1033 program on police spending: FE model

ln(Item value per capita t−1 )

(1)
-0.004
(0.008)

(2)
-0.004
(0.008)

ln(Item value per capita t−2 )
ln(Item value per capita t−3 )

(3)
0.009
(0.008)
0.005
(0.013)
0.031∗∗
(0.014)

ln(Item value per capita t+1 )
County characteristics
Crime controls
State-specific linear time trends
Year fixed effects
Observations
R2

X

X
X
X

X
17539
0.098

17539
0.098

X
X
X
9069
0.053

(4)

0.002
(0.010)
X
X
X
13101
0.110

(5)
0.001
(0.009)

(6)
-0.002
(0.008)

X
X

X
X
X
X
17539
0.102

X
17539
0.046

Note: This analysis uses the unbalanced panel described in Table 2.1. The dependent
variable is logged police protection expenditure of county governments per capita. We
control for county-level time-varying characteristics such as median household incomes,
male shares, shares of the population aged from 15 to 24, racial diversity, poverty rates,
and unemployment rates in all specifications. In column (2) to column (6), we add arrest
rates for the following crime types: murder, rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary,
and assault. All dollars are inflation-adjusted using CPI-U-RS and expressed in 2012 U.S.
dollars. Standard errors are clustered at the government level and given in parentheses. ∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01

with the nationwide value of goods released through the 1033 program as an instrument for
the value of 1033 receipts.17
Specifications in columns (1) and (2) are the same as columns (1) and (2) in Table 2.3,
but with instrumental variables predicting 1033 item value. First stage F-statistics on the
exclusion restrictions are greater than 20, which far exceeds the benchmark value of 10
[97]. While coefficients are larger in magnitude and less precise than those from reduced
form fixed effects models, they are positive (favoring crowding in) and nearly significant
(p-value ≈ 0.11). Columns (3) and (4) address concerns about whether results are driven by
counties that are highly likely or unlikely to participate at the extensive margin. To do so,
we estimated a propensity score for a county’s participation in the 1033 program.18 Column
17

We again refer readers to Harris et al. [45] for additional supporting evidence on the validity of these
instruments.
18
To obtain propensity scores, we estimate a logit model where the dependent variable is a binary indicator
that takes 1 if a county received any 1033 item in a given year and 0 otherwise. The model controls for
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Table 2.4: The effects of 1033 program on police spending: FE-IV model
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

0.023∗∗∗
(0.005)

0.023∗∗∗
(0.005)

0.022∗∗∗
(0.006)

0.021∗∗∗
(0.007)

0.346
(0.217)
25.584
25.774
0.090
Full
X

0.346
(0.223)
24.613
24.773
0.097
Full
X
X
X
17532

0.085
(0.240)
14.921
14.986
0.728
0.1 ≤ p
X
X
X
13627

0.088
(0.301)
9.329
9.360
0.791
0.15 ≤ p
X
X
X
10618

Panel A: First-stage
ln(V aluet−1 × Landj )
Panel B: Second-stage
ln(Item value per capita t−1 )
Kleibergen-Paap LM statistic
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistic
Endogeneity Test
Sample
County characteristics
Crime controls
State-specific linear time trends
Observations

X
17532

Note: Column (1) and column (2) use the full unbalanced sample. Column (3)
and column (4) restrict the sample based on the likelihood of receiving any items
through the 1033 program, p. Panel A summarizes the first-stage estimates where
the the dependent variable is the value of items that a county-level agency has
received through 1033 program. V aluet−1 is the total value of 1033 items released
by the Department of Defense in a year t − 1. Landj is the land area of county j.
Panel B summarizes the second-stage results where the dependent variable is logged
police protection expenditure of county governments per capita. The KleibergenPaap Wald F statistic shows the relevance of the instruments. The Kleibergen-Paap
LM statistic is used to test whether a model is under-identified. We also test the
null hypothesis that the item value can actually be treated as exogenous using a
GMM distance test proposed by [8] and present the results. All dollars are inflationadjusted using CPI-U-RS and expressed in 2012 U.S. dollars. Standard errors are
clustered at the government level and given in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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(3) contains results from a sample restricted to counties with a greater than 10 percent
estimated propensity to participate. Column (4) also excludes counties with a less than
15 percent estimated propensity to participate. While these sample restrictions decrease
the magnitude of estimates, they further support the inference that receipts from the 1033
program do not crowd out county expenditures on law enforcement.

V.A

Heterogeneous effects of the 1033 program

We show in the previous section that grants-in-kind through the 1033 program do not
crowd out subsequent local police spending. However, our null results may mask significant
heterogeneous effects either by equipment type or subsample. For example, it is possible that
certain ordinary items may result in substantial crowding out, while vehicles may require
additional funds for maintenance and operation resulting in crowding in. Alternatively, if
acquiring resources through the 1033 program gives chiefs additional political capital in the
budget process, we may expect crowding-in effects to be more or less pronounced in counties
with greater fiscal conservatism, for which we use the county’s vote in the 2008 presidential
election as a proxy. Finally, the size of the county may also lead to heterogeneity in the
effects of 1033 receipts. On one hand, larger counties may find it easier to shift resources to
provide complementary inputs. Alternatively, the moving of resources between budget areas
may simply be more visible in smaller counties.
To investigate heterogeneous effects by equipment type, we split the value of receipts into
two categories: vehicle and non-vehicle. While it is not always clear which items will require
complementary inputs, vehicles are the most likely candidates. In the absence of additional
funds for storage, fuel, maintenance, and possibly personnel who can operate and maintain
military vehicles, these items will not be productive inputs for public safety.19 Table 2.5
summarizes estimation results from a specification identical to column (1) in Tables 2.3 and
county population as well as all covariates included in the column (2) of Table 2.3. The average propensity
score in the unbalanced sample is 0.188.
19
We define an item as a vehicle if its FSG is 15 (aircraft and airframe structural components), 16 (aircraft
components and accessories), 17 (aircraft launching, landing, and ground handling equipment), 19 (ships,
small craft, pontoons, and floating docks), 20 (ship and marine equipment), 23 (ground effect vehicles, motor
vehicles, trailers, and cycles), or 24 (tractors). Non-vehicle item values are obtained by simply subtracting
the vehicle item values from the total item values at the agency level.
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Table 2.5: The heterogeneous effects of 1033 program on police spending: by item types
(1)
(2)
Vehicle
FE
FE-IV
0.001
0.590
(0.007) (0.391)

ln(V ehicle item value per capita t−1 )
ln(N on − vehicle item value per capita t−1 )
Kleibergen-Paap LM statistic
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistic
Endogeneity test
Observations

(3)
(4)
Non-vehicle
FE
FE-IV

-0.049
(0.033)

17539

8.553
8.535
0.077
17532

17539

0.174
(0.256)
242.324
270.915
0.385
17532

Note: We use the unbalanced panel and estimate the baseline equation (2.1) using both
FE and FE-IV models. In column (1) and column (2), the dependent variable is the logged
value of vehicle items that a county has received through 1033 program. In column (3) and
column (4), the dependent variable is the logged value of non-vehicle items. The FE-IV
models use the value-land interaction to instrument for the item value. See the note in
Table 2.4 for descriptions of test statistics. All dollars are inflation-adjusted using CPI-URS and expressed in 2012 U.S. dollars. Standard errors are clustered at the government
level and given in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.

2.4, except that the key covariate in this analysis is either the lagged values of vehicle items
or the lagged values of non-vehicle items. Results imply that neither lagged 1033 vehicle nor
non-vehicles values lead to crowding out in local police spending. The FE-IV estimates for
both vehicles and non-vehicles, shown in columns (2) and (4) are both positive for vehicles
and non-vehicles, but much larger and nearly significant for vehicles. While results are
somewhat consistent with a complimentary inputs story for vehicles, they are ultimately too
weak to be conclusive.
In Table 2.6, we question whether the fiscal impact of the 1033 program on local police
expenditures depends on the political preferences of counties. We divide the sample into
two groups, Democrat and Republican, based on the 2008 U.S. presidential election votes.
If the number of votes for the candidate from the Democratic party is above the median
in our sample, the county is considered as Democrat. Otherwise, the county is considered
as Republican. We repeat both FE and FE-IV specifications on each subsample. Results
in Table 2.6 do not suggest heterogeneous effects by party affiliation. For both subsamples,
baseline results are a relatively precise zero, and IV results are weakly positive but imprecise.

62

Table 2.6: The heterogeneous effects of 1033 program on police spending: by political
preferences

ln(Item value per capita t−1 )
Kleibergen-Paap LM statistic
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistic
Endogeneity test
County characteristics
Crime controls
State-specific linear time trends
Observations

(1)
(2)
Republican
FE
FE-IV
-0.004
0.308
(0.009) (0.242)
18.585
18.709
0.177
X
X
X
X
X
X
10741
10734

(3)
(4)
Democrat
FE
FE-IV
-0.010
0.522
(0.012) (0.494)
6.637
6.625
0.240
X
X
X
X
X
X
6798
6798

Note: We split the unbalanced panel into two groups based on political preferences
of counties and estimate the baseline equation (2.1) using both FE and FE-IV
models. The sample is restricted to counties whose Democrat vote shares for 2008
U.S. presidential election are less than or equal to the median of the balanced panel
(“Republican”) in the first two columns and to counties whose Democrat vote shares
are greater than the median (“Democrat”) in the last two columns. The dependent
variable is logged police protection expenditure of county governments per capita. The
FE-IV models use the value-land interaction to instrument for the item value. See the
note in Table 2.4 for descriptions of test statistics. All dollars are inflation-adjusted
using CPI-U-RS and expressed in 2012 U.S. dollars. Standard errors are clustered at
the government level and given in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.

Finally, we investigate heterogeneous effects of 1033 receipts on local police spending by
the size of the county. We split the sample into large counties and small counties based
on the population size and estimate FE and FE-IV specifications. Results are summarized
in Table 2.7. Similar to prior tables, FE estimates in column (1) and column (3) are a
relatively precise zero, reinforcing the null result. FE-IV results actually imply that 1033
receipts lead to crowding in among small counties, but are insignificant for larger counties.
Larger counties may find it easier to move money between line items because of the breadth
and size of the overall budget. Small counties are more likely to face sharper tradeoffs in
reallocating resources, and are therefore more likely to seek additional money from the county
government. However, conclusions that 1033 acquisitions crowd in more spending in small
counties are not robust to sample or specification changes in Appendices B.B and B.C.
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Table 2.7: The heterogeneous effects of 1033 program on police spending: by population
size
(1)

ln(Item value per capita t−1 )
Kleibergen-Paap LM statistic
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistic
Endogeneity test
County characteristics
Crime controls
State-specific linear time trends
Observations

(2)

Small
FE
FE-IV
-0.010 0.655∗∗
(0.009) (0.262)
19.807
19.945
0.002
X
X
X
X
X
X
10289
10282

(3)

(4)

Large
FE
FE-IV
0.006
-0.351
(0.010) (0.468)
7.703
7.700
0.432
X
X
X
X
X
X
7250
7250

Note: We split the unbalanced panel into two groups based on the population size of
counties and estimate the baseline equation (2.1) using both FE and FE-IV models.
The sample is restricted to counties whose population sizes are less than or equal to
the mean of the balanced panel (“Small”) in the first two columns and to counties
whose population sizes are greater than the median (“Large”) in the last two columns.
The dependent variable is logged police protection expenditure of county governments
per capita. The FE-IV models use the value-land interaction to instrument for the
item value. See the note in Table 2.4 for descriptions of test statistics. All dollars are
inflation-adjusted using CPI-U-RS and expressed in 2012 U.S. dollars. Standard errors
are clustered at the government level and given in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗∗
p < 0.01.

VI

Discussion

We investigate the effect of aid-in-kind from the 1033 program on local expenditures
for police protection.

In sharp contrast to virtually all recent empirical literature on

intergovernmental transfers, we find no evidence that receipts of 1033 goods crowd out local
spending on public safety. In other words, we find evidence of a perfect flypaper effect. This
lack of crowd out is robust to using unbalanced or balanced panel samples, year fixed effects,
or a level-level, rather than a log-log specification. These specification checks are available
in Appendices B.A-B.D.
While these results are not sufficiently precise to completely rule out any crowding out
effects, they indicate that capital receipts through the 1033 program lead to much less
crowding out that other studies of earmarked grants for transportation, law enforcement, and
education. Estimated effects of intergovernmental transfers from recent economics papers
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Table 2.8: Related research on intergovernmental transfers
Author(s)
Knight (2002)
Baicker and Jacobson (2007)
Brooks and Phillips (2008)
Lutz (2010)
Cascio, Gordon, and Reber (2013)
Vegh and Vuletin (2015)
Bruce et al (2018)
Bruce et al (2018)
Bruce et al (2018)

Program/transfer type
Federal Highway Aid
Police seizures
Community Development Block Grant
New Hampshire’s school finance reform
Introduction of Title I
Fiscal transfers in Argentina
1033 Grants-in-Kind (FE)
1033 Grants-in-Kind (FE-IV)
1033 Grants-in-Kind (FE level-level)

Estimates
[-0.88(0.42), -1.33(0.53)]
[-0.81(0.36), -1.3(0.39)]
[-0.66(0.31), -0.77(0.39)]
[-0.75(0.12), -0.98(0.19)]
-0.5(0.08)
[-1.64(0.19), -1.7(0.22)]
[-0.004 (0.008)]
[0.346 (0.217)]
[0.10 (0.21)]

Grant size (%)
33.59 - 34.90%a
3.61%b
1.63%
29.90%c
2.86% d
60%
1.5% e

Note: Ranges of estimates are given in the bracket. Standard errors of estimates are given in the parentheses.
Figures presented in Table 1 of Knight [57] are used.
b Figures presented in Table 1 of Baicker and Jacobson [5] are used.
c Figures presented in Table 2 of Lutz [74] are used.
d Figures presented in Table 1 of Cascio et al. [21] are used.
e The figure presents the share of the 1033 grants conditional on the receipt.
a

are summarized in Table 2.8. While the first two estimates from this paper are elasticities
rather than level-level effects, FE estimates are centered near zero, which is outside the 95
percent confidence interval for virtually all previous estimates. The FE-IV estimates, while
imprecise, are positive with a p-value just over 0.12. We also include the FE result from
our level-level specification in Appendix B.D. This point estimate is also above zero, which
implies crowding in, and the confidence interval imples that there is at most 30 percent
crowding out, which is much less than most prior piont estimates in this literature. While
we therefore cannot completely reject crowding out, results imply that the 1033 grants are
considerably sticker than previously studied grants.
The stickiness of the 1033 grants may be attributable to unique features of the program.
Unlike other intergovernmental aid programs, 1033 grants are provided in the form of less
fungible, non-transferable capital goods and the take-up decision is made by a chief of police
rather than local voters or budgetary personnel. The opacity of the process means that
there is little if any public oversight associated with gear acquisition. While the stickiness
of the grant program may be deemed positive when the goal of the grant is to increase the
total amount of resources allocated for a public good in a specific category, the lack of local
oversight raises questions regarding welfare consequences of the 1033 program.
Due to data limitations, we leave for future work the question of which specific features of
the program are necessary to achieve perfect stickiness. Understanding which features (lack
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of transparency, weak fungibility, or application below the level of budget authority) leads
to stickiness or crowd in would be of great value in designing future grants in contexts where
crowd out is highly undesirable. Each such feature, however, leads to some inefficiency
and reduces total welfare compared to lump-sum cash transfers. However, when either
paternalistic motivations or the desire to capitalize on positive externalities motivates the
grant, programs that share some structural or administrative features of the 1033 program
may be more effective in preventing the crowd out of intergovernmental transfers.
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Chapter 3
Expenditure Cascades: Evidence from
the Bush Administration Tax Reforms
I

Introduction
One remarkable feature of recent growing income inequality in the U.S. is a sharp increase

in real income of the top 1 percent in contrast to stagnant median income (for example, see
Piketty and Saez [84], Autor et al. [4]). In a series of work [36, 37, 38], Frank has suggested
that the very-rich would engage in more consumption as their income rises, increasing the
standard of consumption. This in turn makes households whose income are just below them
consume more. Frank refers to this chain of process as expenditure cascades.
This paper provides quasi-experimental evidence of consumption externalities along the
income distribution. A series of tax reforms during the Bush Administration (2001-2009)
changed purchasing power of U.S. households in an asymmetric way by reducing marginal
tax rates (MTR) for households whose MTR was equal to or greater than 28 percent
by at least three percentage points, while leaving the MTR for those at the 15 percent
tax bracket unchanged. As a result, the after-tax income distribution of U.S. households
has become more unequal. I exploit this exogenous shock in the income distribution to
examine whether the middle-to-low-income households raise their consumption in response
to increased consumption among high-income households.
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Using the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CE) data ranging from 1994 to 2007, I show
that quarterly consumption of households with high tax liabilities went up by $520 after
the tax reforms. I also show that households with low tax liabilities living in states with a
greater share of high-income taxpayers increased their consumption more substantially than
similar households living in states with a lower share of high-income taxpayers, after the tax
reforms. My preferred specification estimates that consumption externalities generated by
the tax reforms raised consumption of middle-to-low-income households by $410 to $443.
Further analysis reveals that increased spending on housing and vehicles primarily led to
the consumption growth for both upper-income and lower-income households. This entailed
a reduction in food consumption at home for lower-income households. On the contrary,
food-at-home consumption of high-income households was constant over the period. This
finding is consistent with the argument of Frank [36] that the growth in consumption of
visible goods triggered by consumption of the top-income would hurt low-income households
by reducing resources that can be spent on necessities such as food, unless their incomes rise
accordingly.
This paper makes two distinct contributions to existing studies on household consumption. First, to my knowlege, this is the first paper that documents evidence of consumption
externalities trickling down from upper-income households to lower-income households using
a natural experiment. There exists a large body of literature that documents empirical
evidence of consumption externalities [43, 2, 15, 63, 87].

However, the origin of such

externalities is not necessarily the upper-income households in those studies, thus having
very different policy implications. Drechsel-Grau and Schmid [30], Bertrand and Morse [10]
examine whether consumption of richer households influences consumption of others who
make less income. However, both studies rely on observational variation, which might not
be ideal to test the causal relationship between reference consumption and own consumption.
I exploit exogenous variation from the Bush Administration tax reforms, which is less
vulnerable to the potential endogeneity including reverse causality. Second, the economic
impact of tax reforms is interesting in itself. In particular, the distributional effects of the
Bush tax reforms have garnered attention from both media outlets and academia [32, 51, 50].
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The evidence provided in this paper suggests that policy makers should account for the
welfare losses from the expenditure cascades when designing tax reform.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section II presents a simple framework that provides
a testable hypothesis on household consumption under interdependent preference. Section
III provides background on the Bush tax reforms and Section IV explains how I identify
the evidence of consumption externalities from upper-income households to lower-income
households in the aftermath of the tax reforms. Section V describes the data that I use in
the study and Section VI presents the estimation strategy and results. Section VII concludes.

II

Framework
I begin by presenting a simple discrete-time finite-horizon model based on Ljungqvist and

Uhlig [70] to describe how changes in consumption of other households influence one’s own
consumption in the presence of interdependent preferences. Households live during periods
t ∈ {0, 1, ..., T } for some finite T ≥ 1. The utility function of households is given as
u(ct , ct , lt ) =

(ct − αct )1−γ − 1
− Alt
1−γ

(3.1)

where ct denotes own household consumption in period t, l denotes own labor supply, and c
denotes consumption of a reference group. The externality parameter α ∈ [0, 1) represents
the sensitivity of own consumption to reference consumption and γ represents the inverse
of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. A is the relative importance of leisure. For
simplicity, assume that c is exogenous. In other words, reference consumption is independent
of consumption and labor supply decisions of household t.
I can write the household utility maximization problem as

max

T
{ct }T
t=0 ,{lt }t=0

T
X
t=0

n (c − αc )1−γ − 1
o
t
t
− Alt
β
1−γ
t
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(3.2)

subject to ct +

at+1
= at + wt lt , ∀t
1+r

a0 > 0
aT +1 ≥ 0
where β is the discount factor, at is the level of assets in period t, r is the interest rate, and
w is a wage. It can be easily shown that the optimal consumption of a household is
c∗t = (

wt γ1
) + αct .
A

(3.3)

The goal of this paper is to examine whether an exogenous increase in consumption of
upper-income households (i.e., reference consumption) affects consumption of lower-income
households (i.e., own consumption). A simple comparative static yields a testable hypothesis
regarding the effect of reference consumption on own household consumption:
∂c∗
= α ≥ 0.
∂c

(3.4)

In a standard model where there is no consideration of others’ consumption (i.e., α = 0),
own consumption is completely insensitive to reference consumption. On the other hand,
if there exist interdependent preferences, an exogenous increase in reference consumption
would also increase own household consumption by the externality parameter α.

III

Bush Tax Reforms

A series of tax reforms, the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001
(EGTRRA) and the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 (JGTRRA),
was implemented during the Bush Administration (2001-2009). EGTRRA and JGTRRA
were designed to provide economic incentives to work and invest by reducing the distortion
created by a high tax burden [3]. EGTRRA and JGTRRA contained many tax provisions,
including raising the standard deduction for joint returns, raising the child tax credit from
$500 to $1000, gradually repealing estate taxes, lowering taxes on dividends and capital
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Figure 3.1: Average Federal Income Tax Liabilities
Note: MTR15 represents households whose marginal tax rates are 15 percent
or below and MTR28 represents households whose marginal tax rates are 28
percent or above during the pre-reform periods. The average tax liabilities
are calculated using the CPS weight. All figures are adjusted for inflation
using CPI-U-RS and presented in 2013 U.S. dollars.
Source: Current Population Survey March microdata, 1995-2008.

gains, and so on.1 Among the provisions, the most noticeable feature of the reforms is a
reduction of marginal income tax rates (MTR).
Table 3.1 shows the MTRs and tax brackets for joint returns from 2000 to 2003. The
MTRs were stable before and after the tax reforms. As shown in Table 1, the MTRs were
reduced by at least three percentage points for households who faced the top four income tax
brackets, while the reforms did not change the MTR for households whose taxable income
belonged to the lowest tax bracket in the pre-reform period.2 . Throughout the paper, I
define households in the former group as M T R28 as their pre-reform MTRs were 28 percent
or above and households in the latter group as M T R15 for a similar reason.
Figure 3.1 summarizes the evolution of federal tax liabilities of both MTR15 and MTR28
households. It is clear that the average federal tax liabilities of MTR28 households reduced
1

Table A2 in Auten et al. [3] provides a summary of EGTRRA and JGTRRA provisions.
The tax reforms also introduced a new 10 percent bracket, which affected all households whose taxable
income was positive
2
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Table 3.1: Marginal federal income tax rates for joint returns
2000
MTR(%)

15.0
28.0
31.0
36.0
39.6

Taxable income
Lower
Upper
0
59,334
59,334 143,361
143,361 218,459
218,459 390,168
390,168

2001
MTR(%)
10.0
15.0
27.5
30.5
35.5
39.1

Taxable
Lower
0
15,788
59,467
143,735
219,055
391,208

2002

income MTR(%) Taxable income MTR(%)
Upper
Lower
Upper
15,788
10.0
0
15,543
10.0
59,467
15.0
15,543 60,487
15.0
143,735
27.0
60,487 146,167
25.0
219,055
30.0
146,167 222,715
28.0
391,208
35.0
222,715 397,701
33.0
38.6
397,701
35.0
395,075

2003
Taxable
Lower
0
17,731
71,935
145,201
221,252

income
Upper
17,731
71,935
145,201
221,252
395,075

Note: All figures are adjusted for inflation using CPI-U-RS and presented in 2013 U.S. dollars.
Source: www.taxfoundation.org

considerably after the reform. The average federal tax liabilities of MTR15 also decreased for
the same period, but this is due to the introduction of a new 10 percent bracket. It is worth
noting that tax liabilities of MTR28 are underestimated because the variable is top-coded
at $99,999 in the CPS data. Considering the fact that the reforms also included other tax
provisions, the actual distributional effects of the tax reforms should be larger than shown
in Figure 3.1. In fact, Elmendorf et al. [32] conclude that only households in the top quintile
received substantial benefits from the tax reforms and the majority of households were made
worse off. Sherman and Aron-Dine [94] estimate that the average after-tax income of the top
one percent increased by $146,000 (or 20 percent) from 2003 to 2004, compared to a $1,700
(or 3.6 percent) increase for the the median households.
Assuming that the M T R28 increased their consumption after the tax reforms, the
expenditure cascades hypothesis implies that the M T R15 would increase their consumption,
not because their income went up, but because the increase in consumption of the M T R28
shifted the consumption standard of society upward. Therefore, the overconsumption of
the M T R15 is an unintended consequence of the tax reforms, which might cause significant
welfare loss to society (for example, see Frank [36]).

IV

Identification

The main objective of this paper is to empirically examine whether the increased
consumption of upper-income households trickled down to lower-income households. Nonexperimental variation in household purchasing power can be correlated with unobserved
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household characteristics such as preferences [54], which also influence household consumption behavior. The Bush tax reforms, which exogenously widened the after-tax income
distribution of U.S. households, provide an unusual setting that one can exploit to test the
expenditure cascade hypothesis.
Due to the introduction of a new 10 percent bracket and other changes in tax provisions,
all households are effectively treated and this challenges the construction of an appropriate
counterfactual. I overcome this challenge by exploiting state heterogeneity in the share
of households who pay higher marginal tax rates. The idea is based on the notion of
demonstration effects [31], saying that frequent exposure to a reference population that
consumes goods of higher quality than their own urges them to imitate the reference
consumption.
I measure the externality intensity using 1) the state share of MTR28 households in year
2000 and 2) the state share of households whose MTRs were equal to or greater than 31
percent (MTR31). The first measure is straightforward. It measures the chance of seeing
a MTR28 household in a given state. This measure is intuitive, but considering that the
tax reforms benefited households with the highest tax liabilities the most, the MTR28 share
may not capture the externality intensity very well.3 On the other hand, the second measure
would capture the share of higher income households better. If consumption of the highestincome households indeed trickled down to households below them in the income distribution,
the MTR31 share would measure the externality intensity more accurately.
Figure 3.2 shows that there exists substantial variation in the state share of upper-income
households. In general, the MTR28 share and the MTR31 share are strongly correlated, but
they are not perfectly collinear. For example, Minnesota ranks the second among the states
in terms of the MTR28 share, but its ranking in terms of the MTR31 share falls to 13th.
By contrast, consumption externalities are assumed to be stronger in California when it is
measured by the MTR31 share rather than the MTR28 share. I will provide further details
regarding the construction of intensity measures in the next section.
3

For example, the lower and upper tax bracket for married households who filed jointly were $43,850 and
$105,950 in 2000. This means that the households whose pre-reform MTR was 28 would have gained around
$1,863 at most in nominal terms, relative to households below them in the distribution of adjusted gross
income.
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(a) MTR28 share

(b) MTR31 share

Figure 3.2: Externality intensity measures
Note: MTR15 represets households whose marginal tax rates are 15 percent
or below. MTR28 (MTR31) represents households whose marginal tax rates
are 28 percent (31 percent) or above during the pre-reform periods. The
average tax liabilities are calculated using the CPS weight. All figures are
adjusted for inflation using CPI-U-RS and presented in 2013 U.S. dollars.
Source: Current Population Survey March microdata, 1995-2008.
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The identifying assumption is that, on average, MTR15 consumption in state i and state
j for all i 6= j would have grown similarly in the absence of EGTRRA and JGTRRA. This
assumption would not hold if the average household in each state experiences different levels
of income growth. To control for the income effect, I include the 6th order polynomial
of after-tax household income in the model. It is also possible that states with a larger
share of households with high tax liabilities underwent greater local inflation in the postreform period. In this case, household spending increased even when they consumed more
or less the same bundle of goods and services before and after the tax reforms. I control for
heterogeneity in the growth of local prices by adding the state-level single-family housing
price index (HPI) to the model.

V

Data
The main source of information on household consumption is the Consumer Expenditure

(CE) Survey microdata, which is by far the most comprehensive data regarding household
consumption in the United States. The CE consists of the Interview survey and the Diary
survey and I only use the former for the purpose of this study. Among several quarterly files
from the Interview survey, I use FMLI files ranging from 1994 to 2007. In the Interview
survey, each consumer unit (CU) provides information on demographics and household
characteristics in the initial interview and information on expenditures in the second through
the fifth interviews.
Although I also analyze household consumption for specific expenditure categories,
the primary consumption measure is total household consumption. The total quarterly
expenditure variable in the CE comprises household spending on food, alcohol and beverage,
housing, apparel, transportation, health, entertainment, personal care, reading, education,
tobacco, miscellanea, cash contribution, and personal insurance. Following existing literature
using the CE data [75, 10], I convert expenditures on vehicle and housing purchases into
service flows by merging a dataset created by Meyer and Sullivan [75] to the original CE
data. Using the CE information on makes and models of vehicles, Meyer and Sullivan
estimate values of the vehicles and annual depreciation rates to calculate vehicle service
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flows. The authors also impute the rental equivalent for households in public or subsidized
housing.
The CE also collects information on household income in the second and the fifth
interviews. I use both before-tax income and after-tax income to control for any income
effects. Before-tax income includes wage and salary, gain/loss from business, Social Security
and Railroad Retirement income, benefits, workers’ compensation and veterans’ payments,
unemployment compensation, public assistance/welfare, interest, child support, alimony,
food stamps, income from dividends, royalties, estates, trusts, and other income. After-tax
income is obtained by subtracting federal and state/local income taxes, property taxes, and
other taxes from before-tax income.
To identify MTR28 and MTR15, I need information on taxable income and tax filing
status of households. Unfortunately, tax filing status data is not available for the period
that I study.4 Therefore, I impute household tax filing status and MTRs based on family
characteristics and the total amount of federal tax paid. In particular, I define the total
federal tax paid as a sum of annualized federal income tax reduction from earnings and
additional federal income tax paid, less than additional federal income tax refund. For
example, if the imputed tax filing status of a household is “married filing jointly” and the
total amount of federal income tax paid is larger than $9804.14, which is the federal tax
liability at the maximum upper bound of the 15 percent bracket during the estimation
window, the household is a MTR28.
A nontrivial portion of observations are dropped for several reasons. First of all, the CE
suppresses state identifiers for observations that might be identifiable given state information.
I drop those households.5 I also drop households that report total quarterly consumption
below $1,000, non-positive before-tax income, or non-positive after-tax income.6 In addition,
I exclude households that could be a MTR28 in some years and MTR15 in another years
due to changes in bracket endpoints or the “bracket creep” [90].7 Lastly, I drop households
4

Tax filing status data in the CE becomes available in 2013.
Observations from Mississippi, Montana, New Mexico, North Dakota, and Wyoming do not have state
identifiers.
6
[10] also drop households with zero income or with zero food consumption.
7
For example, the MTR of households whose taxable income were between $60,470 to $71,941 in 2002
was reduced from 27 percent to 15 percent in 2003 (see Table 3.1).
5
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Table 3.2: Summary statistics

Quarterly consumption ($)
Income before tax ($)
Income after tax ($)
Family size
Number of earners
Age
Male
White
Single
BA degree
Home ownership
Married filing jointly
Head of households
Observations

MTR28
Mean
SD
18,906.58 (8,013.86)
120,706.51 (67,327.70)
99,618.91 (58,897.54)
2.52
(1.41)
1.75
(0.83)
44.97
(11.72)
0.64
(0.48)
0.88
(0.33)
0.28
(0.45)
0.45
(0.50)
0.79
(0.41)
0.59
(0.49)
0.03
(0.18)
30,038

MTR15
Mean
SD
11,655.57 (6,622.86)
55,650.99 (41,712.67)
54,773.71 (41,243.95)
2.66
(1.54)
1.33
(1.00)
49.92
(17.63)
0.51
(0.50)
0.82
(0.39)
0.25
(0.43)
0.22
(0.41)
0.66
(0.47)
0.53
(0.50)
0.07
(0.26)
190,929

Note: All monetary figures are adjusted for inflation using CPI-U-RS and presented in 2013
U.S. dollars.
Source: Consumer Expenditure Survey data, 1994-2007, and the author’s calculation.

whose before-tax income is too high to be a MTR15 or too low to be a MTR28. Appendix
C.B provides more details on the CE data management.
Table 3.2 provides summary statistics for the CE data. Not surprisingly, the average quarterly consumption of MTR28 households is higher than the average quarterly consumption of
MTR15 households by $7,251. Similarly, the annual pre-tax income of MTR28 households
is larger than twice the the annual pre-tax income of MTR15 households. While family
size is not very different across two samples, MTR28 households have a greater number of
earners, which partially explains the income gap between two groups. The head of MTR28
households is almost five years younger, more likely to be male and white, and more likely
to have a bachelor’s degree. MTR28 households are also more likely to be married couples
and homeowners, compared to the MTR 15 households.
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VI

Empirical Strategy and Results

This section can be divided into two parts. In the first part, I show that MTR28
households increased consumption as a result of the tax reforms using difference-in-difference
and event-study specifications. Assuming that both consumption and savings are normal
goods and the credit constraint of MTR28 households is binding, an exogenous increase in
disposable income should raise consumption of MTR28 households. On the other hand,
it is also possible that MTR28 households did not spend a penny out of extra money
when they were already optimizing their consumption with nonbinding budget constraints.
If the tax reforms did not spur consumption of MTR28 households significantly, the
demonstration effect from MTR28 households to MTR15 households would be negligible,
and thus consumption externalities would not exist in the first place. In the second part, I
use another difference-in-difference model to estimate the effect of consumption externalities
generated by the tax reforms and to examine whether the effect varies across income quartiles
as the expenditure cascades hypothesis suggests.

VI.A

Did MTR28 households increase their spending?

I first investigate whether the tax reforms led to higher consumption among MTR28
households by estimating the following difference-in-difference model:
Ci,s,t = α + δM T R28i + βP ostt × M T R28i + γXi,t + εi,s,t

(3.5)

where Ci,s,t is a measure of consumption of household i who lives in state s in year-quarter
t. For now, I only consider total quarterly consumption of households. P ost is a dummy
variable that takes 1 if consumption took place after 2001, and 0 otherwise. M T R28 takes
1 if household i is MTR28, and 0 if the household is MTR15. X is a vector of household
characteristics including family size, number of earners, home ownership status, age of a
reference person, and dummy variables that indicate whether the reference person is male,
white, single, or whether he has a bachelor’s degree. X also includes dummies for tax filing
status. All specifications include state fixed effects and year-quarter fixed effects. I weight
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each observation using the weight variable that the CE provides and cluster standard errors
by state to account for heteroskedasticity and any form of within-state correlation.
β is the coefficient of interest that captures the effect of the tax reforms on consumption
of MTR28 households. The identifying assumption in this analysis is that the trends in
consumption of MTR28 and MTR15 households should have been similar in the absence of
the tax reforms. Since I hypothesize that there would be consumption externalities from
MTR28 households to MTR15 households, the difference-in-difference model also assumes
that the magnitude of the externalities remains unchanged in the post-treatment period.
If the tax reforms somehow amplified the size of consumption externalities as I argue, the
estimate would be biased downward. On the other hand, the estimate would be biased
upward if the tax reforms reduced the effect of consumption externalities.
Table 3.3 summarizes the results. Column (1) presents the baseline result from estimating
equation (3.5) using a full sample. The estimate implies that, on average, the tax reforms
increased quarterly consumption of MTR28 households by $266.3 and the estimate is
statistically significant at the 5 percent level. In my sample, the average MTR28 household
spent $17,757 in the pre-treatment period and $19,850 in the post-treatment period. This
indicates that the tax reforms alone account for about 12.7 percent of the overall increase in
consumption of MTR28 households. In column (2), I use the 6th order polynomial of beforetax income to allow for nonlinearity of consumption in household income. Surprisingly,
the estimate becomes statistically significant at the 1 percent level and its magnitude is
more than twice the previous estimate. This result implies that controlling for the nonlinear
income effect can be very important. In column (3), I add lagged unemployment rates and the
housing price index to account for macroeconomic conditions at the state-level. Incorporating
macroeconomic controls does not change the result substantially. Column (4) further controls
for any time-varying unobservables at the state level by including state-specific linear time
trends. The estimate is slightly reduced to $519.2, but it is still comparable to estimates
presented in the previous columns.
Results presented in Table 3.3 are based on the assumption that MTR15 consumption
would have trended similarly in the absence of the tax reforms. To show the validity of the
identifying assumption as well as the treatment effect dynamics, I also estimate the following
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Table 3.3: The effect of Bush tax reforms on consumption of MTR28 households
MTR28
Post × MTR28
Before-tax income
Family size
Number of earners
Home ownership
Age
Male
White
Single
BA degree
Family
Head

(1)
1188.6∗∗∗
(76.39)
266.3∗∗
(125.7)
0.0754∗∗∗
(0.00132)
242.5∗∗∗
(60.29)
509.3∗∗∗
(33.45)
2487.4∗∗∗
(178.6)
6.735∗∗∗
(1.374)
-25.71
(38.53)
757.2∗∗∗
(91.97)
-825.8∗∗∗
(83.07)
1870.7∗∗∗
(74.93)
1170.6∗∗∗
(57.41)
303.1∗∗∗
(66.95)

(2)
692.4∗∗∗
(71.91)
553.6∗∗∗
(116.1)
0.0846∗∗∗
(0.00557)
285.8∗∗∗
(54.06)
220.1∗∗∗
(26.82)
2163.8∗∗∗
(163.9)
10.88∗∗∗
(1.296)
-79.30∗∗
(36.68)
709.8∗∗∗
(83.39)
-742.3∗∗∗
(77.96)
1587.2∗∗∗
(58.71)
873.1∗∗∗
(54.31)
390.0∗∗∗
(63.55)
0.000000312∗∗∗
(6.69e-08)
-2.30e-12∗∗∗
(4.31e-13)
4.51e-18∗∗∗
(1.26e-18)
-3.50e-24∗∗
(1.59e-24)
8.98e-31
(7.00e-31)

No
1st
No
220967
0.627

No
6th
No
220967
0.646

(Before-tax income)2
(Before-tax income)3
(Before-tax income)4
(Before-tax income)5
(Before-tax income)6
HPI
Unemployment rate
Macro controls
Income polynomial
State specific time trends
Observations
R2

(3)
704.6∗∗∗
(74.08)
542.8∗∗∗
(125.2)
0.0845∗∗∗
(0.00558)
286.5∗∗∗
(53.84)
219.1∗∗∗
(26.57)
2166.0∗∗∗
(164.2)
10.91∗∗∗
(1.302)
-80.77∗∗
(37.13)
712.3∗∗∗
(83.58)
-742.7∗∗∗
(77.71)
1585.5∗∗∗
(57.26)
874.8∗∗∗
(53.77)
391.1∗∗∗
(62.68)
0.000000313∗∗∗
(6.72e-08)
-2.29e-12∗∗∗
(4.33e-13)
4.50e-18∗∗∗
(1.26e-18)
-3.48e-24∗∗
(1.59e-24)
8.89e-31
(7.02e-31)
6.356∗∗∗
(1.831)
-38.64
(46.90)
Yes
6th
No
220967
0.646

Note: Standard errors are clustered at the state level and given in parentheses.
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∗

p < 0.1,

∗∗

(4)
721.8∗∗∗
(75.04)
519.2∗∗∗
(131.6)
0.0838∗∗∗
(0.00567)
288.3∗∗∗
(53.95)
215.4∗∗∗
(26.52)
2171.0∗∗∗
(164.3)
10.82∗∗∗
(1.314)
-79.82∗∗
(36.54)
716.6∗∗∗
(83.98)
-740.7∗∗∗
(75.37)
1586.7∗∗∗
(56.08)
879.1∗∗∗
(52.89)
389.6∗∗∗
(62.57)
0.000000319∗∗∗
(6.78e-08)
-2.32e-12∗∗∗
(4.36e-13)
4.56e-18∗∗∗
(1.27e-18)
-3.55e-24∗∗
(1.60e-24)
9.16e-31
(7.06e-31)
6.380∗∗∗
(2.066)
-6.087
(33.59)
Yes
6th
Yes
220967
0.646

p < 0.05,

∗∗∗

p < 0.01

Figure 3.3:
consumption

The effect of the Bush tax reforms:

total

Note: Each diamond in the figure represent the estimate for βk in equation
(3.6) for k ∈ 1994, ..., 2007 and dotted lines connect confidence intervals
associated with the estimates.

event study specification:

Ci,s,t = α + δM T R28i +

2007
X

βk {1(k = y) × M T R28i } + γXi,t + δZs,t + εi,s,t

(3.6)

k=1994

where 1(•) is an indicator that takes 1 if k equals year y ∈ {1994, ..., 2007}, and 0 otherwise.
All else is the same as given in equation (3.5).
Figure 3.3 summarizes how the treatment effect of the tax reforms evolved over time. Each
diamond in the figure represents the estimate for βk in equation (3.6) for k ∈ 1994, ..., 2007
and dotted lines connect confidence intervals associated with the estimates.

Prior to

EGTRRA and JGTRRA, the estimates are not statistically different from zero. The evidence
suggests that the parallel assumption is likely to hold in this context. On the contrary, the
treatment effects are positive and statistically significant in years following EGTRRA, which
is consistent with the previous results. In sum, the results generally evidence that the tax
reforms raised consumption of MTR28 households by roughly 25 percent, by reducing tax
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burden of those households substantially. It is worth noting that the estimates presented
in Table 3.3 are likely to be biased downward because the CE data tend to underrepresent
consumption of the high-income households and the problem is getting worse in recent years
(for example, see Sabelhaus et al. [89]).
I further investigate the effect of the tax reforms on MTR28 household consumption
for major consumption categories to provide a better picture of consumption responses of
MTR28 households. While Figure 3.3 suggests that the trends in total quarterly consumption
of MTR28 and MTR15 households were quite similar prior to the tax reforms, it is uncertain
whether the parallel assumption still holds for each consumption category. To validate the
use of MTR15 households as a counterfactual and to demonstrate the effect of tax reforms
on MTR28 household consumption for a specific item, I again estimate the event study
specification similar to equation (3.6), but the dependent variable is household consumption
for each category.
Figure 3.4 clearly demonstrates that the increase in total consumption of MTR28
households after the implementation of EGTRRA was mainly driven by consumption on
housing and vehicles, which are two types of consumption that economists view as visible
[95, 47]. The results support the claim that the rich would spend more on positional goods
such as houses and cars out of the money saved from the tax reforms [36]. Surpringly, the
tax reforms also increased MTR28 spending on utilities, which are less visible than housing
and vehicles. Event study estimates for other items are quite noisy.

VI.B

Did the Bush tax reforms generate consumption externalities from MTR28 to MTR15?

I show that the tax reforms increased consumption of MTR28 households, mainly in
the domain of housing and vehicles. This section explores whether the increase in MTR28
consumption produced externalities to MTR15 households, thus spurring their consumption
after the tax reforms. In other words, I estimate the average treatment effect on the
untreated, similar to Angelucci and De Giorgi [2] and Roth [87].
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(a) Food at home

(b) Food away

(c) Housing

(d) Vehicle

(e) Apparel

(f ) Entertainment

(g) Utility

(h) Health

Figure 3.4: The effects of the Bush tax reforms: consumption
categories
Note: Each diamond in the figure represent the estimate for βk in equation
(3.6) for k ∈ 1994, ..., 2007 and dotted lines connect confidence intervals
associated with the estimates.
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Table 3.4: Consumption externalities on MTR15 households: baseline results

P ost × Intensity
Macro controls
Income polynomial
Observations
R2

MTR28
(1)
(2)
29.96
33.52∗
(20.28) (19.79)
Yes
Yes
1st
6th
190929 190929
0.584
0.600

MTR31
(3)
(4)
∗∗
108.0
116.6∗∗∗
(42.92) (41.48)
Yes
Yes
1th
6th
190929 190929
0.584
0.600

Note: Standard errors are clustered at the state level and given in
parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01

I begin by estimating the following difference-in-differences specification:
Ci,s,t = α + βP ostt × Intensitys + γXi,t + δZs,t + εi,s,t .

(3.7)

where Intensitys is either the MTR28 share or the MTR31 share of state s. Unlike equation
(3.5), I control for after-tax household income so that I can separate the effect of additional
income which might be generated by the tax reforms from the externality effect.

All

other arguments are the same as before. For the purposes of this analysis, I restrict the
sample to MTR15 households. I weight each observation by state-year cell size following the
recommendation of Solon et al. [96].8
Table 3.4 summarizes estimation results. When I use the MTR28 share in column (1), the
estimate is positive, but not statistically significant. Incorporating a more flexible before-tax
income control improves the precision of the estimation in column (2). When evaluating the
estimate at the mean, it implies that total quarterly consumption of MTR15 households
increased by $1,006 (=33.52 × 30). Given that MTR28 households raised their spending by
slightly more than $500 after the tax reforms, the estimate is implausibly large.
In column (3) and column (4), I use the state-share of MTR31 as an alternative
externality intensity measure. When I only control for after-tax household income linearly,
the estimate is 108, implying that MTR15 households spent $410.40 (=108 × 3.8) after the
8

Solon et al. [96] suggests that when the variance of group specific errors is small and the sample size of
a unit of variation is highly variable and small in some units, weighting by the sample size of the unit can
lead to more precise estimates.
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(a) MTR28 share

(b) MTR31 share

Figure 3.5: Consumption externalities on MTR15 households:
total consumption
Note: Each diamond in the figure represent the estimate for the treatment
effect and dotted lines connect confidence intervals associated with the
estimates.
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tax reforms due to externalities from upper-income households. It is worth mentioning that
the estimates presented in the previous section difference out the catching-up responses of
MTR15 households in the post-reform period. Furthermore, the true effect of the tax reforms
on MTR28 consumption would likely be higher after accounting for the underreporting in
consumption of higher-income households in the CE data. Thus, I believe that the estimate
given in column (3) is fairly reasonble. Once I replace a linear after-tax income control with
a 6th order polynomial in column (4), the estimate becomes slightly larger and statistically
significant at the 1 percent level.
I further explore the dynamic effects of consumption externalities using the event study
framework, similar to equation (3.6).

I present the results in Figure 3.5.

Consistent

with the results from static model estimation, none of estimates in the post-reform period
are significant when I measure the externality intensity using the MTR28 share. On the
other hand, confidence intervals for most estimates in the post-reform period indicate that
households in states with a larger share of higher-income households spent more than their
counterparts after the tax reforms.
The event study framework is also useful to check the validity of the identifying
assumption. If indeed consumption externalities generated by the tax reforms drive the
finding, coefficient estimates for year-intensity interaction terms in the pre-reform period
should not be different from zero. However, both figures in Figure 3.5 raise concerns that
there might be other factors that influence the consumption behaviors of households living
in different states, even in the absence of the tax reforms. The figures suggest that MTR15
households who were more likely to encounter richer households spent less prior to the tax
reforms, after controlling for other factors. To identify potential drivers of the pre-treatment
effect, I estimate the event study specification for each consumption category. This exercise
will also confirm whether consumption patterns across MTR28 and MTR15 households are
consistent with the consumption externalities narrative. My preferred specifications use the
MTR31 share to measure externality intensity. I present results from specifications that use
the MTR28 share in Figure C.A.1 in the Appendix.
Figure 3.6 shows household consumption dynamics for specific items before and after the
tax reforms. Figure 3.6c and Figure 3.6d suggest that the growth in total consumption of
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(a) Food at home

(b) Food away

(c) Housing

(d) Vehicle

(e) Apparel

(f ) Entertainment

(g) Utility

(h) Health

Figure 3.6: Consumption externalities on MTR15 households: consumption categories
Note: Each diamond in the figure represents the estimate for the
treatment effect and dotted lines connect confidence intervals associated
with the estimates. The intensity of consumption externalities is measured
by the MTR31 share.
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MTR15 households after the tax reforms is attributable to increases in housing and vehicle
consumption, which are two items that led to higher consumption of MTR28 households.
The symmetry is interesting, given that two analyses use different sources of identifying
variation. However, the symmetry does not hold in food-at-home consumption. Figure 3.4a
indicates that food-at-home consumption of MTR28 households was not affected by the tax
reforms, whereas Figure 3.6a shows that MTR15 households who received stronger exposure
to MTR28 consumption reduced food consumption at home.
The expenditure cascades hypothesis proposed by Frank et al. [38] not only states that
consumption externalities trickle down from the high-income earners to the middle class, it
also suggests that the impact of such externalities should be stronger for households who are
closer to the reference households that generate the externalities. The effect of consumption
of high-income would diminish as it moves down the income distribution. Now I test the
existence of the gradient effect by estimating the following reduced-form equation:

Ci,s,t = α +

4
X

βk P ostt × Intensitys × Qki + γXi,t + δZs,t + εi,s,t .

(3.8)

k=1

where Qk takes 1 if household i belongs to the kth income quartile in a given year, and 0
otherwise. The expenditure cascades hypothesis implies that Q1 < Q2 < Q3 < Q4 .
Table 3.5 summarizes key results from the analysis. Panel A presents coefficient estimates
for each three-way interaction term and Panel B presents p-values for tests of eqaulity across
the βs. Column (1) estimates the baseline specification given in equation (3.8). Column
(2) allows for the effect of the MTR31 share on household consumption to differ across
income quartiles. Lastly, column (3) estimates a fully-specified triple difference model. In
general, the estimates are larger for MTR15 households in a higher quartile, which is the
population that is closer to the upper-income households on the income scale. This evidence
strongly supports the expenditure cascades hypothesis. The gradient in the magnitude of the
externality effect is stark in column (3) where the t-tests clearly reject the null hypotheses
H0 : βj = βu for all j 6= u at the 5 percent level.
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Table 3.5: Expenditure cascades
(1)
Panel A: Estimates for βs
P ost × Intensity × Q1

66.04∗∗
(32.63)
P ost × Intensity × Q2
89.05∗∗
(35.83)
3
P ost × Intensity × Q
123.8∗∗∗
(40.91)
4
P ost × Intensity × Q
180.5∗∗
(70.40)
Panel B: Tests of equality across βs
β4 = β3
0.0877
β3 = β2
0.0220
β2 = β1
0.2454
Intensity-quartile interactions
No
Post-quartile interactions
No
Observations
190929
R2
0.602

(2)

(3)

103.6∗∗∗
(37.72)
100.3∗∗
(38.55)
111.3∗∗∗
(39.16)
147.1∗∗
(59.69)

4.759
(12.13)
89.02∗∗
(34.58)
140.1∗∗∗
(48.79)
235.6∗∗∗
(81.94)

0.1897
0.2846
0.8468
Yes
No
190929
0.602

0.0164
0.0336
0.0023
Yes
Yes
190929
0.602

Note: Standard errors are clustered at the state level and given in
parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01

VII

Prices or Quantities?

The evidence that I present in the previous section relies on the assumption that the
MTR 31 share, which is the preferred measure of consumption externalities, is uncorrelated
with other unobserved characteristics. However, event study estimates presented in Figure
3.5 suggest that the assumption might not hold. Among many possibilities, I examine the
role of local prices in explaining different post-reform consumption behaviors across states. If
there exists heterogeneity in local inflation, it would influence household spending differently
even when they consume the same amount of goods and services [87, 10]. Indeed, Cooper
[24] documents that the correlation between real consumption growth and real house price
growth is about 0.7 during the 2000s. Since a household is unlikely to buy a house as a
result of consumption externalities generated by the tax reforms, the local inflation channel
can be one alternative mechanism that drives my findings.
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(a) Pre-reform home price growth

(b) Post-reform home price growth

Figure 3.7: Correlation between the home price growth and the
MTR31 share
Note: Pre-form home price growth is the rate of growth in the state-level
single-family housing price index between 1994 to 2000. Post-form home
price growth is the rate of growth in the same index between 2001 to 2007.
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Figure 3.7 plots the unconditional correlation between the home price growth rate and
the MTR 31 share for pre-reform and post-reform periods, respectively. In both periods,
home prices in states with a greater share of MTR 31 grew faster than those in states with
a lower MTR 31 share. However, the heterogeneity in the home price growth rate is much
stronger in the post-reform period. See the cases of California, the District of Columbia,
and Massachusetts, for example. While I control for the state-level housing price index in
all specifications, it would not fully account for the time-varying variation in the home price
growth rates across states. Separating the local inflation effect from the externality effect is
left for future work.

VIII

Discussion

This paper documents empirical evidence of consumption externalities trickling down
from upper-income households to low-to-middle-income households using a series of tax
reforms during the Bush Administration as a natural experiment. I first show that the
tax reforms spurred consumption of households with higher tax liabilities. I also show
that households with low tax liabilities living in states that feature a greater share of
households with higher tax liabilities increased their consumption more substantially than
their counterparts after the tax reforms. Finally, I find that the effect of consumption
externalities was stronger in households whose income levels were similar to the reference
households.
The existence of consumption externalities along the income distribution has an
important policy implication. More than a decade ago, Frank [36] claims that tax reforms
on the top-income earners would encourage them to spend more on positional goods and
this in turn would generate so-called positional externalities to the middle class. Unless
household income does not rise accordingly, such externalities would hurt the middle class
by making them spend too much on visible goods and too less on necessities. I find that
all households raised their spending on housing and vehicles after the tax reforms, but only
low-to-middle-income households reduced their food-at-home consumption. The evidence
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implies that government intervention designed to mitigate consumption externalities (e.g.,
raising taxes on positional goods) could imporve social welfare.
The paper is not without limitations. The biggest threat to internal validity of my
findings would be state-level changes in goods prices occurring concurrently with the tax
reforms. In particular, the period that I analyze is exactly coincident with the remarkable
changes in housing prices in the United States. Separating the externality effects from the
price effect or the housing wealth effect is easier said than done. I acknowlege these concerns
and will address them in future research.

92

Bibliography

93

[1] Alesina, A., Baqir, R., and Easterly, W. (1999). Public goods and ethnic divisions.
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114:4:1243–1284. 52
[2] Angelucci, M. and De Giorgi, G. (2009). Indirect effects of an aid program: How do cash
transfers affect ineligibles’ consumption? American Economic Review, 99(1):486–508. 68,
82
[3] Auten, G., Carroll, R., and Gee, G. (2008). The 2001 and 2003 tax rate eductions: An
overview and estimate of the taxable income response. National Tax Journal, 61(3):345–
364. 70, 71
[4] Autor, D., Katz, L., and Kearne, M. S. (2008). Trends in u.s. wage inequality: Revising
the revisionists. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 90(2):300–323. 67
[5] Baicker, K. and Jacobson, M. (2007). Finders keepers: Forfeiture laws, policing incentives
and local budgets. Journal of Public Economics, 91:2113–2136. 43, 46, 48, 65
[6] Baicker, K. and Staiger, D. (2005). Fiscal shenanigans, targeted federal health care funds,
and patient mortality. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 120(1):345–386. 43
[7] Barr, A. and Turner, S. (2015). Out of work and into school: Labor market policies and
college enrollment during the great recession. Journal of Public Economics, 124:63 – 73.
3, 38
[8] Baum, C., Schaffer, M., and Stillman, S. (2007). Enhanced routines for instrumental
variables/generalized method of moments estimation and testing. Stata Journal, 7(4):465–
506. 60, 112, 117, 122
[9] Bayer, P., Ross, S. L., and Topa, G. (2008). Place of work and place of residence: Informal
hiring networks and labor market outcomes. Journal of Political Economy, 116(6):1150–
1196. 2, 17, 29
[10] Bertrand, M. and Morse, A. (2016). Trickle-down consumption. Review of Economics
and Statistics, Forthcoming. 68, 75, 76, 89

94

[11] Bloemen, H. G. and Stancanelli, E. G. F. (2001). Individual wealth, reservation wages,
and transitions into employment. Journal of Labor Economics, 19(2):400–439. 37
[12] Bostic, R., Gabriel, S., and Painter, G. (2009). Housing wealth, financial wealth, and
consumption: New evidence from micro data. Regional Science and Urban Economics,
39(1):79–89. 12
[13] Bradford, D. and Oates, W. E. (1971). The analysis of revenue sharing in a new approach
to collective fiscal decisions. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 85(3):416–439. 43
[14] Brooks, L., Phillips, J. H., and Sinitsyn, M. (2011). The cabals of a few or the confusion
of a multitude: The institutional trade-off between representation and governance.
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 3(1):1–24. 43
[15] Brown, P. H., Bulte, E., and Zhang, X. (2011). Positional spending and status seeking
in rural china. Journal of Development Economics, 96(1):139 – 149. 68
[16] Burch, A. M. (2012). Sheriffs’ officies, 2007 - statistical tables. Technical report, Bureau
of Justice Statistics, https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=4555. 52
[17] Burgess, S., Propper, C., Rees, H., and Shearer, A. (2003). The class of 1981: the
effects of early career unemployment on subsequent unemployment experiences. Labour
Economics, 10(3):291 – 309. 2
[18] Card, D., Chetty, R., and Weber, A. (2007). Cash-on-hand and competing models
of intertemporal behavior: New evidence from the labor market. Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 122(4):1511–1560. 3, 4, 5, 35
[19] Carneiro, P. and Heckman, J. J. (2002). The Evidence on Credit Constraints in PostSecondary Schooling. Economic Journal, 112:705–734. 17, 28
[20] Carruthers, C. K. and Wanamaker, M. H. (2013). Closing the gap? the effect of private
philanthropy on the provision of african-american schooling in the u.s. south. Journal of
Public Economics, 101:53 – 67. 44

95

[21] Cascio, E. U., Gordon, N., and Reber, S. (2013). Local Responses to Federal Grants:
Evidence from the Introduction of Title I in the South. American Economic Journal:
Economic Policy, 5(3):126–159. 43, 65
[22] Chetty, R. (2008). Moral hazard versus liquidity and optimal unemployment insurance.
Journal of Political Economy, 116(2):173–234. 5, 7, 32, 36
[23] Choi, E. J. and Hwang, J. (2015). Child gender and parental inputs: No more son
preference in korea? American Economic Review, 105(5):638–43. 34
[24] Cooper, D. (2013). House price fluctuations: The role of housing wealth as borrowing
collateral. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 95(4):1183–1197. 18, 89
[25] Cunha, J. M. (2014). Testing paternalism: Cash versus in-kind transfers. American
Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 6(2):195–230. 44
[26] Currie, J. and Gahvari, F. (2008). Transfers in cash and in-kind: Theory meets the
data. Journal of Economic Literature, 46(2):333–83. 44
[27] Danforth, J. P. (1979). On the role of consumption and decreasing absolute risk aversion
in the theory of job search. In Lippman, S. A. and McCall, J. J., editors, Studies in the
Economics of Search, pages 109–131. North-Holland, New York. 1, 5, 35, 37
[28] DellaVigna, S. and Paserman, M. D. (2005). Job search and impatience. Journal of
Labor Economics, 23(3):527–588. 2, 17, 34, 37
[29] Di Tella, R. and Schargrodsky, E. (2004). Do police reduce crime? estimates using the
allocation of police forces after a terrorist attack. American Economic Review, 94(1):115–
133. 58
[30] Drechsel-Grau, M. and Schmid, K. D. (2014). Consumption-savings decisions under
upwardlooking comparisons. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 106:254–
268. 68
[31] Duesenberry, J. S. (1949). In Income, Saving, and the Theory of Consumer Behavior.
Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA. 73
96

[32] Elmendorf, D. W., Furman, J., Gale, W. G., and Harris, B. H. (2008). Distributional
effects of the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts: How do financing and behavioral responses matter?
National Tax Journal, 61(3):365–380. 68, 72
[33] Evans, W. N. and Owens, E. G. (2007).

C.O.P.S. and crime.

Journal of Public

Economics, 91:181–201. 43, 46
[34] Filimon, R., Romer, T., and Rosenthal, H. (1982). Asymmetric information and agenda
control: The bases of monopoly power in public spending. Journal of Public Economics,
17(1):51–70. 43
[35] Fradkin, A., Panier, F., and Tojerow, I. (2017). Blame the parents? how financial
incentives affects labor supply and job quality for young adults. Working Paper. 1, 3, 4,
35
[36] Frank, R. H. (2005). Positional externalities cause large and preventable welfare losses.
American Economic Review: Papers and Preceedings, 95(2):137–141. 67, 68, 72, 82, 91
[37] Frank, R. H. (2007). In Falling Behind: How Rising Inequality Harms the Middle Class.
University of California Press. 67
[38] Frank, R. H., Levine, A. S., and Dijk, O. (2014). Expenditure cascades. Review of
Behavioral Economics, 1(1-2):55–73. 67, 88
[39] Glaeser, E. L. (2012). Urban public finance. NBER Working Paper Series, w18244. 43
[40] Glindro, E. T., Subhanij, T., Szeto, J., and Zhu, H. (2008). Determinants of house
prices in nine asia-pacific economies. BIS Working Papers, No. 263. 18
[41] Gordon, N. (2004). Do federal grants boost school spending? Evidence from Title I.
Journal of Public Economics, 88:1771–1792. 43
[42] Grambsch, P. M. and Therneau, T. M. (1994).

Proportional hazards tests and

diagnostics based on weighted residuals. Biometrika, 81(3):515–526. 28

97

[43] Grinblatt, M., Keloharju, M., and Ikäheimo, S. (2008).
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Appendix for Chapter 1

(a) Top 5percent vs. Bottom 5percent

(b) Top 50percent vs. Bottom 50percent

Figure A.1: Kaplan-Meier survival curves
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Figure A.2: Graphical tests of the proportionality assumption: Log-log plots
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(c) Sex

(d) Working experience

(e) Parental income

(f ) Age

Figure A.2: Continued
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(g) Fathers’ education

(h) Mothers’ education

(i) Housing type

Figure A.2: Continued
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Figure A.3: The distribution of 3-year home price (KMW/m2 ) changes
by income groups
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Table A.1: Variable definitions
Name
Panel A: Control variables
Male
Age
Major

Description

A binary indicator for male individuals.
Age at the time of the initial survey.
Numeric codes for detailed college major identifier provided
by the GOMS data. The Cox PH model in equation (1.8) is
stratified by 121 uniuqe college major categories.
Number of household members The number of household members living together, including
himself/herself.
Rank
The ranking of college from which an individual graduated.
Time of graduation
Dummy variables for each graduation year-month (from
August 2007 to February 2010).
Parental income (Inc)
Dummy variables for parental income categories at the time of
college entrance described in Table 1.1.
Parental education
Dummy variables for final education of each parent (less than
middle school, middle school, high school, vocational college or
more).
Parental occupations
Dummy variables for occupation of each parent at the time
of college entrance based on Korean Standard Classification of
Occupations (9 categories).
Home ownership
An indicator of parental home ownership that takes 1 if parents
own a home, 0 otherwise.
Housing types (Type)
Dummy variables for parental housing types (house, apartment, multi-family residential housing).
GPA
A grouped GPA measure based on 20 quantiles (e.g., 1 = 0
to 5 percentiles of the GPA distribution in a given graduation
year).
Loan take-up
An indicator of individuals who took out loans to pay for
college.
Dual degree
An indicator of dual degree earners.
TOEIC
Scores for the test of English for International Communication
(TOEIC).
I(Toeic > 0)
An indicator of individuals who had ever took the TOEIC test.
Working experience
An indicator of individuals who had ever worked during college
years.
Study abroad
An indicator of individuals who had ever participated in
language programs in other countries.
Qualification
An indicator of individuals who had earned at least one
qualification.
High school types
Dummy variables for seven types of high schools
Panel B: Variables used in housing wealth imputation
Location
Dummy variables for municipality of residence of households.
Edu
Final education of a parent who are more educated.
Year
Dummy variables for survey years of the Korea Housing Survey.
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B

Appendix for Chapter 2

B.A

Log-log specifications, balanced panel, state-specific time
trends

Table B.A.1: The effects of 1033 program on police spending: FE model, balanced panel,
state-specific time trends

ln(Item value per capita t−1 )

(1)
0.010
(0.012)

(2)
0.009
(0.012)

ln(Item value per capita t−2 )
ln(Item value per capita t−3 )

(3)
0.018∗
(0.010)
-0.001
(0.016)
0.037∗∗
(0.017)

ln(Item value per capita t+1 )
County characteristics
Crime controls
State-specific linear time trends
Year fixed effects
Observations
R2

X

X
X
X

X
10998
0.124

10998
0.125

X
X
X
7332
0.061

(4)

-0.003
(0.012)
X
X
X
9776
0.132

(5)
0.019
(0.014)

(6)
0.013
(0.013)

X
X

X
X
X
X
10998
0.130

X
10998
0.055

Note: This analysis uses the balanced panel described in Table 2.1. The dependent
variable is logged police protection expenditure of county governments per capita. We
control for county-level time-varying characteristics such as median household incomes,
male shares, shares of the population aged from 15 to 24, racial diversity, poverty rates,
and unemployment rates in all specifications. In column (2) to column (6), we add arrest
rates for the following crime types: murder, rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary,
and assault. All dollars are inflation-adjusted using CPI-U-RS and expressed in 2012 U.S.
dollars. Standard errors are clustered at the government level and given in parentheses. ∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table B.A.2: The effects of 1033 program on police spending: FE-IV model, balanced
panel, state-specific time trends
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

0.021∗∗∗
(0.005)

0.020∗∗∗
(0.005)

0.019∗∗∗
(0.006)

0.018∗∗∗
(0.007)

-0.069
(0.265)
18.843
19.047
0.766
Full
X

-0.070
(0.274)
17.769
17.934
0.773
Full
X
X
X
10998
-0.005

-0.320
(0.336)
9.363
9.421
0.289
0.1 ≤ p
X
X
X
8385
-0.137

-0.161
(0.380)
6.955
6.986
0.612
0.15 ≤ p
X
X
X
6878
-0.047

Panel A: First-stage
ln(V aluet−1 × Landj )
Panel B: Second-stage
ln(Item value per capita t−1 )
Kleibergen-Paap LM statistic
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistic
Endogeneity Test
Sample
County characteristics
Crime controls
State-specific linear time trends
Observations
R2

X
10998
-0.005

Note: Column (1) and column (2) use the full balanced sample. Column
(3) and column (4) restrict the sample based on the likelihood of receiving
any items through the 1033 program, p. Panel A summarizes the first-stage
estimates where the the dependent variable is the value of items that a countylevel agency has received through 1033 program. V aluet−1 is the total value
of 1033 items released by the Department of Defense in a year t − 1. Landj
is the land area of county j. Panel B summarizes the second-stage results
where the dependent variable is logged police protection expenditure of county
governments per capita. The Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistic shows the
relevance of the instruments. The Kleibergen-Paap LM statistic is used to
test whether a model is under-identified. We also test the null hypothesis that
the item value can actually be treated as exogenous using a GMM distance test
proposed by [8] and present the results. All dollars are inflation-adjusted using
CPI-U-RS and expressed in 2012 U.S. dollars. Standard errors are clustered
at the government level and given in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p < 0.01.
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Table B.A.3: The heterogeneous effects of 1033 program on police spending: by item types,
balanced panel, state-specific time trends
(1)
(2)
Vehicle
FE
FE-IV
∗
0.018
-0.019
(0.011) (0.781)

ln(V ehicle item value per capita t−1 )
ln(N on − vehicle item value per capita t−1 )
Kleibergen-Paap LM statistic
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistic
Endogeneity test
Observations
R2

(3)
(4)
Non-vehicle
FE
FE-IV

-0.072
(0.052)

10998
0.125

2.063
2.054
0.080
10998
-0.001

10998
0.125

0.111
(0.365)
149.778
173.569
0.385
10998
-0.003

Note: We use the balanced panel and estimate the baseline equation (2.1) using both
FE and FE-IV models. In column (1) and column (2), the dependent variable is
the logged value of vehicle items that a county has received through 1033 program.
In column (3) and column (4), the dependent variable is the logged value of nonvehicle items. The FE-IV models use the value-land interaction to instrument for the
item value. See the note in Table 2.4 for descriptions of test statistics. All dollars
are inflation-adjusted using CPI-U-RS and expressed in 2012 U.S. dollars. Standard
errors are clustered at the government level and given in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table B.A.4: The heterogeneous effects of 1033 program on police spending: by political
preferences, balanced panel, state-specific time trends

ln(Item value per capita t−1 )
Kleibergen-Paap LM statistic
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistic
Endogeneity test
County characteristics
Crime controls
State-specific linear time trends
Observations
R2

(1)
(2)
Republican
FE
FE-IV
0.018
-0.083
(0.017) (0.270)
13.609
13.778
0.710
X
X
X
X
X
X
5499
5499
0.123
-0.009

(3)
(4)
Democrat
FE
FE-IV
-0.007
-0.060
(0.014) (0.758)
3.590
3.570
0.944
X
X
X
X
X
X
5499
5499
0.153
-0.002

Note: We split the balanced panel into two groups based on political
preferences of counties and estimate the baseline equation (2.1) using
both FE and FE-IV models. The sample is restricted to counties whose
Democrat vote shares for 2008 U.S. presidential election are less than or
equal to the median of the balanced panel (“Republican”) in the first two
columns and to counties whose Democrat vote shares are greater than the
median (“Democrat”) in the last two columns. The dependent variable
is logged police protection expenditure of county governments per capita.
The FE-IV models use the value-land interaction to instrument for the
item value. See the note in Table 2.4 for descriptions of test statistics. All
dollars are inflation-adjusted using CPI-U-RS and expressed in 2012 U.S.
dollars. Standard errors are clustered at the government level and given in
parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table B.A.5: The heterogeneous effects of 1033 program on police spending: by population
size, balanced panel, state-specific time trends
(1)

ln(Item value per capita t−1 )
Kleibergen-Paap LM statistic
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistic
Endogeneity test
County characteristics
Crime controls
State-specific linear time trends
Observations
R2

(2)

Small
FE
FE-IV
0.004
0.363
(0.016) (0.334)
11.954
12.060
0.261
X
X
X
X
X
X
5445
5445
0.145
-0.108

(3)

(4)

Large
FE
FE-IV
0.013
-0.959
(0.012) (0.618)
5.878
5.867
0.049
X
X
X
X
X
X
5553
5553
0.127
-0.785

Note: We split the balanced panel into two groups based on the population
size of counties and estimate the baseline equation (2.1) using both FE and
FE-IV models. The sample is restricted to counties whose population sizes
are less than or equal to the mean of the balanced panel (“Small”) in the
first two columns and to counties whose population sizes are greater than
the median (“Large”) in the last two columns. The dependent variable
is logged police protection expenditure of county governments per capita.
The FE-IV models use the value-land interaction to instrument for the
item value. See the note in Table 2.4 for descriptions of test statistics. All
dollars are inflation-adjusted using CPI-U-RS and expressed in 2012 U.S.
dollars. Standard errors are clustered at the government level and given in
parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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B.B

Log-log specifications, unbalanced panel, year fixed effects

Table B.B.1: The effects of 1033 program on police spending: FE model, unbalanced panel,
year fixed effects

ln(Item value per capita t−1 )

(1)
0.001
(0.009)

(2)
0.001
(0.009)

ln(Item value per capita t−2 )
ln(Item value per capita t−3 )

(3)
0.010
(0.009)
0.012
(0.014)
0.044∗∗∗
(0.014)

ln(Item value per capita t+1 )
County characteristics
Crime controls
State-specific linear time trends
Year fixed effects
Observations
R2

(4)

X

X
X

X
X

0.003
(0.010)
X
X

X
17539
0.045

X
17539
0.046

X
9069
0.006

X
13101
0.048

(5)
0.001
(0.009)

(6)
0.001
(0.009)

X
X
X

X
X
X
X
17539
0.046

17539
0.046

Note: This analysis uses the unbalanced panel described in Table 2.1. The dependent variable
is logged police protection expenditure of county governments per capita. We control for
county-level time-varying characteristics such as median household incomes, male shares,
shares of the population aged from 15 to 24, racial diversity, poverty rates, and unemployment
rates in all specifications. In column (2) to column (6), we add arrest rates for the following
crime types: murder, rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, and assault. All dollars
are inflation-adjusted using CPI-U-RS and expressed in 2012 U.S. dollars. Standard errors
are clustered at the government level and given in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p < 0.01
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Table B.B.2: The effects of 1033 program on police spending: FE-IV model, unbalanced
panel, year fixed effects
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

-0.077∗∗∗
(0.020)

-0.076∗∗∗
(0.019)

-0.087∗∗∗
(0.021)

-0.095∗∗∗
(0.023)

0.475
(0.332)
14.801
15.700
0.147
Full
X

0.450
(0.339)
14.422
15.432
0.181
Full
X
X
X
17532
(0.339)

0.232
(0.295)
18.596
17.454
0.440
0.1 ≤ p
X
X
X
13041
(0.295)

0.365
(0.291)
20.563
17.021
0.227
0.15 ≤ p
X
X
X
9615
(0.291)

Panel A: First-stage
ln(V aluet−1 ×

1
Distj )

Panel B: Second-stage
ln(Item value per capita t−1 )
Kleibergen-Paap LM statistic
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistic
Endogeneity Test
Sample
County characteristics
Crime controls
Year fixed effects
Observations
R2

X
17532
(0.332)

Note: Column (1) and column (2) use the full unbalanced sample. Column (3)
and column (4) restrict the sample based on the likelihood of receiving any items
through the 1033 program, p. Panel A summarizes the first-stage estimates where
the the dependent variable is the value of items that a county-level agency has
received through 1033 program. V aluet−1 is the total value of 1033 items released
by the Department of Defense in a year t−1. Distj measures distance between the
centroid of county j and the closest Field Activity Center from the county. Panel B
summarizes the second-stage results where the dependent variable is logged police
protection expenditure of county governments per capita. The Kleibergen-Paap
Wald F statistic shows the relevance of the instruments. The Kleibergen-Paap
LM statistic is used to test whether a model is under-identified. We also test the
null hypothesis that the item value can actually be treated as exogenous using
a GMM distance test proposed by [8] and present the results. All dollars are
inflation-adjusted using CPI-U-RS and expressed in 2012 U.S. dollars. Standard
errors are clustered at the government level and given in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10,
∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table B.B.3: The heterogeneous effects of 1033 program on police spending: by item types,
unbalanced panel, year fixed effects
(1)
(2)
Vehicle
FE
FE-IV
0.005
0.626∗
(0.008) (0.380)

V ehicle item value per capita t−1
N on − vehicle item value per capita t−1
Kleibergen-Paap LM statistic
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistic
Endogeneity test
Observations
R2

(3)
(4)
Non-vehicle
FE
FE-IV

-0.039
(0.034)

17539
0.046

16.250
17.126
0.100
17532
-0.320

17539
0.046

0.641
(5.768)
0.230
0.243
0.904
17532
-0.048

Note: We use the unbalanced panel and estimate the baseline equation (2.1)
using both FE and FE-IV models. In column (1) and column (2), the dependent
variable is the logged value of vehicle items that a county has received through
1033 program. In column (3) and column (4), the dependent variable is the logged
value of non-vehicle items. The FE-IV models use the value-distance interaction
to instrument for the item value. See the note in Table 2.4 for descriptions of
test statistics. All dollars are inflation-adjusted using CPI-U-RS and expressed
in 2012 U.S. dollars. Standard errors are clustered at the government level and
given in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table B.B.4: The heterogeneous effects of 1033 program on police spending: by political
preferences, unbalanced panel, year fixed effects

ln(Item value per capita t−1 )
Kleibergen-Paap LM statistic
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistic
Endogeneity test
County characteristics
Crime controls
Year fixed effects
Observations
R2

(1)
(2)
Republican
FE
FE-IV
-0.000
0.308
(0.011) (0.638)
3.744
4.735
0.625
X
X
X
X
X
X
10741
10734
0.046
-0.093

(3)
(4)
Democrat
FE
FE-IV
0.001
0.520
(0.014) (0.357)
16.507
9.752
0.157
X
X
X
X
X
X
6798
6798
0.051
-0.189

Note: We split the unbalanced panel into two groups based on political
preferences of counties and estimate the baseline equation (2.1) using
both FE and FE-IV models. The sample is restricted to counties whose
Democrat vote shares for 2008 U.S. presidential election are less than or
equal to the median of the balanced panel (“Republican”) in the first two
columns and to counties whose Democrat vote shares are greater than the
median (“Democrat”) in the last two columns. The dependent variable
is logged police protection expenditure of county governments per capita.
The FE-IV models use the value-distance interaction to instrument for the
item value. See the note in Table 2.4 for descriptions of test statistics. All
dollars are inflation-adjusted using CPI-U-RS and expressed in 2012 U.S.
dollars. Standard errors are clustered at the government level and given in
parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table B.B.5: The heterogeneous effects of 1033 program on police spending: by population
size, unbalanced panel, year fixed effects
(1)

ln(Item value per capita t−1 )
Kleibergen-Paap LM statistic
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistic
Endogeneity test
County characteristics
Crime controls
Year fixed effects
Observations
R2

(2)

Small
FE
FE-IV
-0.002
-0.001
(0.011) (1.538)
0.422
0.472
0.999
X
X
X
X
X
X
10289
10282
0.060
0.000

(3)

(4)

Large
FE
FE-IV
-0.005
0.148
(0.012) (0.390)
13.994
11.399
0.695
X
X
X
X
X
X
7250
7250
0.032
-0.015

Note: We split the unbalanced panel into two groups based on the
population size of counties and estimate the baseline equation (2.1) using
both FE and FE-IV models. The sample is restricted to counties whose
population sizes are less than or equal to the mean of the balanced panel
(“Small”) in the first two columns and to counties whose population
sizes are greater than the median (“Large”) in the last two columns.
The dependent variable is logged police protection expenditure of county
governments per capita. The FE-IV models use the value-distance
interaction to instrument for the item value. See the note in Table 2.4
for descriptions of test statistics. All dollars are inflation-adjusted using
CPI-U-RS and expressed in 2012 U.S. dollars. Standard errors are clustered
at the government level and given in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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B.C

Log-log specifications, balanced panel, year fixed effects

Table B.C.1: The effects of 1033 program on police spending: FE model, balanced panel,
year fixed effects

ln(Item value per capita t−1 )

(1)
0.019
(0.014)

(2)
0.019
(0.014)

ln(Item value per capita t−2 )
ln(Item value per capita t−3 )

(3)
0.016
(0.011)
0.004
(0.018)
0.049∗∗∗
(0.018)

ln(Item value per capita t+1 )
County characteristics
Crime controls
Year fixed effects
Observations
R2

X
X
10998
0.053

X
X
X
10998
0.055

X
X
X
7332
0.007

(4)

-0.000
(0.013)
X
X
X
9776
0.059

Note: This analysis uses the balanced panel described in Table 2.1. The
dependent variable is logged police protection expenditure of county
governments per capita. We control for county-level time-varying
characteristics such as median household incomes, male shares, shares
of the population aged from 15 to 24, racial diversity, poverty rates, and
unemployment rates in all specifications. In column (2) to column (4),
we add arrest rates for the following crime types: murder, rape, robbery,
aggravated assault, burglary, and assault. All dollars are inflationadjusted using CPI-U-RS and expressed in 2012 U.S. dollars. Standard
errors are clustered at the government level and given in parentheses. ∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table B.C.2: The effects of 1033 program on police spending: FE-IV model, balanced
panel, year fixed effects
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

-0.082∗∗∗
(0.019)

-0.081∗∗∗
(0.019)

-0.084∗∗∗
(0.021)

-0.089∗∗∗
(0.022)

0.396
(0.331)
21.517
17.661
0.262
Full
X

0.370
(0.338)
21.375
17.546
0.307
Full
X
X
X
10998
-0.096

0.168
(0.329)
21.513
16.097
0.644
0.1 ≤ p
X
X
X
8477
-0.022

0.232
(0.358)
20.900
15.838
0.549
0.15 ≤ p
X
X
X
6449
-0.051

Panel A: First-stage
ln(V aluet−1 ×

1
Distj )

Panel B: Second-stage
ln(Item value per capita t−1 )
Kleibergen-Paap LM statistic
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistic
Endogeneity Test
Sample
County characteristics
Crime controls
Year fixed effects
Observations
R2

X
10998
-0.111

Note: Column (1) and column (2) use the full balanced sample. Column (3)
and column (4) restrict the sample based on the likelihood of receiving any items
through the 1033 program, p. Panel A summarizes the first-stage estimates where
the the dependent variable is the value of items that a county-level agency has
received through 1033 program. V aluet−1 is the total value of 1033 items released
by the Department of Defense in a year t−1. Distj measures distance between the
centroid of county j and the closest Field Activity Center from the county. Panel B
summarizes the second-stage results where the dependent variable is logged police
protection expenditure of county governments per capita. The Kleibergen-Paap
Wald F statistic shows the relevance of the instruments. The Kleibergen-Paap
LM statistic is used to test whether a model is under-identified. We also test the
null hypothesis that the item value can actually be treated as exogenous using
a GMM distance test proposed by [8] and present the results. All dollars are
inflation-adjusted using CPI-U-RS and expressed in 2012 U.S. dollars. Standard
errors are clustered at the government level and given in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10,
∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.

122

Table B.C.3: The heterogeneous effects of 1033 program on police spending: by item types,
balanced panel, year fixed effects
(1)
(2)
Vehicle
FE
FE-IV
∗∗
0.027
0.504
(0.013) (0.386)

V ehicle item value per capita t−1
N on − vehicle item value per capita t−1
Kleibergen-Paap LM statistic
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistic
Endogeneity test
Observations
R2

(3)
(4)
Non-vehicle
FE
FE-IV

-0.063
(0.057)

10998
0.055

24.505
17.700
0.229
10998
-0.162

10998
0.055

0.681
(2.176)
2.108
2.357
0.729
10998
-0.055

Note: We use the balanced panel and estimate the baseline equation (2.1) using
both FE and FE-IV models. In column (1) and column (2), the dependent variable
is the logged value of vehicle items that a county has received through 1033
program. In column (3) and column (4), the dependent variable is the logged
value of non-vehicle items. The FE-IV models use the value-distance interaction
to instrument for the item value. See the note in Table 2.4 for descriptions of
test statistics. All dollars are inflation-adjusted using CPI-U-RS and expressed
in 2012 U.S. dollars. Standard errors are clustered at the government level and
given in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table B.C.4: The heterogeneous effects of 1033 program on police spending: by political
preferences, balanced panel, year fixed effects

ln(Item value per capita t−1 )
Kleibergen-Paap LM statistic
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistic
Endogeneity test
County characteristics
Crime controls
Year fixed effects
Observations
R2

(1)
(2)
Republican
FE
FE-IV
0.020
0.183
(0.020) (0.821)
4.154
5.058
0.843
X
X
X
X
X
X
5499
5499
0.065
-0.023

(3)
(4)
Democrat
FE
FE-IV
0.012
0.489
(0.017) (0.343)
21.030
9.089
0.175
X
X
X
X
X
X
5499
5499
0.047
-0.142

Note: We split the balanced panel into two groups based on political
preferences of counties and estimate the baseline equation (2.1) using
both FE and FE-IV models. The sample is restricted to counties whose
Democrat vote shares for 2008 U.S. presidential election are less than or
equal to the median of the balanced panel (“Republican”) in the first two
columns and to counties whose Democrat vote shares are greater than the
median (“Democrat”) in the last two columns. The dependent variable
is logged police protection expenditure of county governments per capita.
The FE-IV models use the value-distance interaction to instrument for the
item value. See the note in Table 2.4 for descriptions of test statistics. All
dollars are inflation-adjusted using CPI-U-RS and expressed in 2012 U.S.
dollars. Standard errors are clustered at the government level and given in
parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table B.C.5: The heterogeneous effects of 1033 program on police spending: by population
size, balanced panel, year fixed effects
(1)

ln(Item value per capita t−1 )
Kleibergen-Paap LM statistic
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistic
Endogeneity test
County characteristics
Crime controls
Year fixed effects
Observations
R2

(2)

Small
FE
FE-IV
0.022
0.004
(0.020) (1.497)
0.635
0.661
0.991
X
X
X
X
X
X
5445
5445
0.072
0.000

(3)

(4)

Large
FE
FE-IV
0.000
0.016
(0.014) (0.383)
22.760
13.404
0.968
X
X
X
X
X
X
5553
5553
0.041
-0.000

Note: We split the balanced panel into two groups based on the population
size of counties and estimate the baseline equation (2.1) using both FE and
FE-IV models. The sample is restricted to counties whose population sizes
are less than or equal to the mean of the balanced panel (“Small”) in the
first two columns and to counties whose population sizes are greater than
the median (“Large”) in the last two columns. The dependent variable
is logged police protection expenditure of county governments per capita.
The FE-IV models use the value-distance interaction to instrument for the
item value. See the note in Table 2.4 for descriptions of test statistics. All
dollars are inflation-adjusted using CPI-U-RS and expressed in 2012 U.S.
dollars. Standard errors are clustered at the government level and given in
parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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B.D

Level-level specifications estimates
Table B.D.1: FE model estimates with state-specific time trends

Item value per capita t−1

(1)
0.047
(0.200)

Item value per capita t−2
Item value per capita t−3
County characteristics
Crime controls
State-specific linear time trends
Year fixed effects
Observations
R2

X
X
17539
0.033

Unbalanced Sample
Balanced Sample
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
0.036
-0.062
0.090
0.062
0.094
0.091
0.008
(0.200) (0.141) (0.210) (0.201) (0.217) (0.212) (0.167)
0.215
-0.010
(0.298)
(0.231)
1.339∗∗∗
1.590∗∗∗
(0.429)
(0.579)
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
17539
9069
17539
17539
10998
10998
7332
0.034
0.054
0.020
0.036
0.074
0.077
0.067

Note: Column (1) to column (5) in this table correspond to column (1) to column (5) in Table 2.3, except that
the police expenditure and the item value are given in level terms. From column (6) to column (8), we re-estimate
specifications given in column (1) to column (3) using balanced panel. All dollars are inflation-adjusted using CPI-U-RS
and expressed in 2012 U.S. dollars. Standard errors are clustered at the government level and given in parentheses. ∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table B.D.2: FE-IV model estimates with state-specific time trends

Item value per capita t−1
County characteristics
Crime controls
State-specific linear time trends
Kleibergen-Paap LM statistic
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistic
Endogeneity Test
Sample
Observations
R2

(1)
-4.746
(7.369)
X
X
4.748
4.746
0.498
Full
17532
-0.044

Unbalanced Sample
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
-4.640 -12.010 -14.724
-6.627
(7.464) (9.606) (9.446) (10.138)
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
4.664
4.364
6.956
2.130
4.659
4.358
6.970
2.122
0.515
0.127
0.061
0.463
Full
0.1 ≤ p 0.15 ≤ p
Full
17532
13627
10618
10998
-0.042 -0.313
-0.332
-0.173

Balanced Sample
(6)
(7)
(8)
-5.858
-8.595
-7.771
(10.245) (10.353) (6.823)
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
1.928
2.233
8.186
1.920
2.223
8.235
0.528
0.323
0.209
Full
0.1 ≤ p 0.15 ≤ p
10998
8390
6570
-0.135
-0.332
-0.159

Note: Column (1) to column (4) in this table correspond to column (1) to column (4) in Table 2.4, except that the police
expenditure and the item value are given in level terms. From column (5) to column (6), we re-estimate specifications given in
column (1) to column (4) using the balanced panel. Our instrument in this analysis is the interaction between V aluet−1 and
ln(landj ). See the note in Table 2.4 for descriptions of test statistics. All dollars are inflation-adjusted using CPI-U-RS and
expressed in 2012 U.S. dollars. Standard errors are clustered at the government level and given in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table B.D.3: FE model estimates with year fixed effects

Item value per capita t−1
Item value per capita t−2
Item value per capita t−3
County characteristics
Crime controls
Year fixed effects
Observations
R2

Unbalanced Sample
(1)
(2)
(3)
0.099
0.090
-0.037
(0.208) (0.210) (0.145)
0.362
(0.302)
1.536∗∗∗
(0.469)
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
17539
17539
9069
0.019
0.020
0.009

Balanced Sample
(4)
(5)
(6)
0.148
0.146
0.010
(0.233) (0.230) (0.168)
0.122
(0.241)
1.772∗∗∗
(0.640)
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
10998
10998
7332
0.043
0.045
0.012

Note: Column (1) to column (3) in this table correspond to the column (1) to column
(3) in Table B.B.1, except that the police expenditure and the item value are given
in level terms. From column (4) to column (6), we re-estimate specifications given in
column (1) to column (3) using the balanced panel. All dollars are inflation-adjusted
using CPI-U-RS and expressed in 2012 U.S. dollars. Standard errors are clustered at
the government level and given in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table B.D.4: FE-IV model estimates with year fixed effects

Item value per capita t−1
County characteristics
Crime controls
Year fixed effects
Kleibergen-Paap LM statistic
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistic
Endogeneity Test
Sample
Observations
R2

Unbalanced Sample
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
0.781
0.083
3.389
1.149
1.641
(8.242) (8.975) (7.989) (6.743) (7.122)
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
7.500
6.877
6.959
13.746
11.646
7.985
7.412
7.853
11.819
10.403
0.934
0.999
0.682
0.879
0.834
Full
Full
0.1 ≤ p 0.15 ≤ p
Full
17532
17532
13627
10618
10998
-0.001
0.000
-0.024
-0.002
-0.008

Balanced Sample
(6)
(7)
(8)
1.438
3.509
4.744
(7.220) (5.949) (6.333)
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
11.641 11.331
13.079
10.256
9.502
9.431
0.858
0.581
0.494
Full
0.1 ≤ p 0.15 ≤ p
10998
8390
6570
-0.006 -0.046
-0.045

Note: Column (1) to column (4) in this table correspond to column (1) to column (4) in Table B.B.2, except that the police
expenditure and the item value are given in level terms. From column (5) to column (6), we re-estimate specifications given
in column (1) to column (4) using the balanced panel. Our instrument in this analysis is the interaction between V aluet−1
1
and Dist
. See the note in Table 2.4 for descriptions of test statistics. All dollars are inflation-adjusted using CPI-U-RS
j
and expressed in 2012 U.S. dollars. Standard errors are clustered at the government level and given in parentheses. ∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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(a) Food at home

(b) Food away

(c) Housing

(d) Vehicle

(e) Apparel

(f ) Entertainment

(g) Utility

(h) Health

Figure C.A.1:
Consumption externalities on MTR15
households: evidence from an alternative externality measure
Note: Each diamond in the figure represent the estimate for the treatment
effect and dotted lines connect confidence intervals associated with the
estimates. The intensity of consumption externalities is measured by the
MTR28 share.
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Table C.A.1: The effect of tax reforms on consumption of MTR28 households: by
consumption category

P ost × M T R28
Observations
R2

P ost × M T R28
Observations
R2

(1)
Food at home
3.855
(10.49)
243551
0.283
(5)
Apparel
-61.78∗∗∗
(19.64)
203422
0.054

(2)
Food away
-71.18∗∗
(28.04)
202478
0.119
(6)
Entertainment
-2.332
(27.67)
220595
0.053

(3)
Housing
579.4∗∗∗
(89.39)
243613
0.363
(7)
Utility
26.43∗∗∗
(5.248)
242627
0.313

(4)
Vehicle
88.53∗∗∗
(20.56)
211835
0.255
(8)
Health
-25.37
(21.30)
202228
0.097

Note: Standard errors are clustered at the state level and given in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1,
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Source: Consumer Expenditure survey data, 1994-2007, and the author’s calculation.
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∗∗

Table C.A.2: The effect of tax reforms on consumption of MTR15 households: by
consumption category

P ost × M T R28
Observations
R2

P ost × M T R28
Observations
R2

(1)
Food at home
-2.882
(10.75)
189912
0.281
(5)
Apparel
3.306∗
(1.892)
157209
0.133

(2)
Food away
3.604
(4.102)
156134
0.126
(6)
Entertainment
0.576
(3.445)
171307
0.150

(3)
Housing
81.22∗∗∗
(12.47)
184502
0.286
(7)
Utility
-0.278
(2.307)
189226
0.328

(4)
Vehicle
12.94∗∗∗
(3.258)
165512
0.234
(8)
Health
5.303
(5.478)
156217
0.0977

Note: Standard errors are clustered at the state level and given in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1,
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Source: Consumer Expenditure survey data, 1994-2007, and the author’s calculation.
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∗∗

C.B

Identifying MTR28 and MTR15

The CPS contains information on individual taxable income (TAXINC) and household
tax filing status (FILESTAT). To create a household taxable income variable, I sum taxable
income of all individuals who have the same household identifier (SERIAL). Next, I convert
the nominal household taxable income into 2013 U.S. dollars using CPI-U-RS. Finally, I
determine whether a household is MTR28 or MTR15 based on taxable income and tax filing
status of the household. If a household had taxable income greater than the maximum upper
bound for 15% bracket as of 2000, then the household is MTR28. If a household had taxable
income equal to or less than the minimum lower bound for 15% bracket as of 2000, then the
household is MTR15. Table C.B.1 provides lower bounds and upper bounds for each tax
bracket by tax filing status from 1994 to 2007.
Table C.B.1: Upper/lower bounds of federal tax liabilities at the 15% bracket, 1994 to
2007
Year

Married filing jointly Single Head of household
1994
8553.88
5121.08
6865.62
1995
8572.56
5132.55
6869.04
1996
8585.80
5138.63
6883.63
1997
8634.75
5166.18
6926.66
1998
8753.57
5239.74
7017.32
1999
8716.44
5213.66
6995.42
2000
8590.54
5142.57
6886.15
2001
8613.21
5154.59
6907.72
2002
8007.46
4866.36
6397.84
2003
9562.92
4781.46
6368.15
2004
9525.59
4762.80
6340.47
2005
9423.98
4711.99
6275.93
2006
9414.83
4707.42
6269.12
2007
9515.79
4757.89
6332.11
Maximum upper bound
9562.92
5239.74
7017.32
Minimum lower bound
8007.46
4707.42
6269.12
Note: All figures are adjusted for inflation using CPI-U-RS and presented in 2013 U.S. dollars.
Source: www.taxfoundation.org and the authors calculation.

Unlike the CPS, the CE does not contain information on household tax filing status.
Thus, I have to impute tax filing status of households using information on family type (FAM
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TYPE) and the composition of earners (EARNCOMP). Table C.B.2 provides description of
the variables.
Table C.B.2:
(EARNCOMP)
Code
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Code
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

Codes for family type (FAM TYPE) and composition of earners

Family type
Husband and wife (H/W) only
H/W, own children only, oldest child under 6 years old
H/W, own children only, oldest child 6 to 17 years old
H/W, own children only, oldest child over 17 years old
All other H/W CUs
One parent, male, own children only, at least one child age under 18 years old
One parent, female, own children only, at least one child age under 18 years old
Single persons
Other CUs
Composition of earners
Reference person only
Reference person and spouse
Reference person, spouse and others
Reference person and others
Spouse only
Spouse and others
Others only
No earners

Source: Interview Data Dictionary of the Consumer Expenditure Survey.

I assume that the tax filing status of households was married filing jointly if the family
type of a household is coded 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5. Exceptions are the cases where 1) family type
code is 3, 4, or 5, and 2) a household member other than the reference person and spouse
works. Together with households whose family type is either 6 or 7, I code tax filing status
for those households as head of household. Lastly, I code tax filing status for single-person
households as single.
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